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  INTRODUCTION   
Sixteen years ago, Ninth Circuit Judge and former Berke-
ley professor William Fletcher wrote “we have in the United 
States an essentially chaotic system in which a multitude of 
different choice of law systems are employed by different 
states.”1 Empirically, his observation remains true. A recent 
survey identifies no fewer than seven distinct choice-of-law 
methodologies presently used by the states.2 Further complicat-
ing matters, fifteen states use more than one methodology, de-
 
 1. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Fed. Express Corp., 189 F.3d 914, 927 (9th Cir. 
1999) (Fletcher, J., concurring). For a similar observation made seventy-five 
years earlier, see infra note 204; see also Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of 
Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 422, 432–
33 (1919) (speaking of choice-of-law as “legal anarchy” that yields “chaos and 
confusion, not to say injustice”).  
 2. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 
2012: Twenty-Sixth Annual Survey, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 217, 279 (2013). 
ROSEN_5fmt 2/3/2015 10:09 AM 
1020 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1017 
 
ploying one for tort and another for contract questions.3 Recent 
empirical studies confirm that different choice-of-law method-
ologies produce different outcomes.4  
But while the fact of a “multitude of different choice of law 
systems” is undeniable, its normativity requires careful consid-
eration. After all, states also differ in their tort, contract, and 
family law, yet we do not typically bemoan as ‘chaotic’ those in-
terstate differences. Quite to the contrary: we praise our feder-
alism for allowing states to adopt divergent laws that best re-
flect their citizens’ distinctive values.5 Then why are different 
tort and family laws across states acceptable, but not choice-of-
law?  
Answering this question is not so easy—indeed, Supreme 
Court precedent suggests that cross-state variations in choice-
of-law are just fine. The 1941 case of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec-
tric Manufacturing Co.6 identified choice-of-law as state law, 
and ruled that federal courts sitting in diversity must use the 
conflicts rules applied by the state in which the federal court is 
located.7 Klaxon recognized this could create a “lack of uni-
formity . . . between federal courts in different states” since 
states utilize different choice-of-law rules.8 But any such 
nonuniformity, explained the Court, “is attributable to our fed-
eral system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permit-
ted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies di-
verging from those of its neighbors.”9 In other words, choice-of-
law is no different from family law in respect of differences 
across states.  
This Article argues that today’s disorder in choice-of-law is 
traceable to a largely overlooked conceptual mistake in Klax-
 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Stuart E. Thiel, Choice of Law and the Home-Court Advantage: 
Evidence, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 291, 310–13 (2000); see also Christopher A. 
Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 719, 750, 771 (2009) (concluding that “choice-of-law doctrine does affect 
decisions” of federal courts in a dataset of international tort cases, and 
summarizing three different earlier studies by different investigators as 
having “found significant differences between the[] outcomes” between the 
First Restatement and modern methods in domestic choice-of-law cases).  
 5. See, e.g., Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political 
Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 886–91 (2002). 
 6. 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
 7. Id. at 496–97. 
 8. Id. at 496. 
 9. Id.  
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on10—the assumption that choice-of-law is state law—and that 
Klaxon must be overruled. Choice-of-law was not viewed as 
state law for most of our country’s history, but long was concep-
tualized as a subset of the “general commercial law” of private 
international law, which was neither state nor federal.11 Cross-
state uniformity was one of the general law’s signal character-
istics, and expectations of uniformity extended to choice-of-law. 
After Erie declared “[t]here is no federal general common 
law,”12 what had been understood to be general law had to be 
parceled out into one of the categories of law Erie recognized as 
legitimate.13 There were two main options—state and federal—
and Klaxon put choice-of-law into the box of state law. 
This Article provides four arguments as to why choice-of-
law is best understood to be federal law, not state law. The first 
argument is an amalgam of history and functional analysis: in 
a post-Erie world in which all law must be attributed to a sov-
ereign, choice-of-law must be federal because only federal law 
can satisfy what I call choice-of-law’s ”Single System Require-
ment.“ To explain, while choice-of-law presupposes variations 
across states in the substantive law to which it applies, choice-
of-law cannot effectively serve its managerial function of pre-
dictably determining which state’s law applies if choice-of-law 
itself varies across states. This gives rise to the Single System 
Requirement: all polities whose differences in substantive law 
give rise to the need for choice-of-law must use the same choice-
of-law rules. While general law satisfied the Single System Re-
quirement before Erie, only federal law can fulfill the Single 
System Requirement after Erie.  
The Article also advances three conceptual arguments for 
the conclusion that choice-of-law is inherently federal. First, at 
its core, choice-of-law sorts out conflicts between states’ over-
lapping regulatory powers, a federal role by its very nature. Se-
cond, choice-of-law plays a substantial role in determining the 
character of our federal union; choice-of-law plays a crucial role 
in determining to what extent states can, as a practical matter, 
have divergent substantive laws in fields that federal constitu-
 
 10. For other scholars who have considered the possibility that choice-of-
law is federal, see infra notes 14–19. 
 11. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 12. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 13. This is not to suggest that general law altogether disappeared after 
Erie. See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 503, 505 (2006) (describing modern general law). 
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tional and statutory law does not demand national uniformity. 
Third, choice-of-law plays a crucial role in maintaining the 
health of our interstate system. State law is unsuited to dis-
charging these three tasks, whereas federal law is the most 
functionally appropriate and democratically legitimate resource 
for accomplishing them.  
In addition to these four arguments, the Article also makes 
the positive doctrinal case for its claim that choice-of-law is 
federal law. The Full Faith and Credit Clause’s “effects clause” 
grants Congress the power to enact choice-of-law rules for state 
courts, and the Diversity Clause (in conjunction with the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause) authorizes Congress to create 
choice-of-law rules for federal courts.  
Because choice-of-law must be federal law, Klaxon’s dra-
matic break with the past—its holding that choice-of-law is 
state law that can vary across states—must be overruled. To be 
more precise, the Article argues that a post-Klaxon amendment 
to the Full Faith and Credit Act is best understood as having 
partially overturned Klaxon, and as currently providing a stat-
utory basis for the development by state courts (and possibly 
federal courts too) of a single body of federal choice-of-law that 
is applicable in all courts. But Klaxon unquestionably impairs 
the effectiveness of a second federal statute, the Rules of Deci-
sion Act, which provides clearer authorization than the Full 
Faith and Credit Act for federal courts to create a body of 
choice-of-law—yet another reason Klaxon should be overruled.  
As this Article explains, the Full Faith and Credit Act and 
the Rules of Decision Act are best understood as imposing obli-
gations consistent with the Single System Requirement: the 
two statutes require that the same federal choice-of-law rules 
be operative in state and federal courts. The statutes do not de-
tail what those choice-of-law rules would be, but—like the anti-
trust laws—delegate courts the authority to flesh out choice-of-
law rules on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the understanding 
that choice-of-law is federal provides considerable guidance in 
formulating choice-of-law rules.  
An important implication of this Article’s argument is that 
federal courts are not alone in being responsible for developing 
the federal common law of choice-of-law. Rather, they have two 
partners: state courts and Congress. State courts have the 
power—indeed, a constitutional duty under the Supremacy 
Clause—to apply, and where necessary to develop, federal 
choice-of-law. This is so because when state courts hear inter-
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state disputes requiring them to determine which state’s law 
applies, they necessarily must rely upon—and in the process 
develop on a case-by-case basis—the federal Full Faith and 
Credit Act. And because Congress has ultimate authority over 
choice-of-law, it can always legislatively revise the choice-of-law 
rules that the courts have generated—even those of the Su-
preme Court. 
Significantly, both federal and state courts would be devel-
oping and applying the same body of law; there is one federal 
choice-of-law, and it is operative in both federal and state 
courts across the entire country. The large number of courts in-
volved in developing choice-of-law is a boon insofar as it holds 
out the prospect of a rapid airing of doctrinal alternatives. En-
tropic dangers would be checked by the federal appellate sys-
tem that would review the choice-of-law holdings of both state 
and federal courts, and by Congress, which has the power to 
codify or modify courts’ choice-of-law doctrines.  
While this Article argues that choice-of-law doctrine went 
seriously amiss seventy-three years ago in Klaxon, the Article 
is neither a wholesale rejection of modern choice-of-law doc-
trine nor a call for returning to the “general law.” The Article 
identifies genuine insights of both the traditional and modern 
choice-of-law approaches. But the Article also locates tradition-
al and modern understandings that must be discarded, as it 
provides a new conceptual scaffolding for the development of a 
uniform body of federal choice-of-law.  
This Article follows in the path of a small but important 
body of scholarship that has contemplated the federalization of 
choice-of-law. Donald Trautman and Harold Horowitz argued 
in short articles in the 1960s and 1970s that choice-of-law 
should be treated as federal common law,14 as did Doug Laycock 
in an important article twenty years ago.15 In the 1990s, Mi-
chael Gottesman called upon Congress to enact a federal 
 
 14. See Harold W. Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of 
Law, 14 UCLA L. REV. 1191 (1967); Donald T. Trautman, The Relation 
Between American Choice of Law and Federal Common Law, 41 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1977); see also Donald T. Trautman, Toward 
Federalizing Choice of Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 1718 (1992) [hereinafter 
Trautman, Toward Federalizing]. 
 15. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: 
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 
332–33 (1992). In addition to the critiques I provide here, see infra notes 263–
65, other important parts of Professor Laycock’s constitutional argument have 
been subject to substantial criticism. See Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and 
Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1217–21 (2009). 
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choice-of-law statute,16 though decades earlier William Baxter 
had pointed to one federal statute, and Elliott Cheatham to an-
other, that, each argued, federalized choice-of-law to some ex-
tent.17 Like Henry Hart sixty years ago,18 recent articles by Al-
lan Erbsen and Kermit Roosevelt understand choice-of-law 
rules in federal courts sitting in diversity to be federal law, but 
treat choice-of-law rules in state courts as state law.19  
This Article builds upon much, though also rejects some, of 
these scholars’ arguments and conclusions. This Article’s 
aforementioned four arguments fortify the sometimes 
conclusory assertions found in the abovementioned scholarship 
that choice-of-law is federal.20 But the Article refutes the sug-
 
 16. See Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for 
Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (1991). 
 17. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 40–41 (1963) (arguing that the Rules of Decision Act 
authorizes federal courts sitting in diversity to create federal choice-of-law 
rules); Elliott E. Cheatham, A Federal Nation and Conflict of Laws, 22 ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN L. REV. 109, 114 (1950) [hereinafter Cheatham, A Federal Nation] 
(suggesting that the 1948 amendments to the Full Faith and Credit Act might 
determine the choice-of-law rules applicable in state courts); Elliott E. 
Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581, 585–87 
(1951) [hereinafter Cheatham, Federal Control]. Laycock made a fleeting 
reference as well. See Laycock, supra note 15, at 332. 
 18. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 513–14 (1954) (concluding that although state law 
appropriately governs choice-of-law in litigation among “citizens of the same 
state [in] the courts of their own state . . . [i]t does not follow that these 
questions should be similarly disposed of when they arise between citizens of 
different states,” and asking “[w]hy is it an offense to the ideals of federalism 
for federal courts to administer, between citizens of different states, a juster 
justice than state courts . . . ?”). 
 19. See Allan Erbsen, Erie’s Four Functions: Reframing Choice of Law in 
Federal Courts, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 641–43 (2013) (“[I]t does not 
necessarily follow that federal courts should create a uniquely federal choice of 
law rule rather than adopting choice of law rules from state governments.”); 
Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon 
to CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 22 n.109 (2012) (suggesting 
the federal choice-of-law rule might “incorporat[e] the preexisting state rule”). 
In an interesting article, William Baude argues that federal choice-of-law 
doctrine should be applicable when federal substantive statutes reference 
state law. See William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal 
Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (2012). Baude’s argument does not address the 
choice-of-law that is operative in state courts, or in federal courts sitting in 
diversity. 
 20. To restate them: (1) the Single System Requirement (that all polities 
whose differences in substantive law occasion the need for choice-of-law utilize 
the same choice-of-law rules), shows that choice-of-law pre-Klaxon was 
conceptualized in a way that satisfied the Single System Requirement, and 
explains why only federal law can satisfy it in a post-Erie world; and (2) 
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gestion that there is a federal choice-of-law for federal courts 
but a state law of choice-of-law for state courts;21 the assump-
tion that choice-of-law was state law before Erie;22 the claim 
that the Constitution requires “territorial choice-of-law rules” 
because “[t]he allocation of authority among the states is terri-
torial;”23 and many other important points.24 
The Article is in four parts. Part I provides a comprehen-
sive intellectual history of choice-of-law from this nation’s birth 
until just before Erie and Klaxon. While there were some shifts 
in how choice-of-law was conceptualized during this pre-
modern era, choice-of-law during this time was understood in 
ways that presumed it was uniform across all states, thereby 
satisfying the Single System Requirement.25  
Part II shows what has transpired in choice-of-law follow-
ing Klaxon’s determination that choice-of-law is state law: a 
landslide of multiple and inconsistent choice-of-law regimes. 
Part II also identifies four lessons that must inform a recon-
structed federal body of choice-of-law. These lessons reflect im-
portant insights from the modern approaches that explain why 
a simple return to the old system is not advisable, and why con-
tinuing to treat choice-of-law as state law is untenable.  
Building on these insights, Part III explains why choice-of-
law is appropriately federal rather than state law. In the pro-
cess, Part III shows that this Article’s approach provides an at-
tractive solution to renvoi, one of the thorniest conceptual prob-
lems in choice-of-law. Part III then suggests that Klaxon has 
been partially overruled by the 1948 Amendments to the Full 
Faith and Credit Act, and argues that Klaxon should be wholly 
 
choice-of-law in its essence polices states’ extraterritorial powers, (3) is 
substantially responsible for determining the character of our federal union, 
and (4) serves to maintain the health of our interstate system—three functions 
that are best and appropriately discharged only by federal law.  
 21. See supra notes 18–19. 
 22. See infra note 76 (critiquing Trautman’s claim). 
 23. Laycock, supra note 15, at 316, 337; see infra notes 263–66(critiquing 
this view). 
 24. Contrary to the positions of Horowitz, Trautman, and Laycock, this 
Article’s primary claim is that two federal statutes authorize state and federal 
courts to develop a uniform body of federal choice-of-law, and that the 
resulting doctrines accordingly are not federal common law. See infra Part III. 
Contrary to Professor Baxter, this Article argues that a federal statute 
compels state courts to develop the federal common law of choice-of-law. See 
Baxter, supra note 17, at 42 (“I cannot justify a federal compulsion [for state 
courts to adopt any particular choice-of-law rules].”); infra Part III.D.1.  
 25. For one fleeting exception, see infra note 182. 
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overruled so as not to interfere with the Rules of Decision Act. 
The upshot is that two federal statutes authorize federal and 
state courts to jointly create a single body of federal choice-of-
law. Part III also explains why choice-of-law would constitute 
federal common law even without these statutes. Part IV antic-
ipates possible objections, and explains why there is reason for 
cautious optimism concerning domestic choice-of-law’s future.  
I.  PRE-MODERN AMERICAN UNDERSTANDINGS OF 
CHOICE-OF-LAW   
A. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS GENERAL LAW 
1. The Concept of General Law  
Erie’s rejection of “federal general common law”26 is an out-
growth of the Court’s adoption of legal positivism.27 Erie over-
turned Swift v. Tyson,28 the famed Justice Story opinion holding 
that federal courts sitting in diversity were not bound by state 
high court determinations of “general principles of commercial 
law,” but could determine the general law on their own.29 Erie 
said Swift’s rule rested on the “fallacy” that “there is a tran-
scendental body of law outside of any particular State but ob-
ligatory within it unless and until changed by statute”30—which 
was a “fallacy” because “law in the sense in which courts speak 
of it today does not exist without some definite authority be-
hind it.”31 The “sense” to which Erie referred was “Austin’s legal 
positivist conception of the nature of law”32 that law must be 
traceable to some ruler or government.33 If neither “the Federal 
 
 26. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 27. See Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal 
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 674 n.7 (1998) (collecting scholars who tie Erie 
to legal positivism). While Professors Goldsmith and Walt take a dissenting 
view, arguing that “Erie’s commitment to legal positivism is conceptually and 
normatively independent of its constitutional holding,” id. at 675, they “do not 
deny that there might be a historical link between beliefs about legal 
positivism and Erie’s holding,” particularly given “the language in the Erie 
opinion.” Id. at 694. I discuss Erie’s language above in the text. 
 28. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
 29. Id. at 18. 
 30. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Justice Holmes). 
 31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice Holmes). 
 32. Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 27, at 673–74. 
 33. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 30 
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1954) (“[C]ustomary laws, considered as positive law, 
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Constitution [n]or . . . acts of Congress”34 provide the rule of de-
cision in a case—but the common law does instead—such com-
mon law must be “the law of that State.”35 Because “the voice 
adopted by the State as its own . . . should utter the last word” 
as to its content, federal courts sitting in diversity must apply 
the common law as understood by the highest courts of the 
state in which they sit.36  
It is difficult today for people to comprehend “general law,” 
much less to understand how it could have held such sway in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.37 We are fortu-
nate Professor Caleb Nelson has done so excellent a job expli-
cating the concept of general law.38 As Nelson explains, law in 
the pre-Erie era was divided into “local” and “general.”39 Local 
law included written (statutory and constitutional law), as well 
as some “unwritten” law.40 Other aspects of unwritten law, 
however, were “of a more general nature.”41 “General law” re-
ferred to that part of the unwritten law whose “rules [were] not 
under the control of any single jurisdiction, but instead re-
flect[ed] principles or practices common to many different ju-
risdictions.”42 According to Blackstone’s influential account, the 
rules of unwritten law “receive[d] their binding power, and the 
force of laws, by long and immemorial usage, and by their uni-
versal reception throughout the kingdom.”43 Adapted to Ameri-
ca, Blackstone’s received teaching was that general law was 
“shaped from the bottom up by the very people who [were] sub-
 
are not commands. And, consequently, customary laws, considered as positive 
law, are not laws or rules properly so called.”); Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State 
Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 891 
(2005) (“[T]he rise of positivistic legal thought led courts to conclude that all 
law, including general law, must be attributable to a sovereign source.”).  
 34. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.  
 35. Id. at 79. 
 36. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Justice Holmes).  
 37. See Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 929 (2013) (“To modern readers, the doctrine 
articulated by Swift v. Tyson might seem baffling.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 925. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. (quoting Swift v. Tyson, (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842)). 
 42. Nelson, supra note 13, at 505. 
 43. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *64, quoted in Nelson, supra 
note 37, at 931 n.34. Early Americans adopted, but also adapted in important 
respects, this Blackstonian understanding. See id.  
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ject to it (or their predecessors)” and grew “out of practices that 
the people themselves ha[d] adopted over time.”44  
a. Private International Law 
But why was there such thing as general law? The needs of 
international commerce, in conjunction with pre-twentieth cen-
tury conceptions of the territorial limits of sovereign powers, 
are crucial parts of the answer. There long has been interna-
tional commerce in which merchants from different polities en-
gaged in multi-step transactions that spanned more than one 
polity. For instance, G (from Germany) may have come to 
France, where he agreed to buy goods from F (from France) 
that were to be shipped from Britain to Germany, payable by a 
bill of exchange upon the shipment’s completion. Such com-
merce required clarity as to the legal consequence of each step 
in the business transaction, which in turn required predictabil-
ity as to what law governed each step.  
The subset of the law of nations known as private interna-
tional law—comprising what today is called admiralty, com-
mercial law, and conflict of laws—facilitated international 
commerce by providing this needed predictability.45 Some parts 
of a multi-step transnational transaction may have been regu-
lated by the “local” law of a single polity. Choice-of-law princi-
ples determined which polity’s law applied, and aimed to en-
sure that the courts of all countries would come to the same 
conclusion and thus apply that polity’s law.46 Other parts of a 
 
 44. Nelson, supra note 37, at 931; see also RANDALL BRIDWELL & RALPH 
U. WHITTEN, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE 
DOCTRINES OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND FEDERALISM 66 (1977) (showing 
that customary law was not laid down by the sovereign state, but emanated 
from the people and was merely recognized by courts). 
 45. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 44, at 51–52. 
 46. Id. at 52; see also 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT 
OF LAWS 4 (1935) (“International commerce created the necessity for some 
principle of law which should protect the interests and give effect to the 
undertakings of the foreigner. . . . International trade could not be carried on 
as has now become necessary unless the trader could be assured that he would 
not be placed absolutely at the mercy of the vagaries or unknown 
requirements of the local law, but would find a well-established body of law to 
protect his rights. This body of law is the Conflict of Laws . . . .”); ERNEST G. 
LORENZEN, Huber’s De Conflictu Legum, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 136, 160–61 (1947) (noting that most foreign conflicts 
scholars aimed to adopt a “uniformity” of conflict of laws derived “from a 
source that [was] superior to the internal law of each state, and this source 
they conceive[d] to be International Law” so that “[i]nstead of being a part of 
the internal law of each state, the rules of the Conflict of Laws constitute, in 
ROSEN_5fmt 2/3/2015 10:09 AM 
2015] CHOICE-OF-LAW 1029 
 
transaction may not have been regulated by any particular pol-
ity, but instead might have been governed by the uniform bod-
ies of transnational admiralty47 (primarily regarding transport 
of goods) and commercial law.48  
 Together, choice-of-law, admiralty, and commercial law 
ensured that each step in a multi-state commercial transaction 
would be governed by a single, knowable law. Predictability re-
quired that choice-of-law, admiralty, and commercial law be 
uniform across all jurisdictions, which could occur only if these 
three fields of law were not part of any single state’s legal sys-
tem but instead were part of international law.  
But if these three bodies of law were not part of a single 
state’s legal system, what determined the law’s content? Schol-
ars agree that the content of private international law arose 
from a combination of merchant customs, judicial recognition of 
such customs in case law, and the critical review of such cus-
toms and judicial decisions by scholars.49 The judicial role was 
not limited to recognizing developed customs, but extended to 
reasoning inductively from the “data points supplied by exist-
ing customs” to generate “broader principles” that might sug-
gest “answers to various questions of first impression.”50 These 
merchant customs and judicial opinions were then rationalized, 
organized, and sometimes critiqued by scholars and treatise-
writers worldwide.51 The needs of international commerce thus 
drove the development of a legal system whose “rules [were] 
not under the control of any single jurisdiction, but instead re-
flect[ed] principles or practices common to many different ju-
risdictions.”52  
 
their opinion, a universal system which imposes its rules upon the individual 
states from without”). 
 47. An extra-state body of admiralty law arose because it was widely 
believed at the time that a polity’s regulatory powers did not extend beyond its 
physical borders. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 44, at 53. 
 48. Scholars have posited several theories as to why extra-state 
commercial law arose. See generally Mark D. Rosen, Do Codification and 
Private International Law Leave Room for a New Law Merchant?, 5 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 83, 83–85 (2004) (summarizing these).  
 49. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, 
AND SPECIFICALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, 
SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS §§ 2–4 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James 
Brown 3d ed. 1846). 
 50. Nelson, supra note 37, at 934. 
 51. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 49, §§ 12–16. For a list of earlier treatises 
on which Story relied, see id. at xviii–xxii.  
 52. Nelson, supra note 13. 
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b. General Law in the United States 
Before Erie¸ a similar law-generating process that was in-
dependent of legislatures occurred within the United States in 
what Swift called “general principles of commercial law.”53 Jus-
tice Story’s opinion in Swift distinguished between “state laws 
strictly local”—“the positive statutes of the state, and the con-
struction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and . . . rights 
and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the 
rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable 
and intraterritorial in their nature and character”—and “ques-
tions of a more general nature” like “questions of general com-
mercial law . . . .”54 The latter was “not the law of a single coun-
try only, but of the commercial world.”55  
Understanding general law facilitates appreciation of 
Swift’s conclusion that federal courts could exercise independ-
ent judgment as to the general law’s contents. To the extent 
general law was a “matter of fact” concerning merchant cus-
tom,56 state courts were no better situated than federal courts 
to make such determinations. Even where custom did not settle 
the question, and courts had to reason inductively, “the state 
tribunals [were] called upon to perform the like functions as 
ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and le-
gal analogies . . . . . . what is the just rule furnished by the 
principles of commercial law to govern the case.”57 Accordingly, 
though decisions of state courts as to the general commercial 
law were given the “most deliberate attention and respect of 
this Court,” state case law did not bind federal courts.58 
2. Choice-of-Law As General Law in Nineteenth Century 
America 
As with commercial law, American courts in the pre-Erie 
era conceptualized domestic choice-of-law as part of the general 
law, and more specifically, as an extension of private interna-
 
 53. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). 
 54. Id. at 18–19. 
 55. Id. at 19. 
 56. See Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1111, 1129 (2011) (noting that insofar as general law was based on 
custom, it was to a large extent a “matter of fact,” and therefore “it was not 
odd that Story thought that courts of different sovereigns could exercise their 
own judgment about” the general law’s contents). 
 57. Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19; see also id. (speaking of “the general 
principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence”). 
 58. Id.; see also Nelson, supra note 37, at 944.  
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tional law.59 Early American courts treated the international 
law of choice-of-law as authoritative for purposes of determin-
ing domestic choice-of-law, and utilized reasoning consistent 
with the understanding that choice-of-law was part of the gen-
eral law.60 To demonstrate this, this section provides a detailed 
examination of two early cases,61 an analysis of two treatises, 
and an overview of late nineteenth century case law. And be-
cause they conceptualized choice-of-law as general law, Ameri-
can courts’ efforts to discern that single body of choice-of-law 
satisfied the Single System Requirement. 
a. Nash v. Tupper 
The 1803 New York case of Nash v. Tupper62 is both repre-
sentative and instructive of choice-of-law’s connections to the 
 
 59. See David F. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the 
Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 732, 737–38 (1963) (noting that 
during the Swift era “choice-of-law questions fell into the domain of ‘general 
law’”); Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 775, 805 (1955) (showing that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
“we find the terms ius gentium and Law of Nations applied to that body of 
legal rules and principles which we now call the ‘law of conflict of laws’ or 
‘private international law.’”); see also Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives 
in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REV. 555 (1984); Michael 
Steven Green, Choice of Law As General Common Law: A Reply to Professor 
Brilmayer, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 125 (Donald Earl 
Childress III ed., 2012). Most of the modern scholars who have observed 
choice-of-law’s original connection to general law were not focused on choice-
of-law, but mentioned this in passing in the course of larger projects 
concerning federal common law. See BRIDWELL & WHITTEN, supra note 44, at 
61–97; Bellia, supra note 33, at 889–90 (“General law, or the law of nations, 
governed matters that courts today categorize as . . . conflict of laws, and 
private international law.”). This Article presents evidence that supports these 
scholars’ observations concerning the general law character of early choice-of-
law jurisprudence in this country. 
 60. See Baxter, supra note 17, at 29–30 (“Choice rules were regarded not 
merely as general rather than local law but as part of a still more august and 
transcendent body of principle, the law of nations.”). 
 61. Many others might be cited. See, e.g., Harvey v. Richards, 11 F. Cas. 
746, 759 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818) (No. 6184) (Story, J.) (“[T]he question . . . is 
properly [one] of international law, dependent upon no local usages, but 
resting on general principles.”), cited in Baxter, supra note 17, at 30; 
Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. (12 Tyng) 1, 4–8 (1816) (Parker, C.J.) 
(explaining that “the laws of any State cannot, by any inherent authority, be 
entitled to respect extraterritorially, or beyond the jurisdiction of the State 
which enacts them, is the necessary result of the independence of distinct 
sovereignties,” considering what occurs “when a merchant of France, Holland, 
or England, enters into a contract in his own country” and proceeding to 
analyze English laws on the choice of law issue). 
 62. 1 Cai. 402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803). 
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general law of private international law. The plaintiff sued in 
New York for promissory notes made in Connecticut. The par-
ties agreed that the notes were governed by Connecticut law, 
but disagreed as to whether Connecticut’s longer statute of lim-
itations applied, or whether the lawsuit had to be dismissed on 
account of the forum’s shorter statute of limitations.  
Private international law was central to the court’s analy-
sis. The majority opinion began by stating:  
  It is a well settled rule, that contracts, with a few exceptions, are 
to be construed according to the laws of that country, in reference to 
which they are made. But it is equally well settled, that the remedy 
on them must be prosecuted according to the laws of that country in 
which the remedy is sought.63 
The first cited case, Dupleix v. De Roven,64 concerned a 
Roman contract sued upon in a British court, which dismissed 
the action on account of England’s statute-of-limitations.65 The 
majority then cited a single New York case that similarly had 
applied the forum’s statute of limitations to a promissory note 
that had been made in another state. Notwithstanding the 
lawyers’ and dissent’s lengthy arguments against the rule that 
forum law governed statutes of limitations, the majority sum-
marily asserted that “[t]he correctness of those decisions”—
meaning the single New York case as well as the British deci-
sion—“I feel no disposition to controvert.”66 The majority 
“conceiv[ed] the law on the point as settled,” noting that “with 
this opinion the Scotch and Dutch laws accord, as will appear 
from Erskine’s Institutes, vol. 2, 581, 582; Kaime[s]’s’ Equity, 
vol. 2, 358; Huberi Prælectiones, vol. 2, book 1, tit. 3; De 
Conflictu Legum, sec. 7.”67  
Dissenting Judge Livingston similarly relied on the general 
law of private international law. “In the exposition of foreign 
contracts, courts take notice of the laws of the state in which 
they are made, or manifest injustice would ensue. This is a dic-
tate of common sense, and is become a principle of general 
law.”68 Forum law applies regarding “the forms of the country 
where the action is depending; . . . but in deciding on the mer-
 
 63. Id. at 412 (Lewis, C.J.).  
 64. Dupleix v. De Roven, (1705) 23 Eng. Rep. 950 (Ch.); 2 Vern. 540.  
 65. For a description of the facts that varies from what is reported in 
Nash, see Le Roy v. Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. 362, 365 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) 
(No. 8269) (Story, J). 
 66. Nash, 1 Cai. at 413. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 414 (Livingston, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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its, the lex loci will be the rule.”69 Judge Livingston claimed 
“[t]his distinction is found in the Roman and French law, and 
Emerigon”—an eighteenth century advocate in the Parliament 
of Aix-en-Provence70—“speaks of it as adopted by all elementary 
writers.”71 After quoting two treatises in their original lan-
guages of French and Latin, Judge Livingston proceeded to 
Emerigon’s discussion of a lawsuit in French courts between 
two Englishmen concerning a contract made in England in 
which the French court upheld the contract notwithstanding its 
nonconformance with France’s statute of frauds. “On a point of 
general law, where we have no rule to the contrary, I cannot 
well err in conforming to one which we find adopted by a for-
eign tribunal . . . .”72  
b. Le Roy v. Crowninshield 
Consider next the 1820 case of Le Roy v. Crowninshield.73 
This decision is particularly instructive for our purposes be-
cause it was written by Justice Story—who thirteen years later 
would publish a treatise on conflict of laws that would prove 
enormously influential in the United States,74 and nine years 
after that would write Swift v. Tyson, which relied so heavily 
on general law.75 Story, like the judges in Crowninshield, un-
derstood domestic choice-of-law to be part of the general law of 
private international law.76 
Crowninshield addressed the mirror image question at is-
sue in Nash: whether the forum would apply its longer statute 
of limitations to allow a contract action that would have been 
barred under the statute of limitations of the state where the 
contract had been made. Like the judges in Nash, Story treated 
international choice-of-law as determinative, and otherwise 
reasoned in a manner that reflected his understanding that it 
was general law. Like Nash, Story’s analysis begins with pri-
vate international law: “personal contracts are to have the 
same validity, interpretation and obligatory force in every other 
 
 69. Id. (emphasis added). 
 70. See STORY, supra note 49, at xix. 
 71. Nash, 1 Cai. at 414. 
 72. Id. (emphasis added). 
 73. 15 F. Cas. 362 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 8269) (1820) (Story, J.). 
 74. See STORY, supra note 49. 
 75. See supra notes 53–58. 
 76. Professor Trautman accordingly is mistaken when he says Justice 
Story treated choice-of-law as state law. See Trautman, Toward Federalizing, 
supra note 14, at 1715–16. 
ROSEN_5fmt 2/3/2015 10:09 AM 
1034 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1017 
 
country, which they have in the country where they are 
made . . . .”77 Reflecting choice-of-law’s connection to the other 
components of private international law, Story explained that 
“the necessities of the civilized and commercial world rendered 
[this principle] indispensable.”78  
But, continued Story, “[a]nother rule equally well settled 
is, that remedies on contracts are to be regulated and pursued 
according to the law of the place, where the action is instituted, 
and not by the law of the place, where the contract is made.”79 
Story’s explanation was tied to the rule’s source in private in-
ternational law: 
Courts of law are instituted by every nation for its own convenience 
and benefit, and the nature of the remedies, and the time and manner 
of the proceedings, are regulated by its own views of justice and pro-
priety, and fashioned by its own wants and customs. It is not obliged 
to depart from its own notions of judicial order, from mere comity to 
any foreign nation.80 
The party who seeks a remedy “must bring himself within 
the prescription [under forum law], that limits it, and if he does 
not . . . the prescription” bars him from recovering because “the 
laws of one country cannot in themselves have any extraterri-
torial force” in another country,81 and “‘every case that comes 
under our law must be decided by that law, and not by the law 
of any other country.’”82 Foreign cases and treatises comprised 
the bulk of Story’s sources.83 
Particularly instructive of Justice Story’s conceptualization 
of choice-of-law as general law was the determinative role 
played by “well established” practices.84 Story identified the two 
main arguments traditionally made in support of the rule that 
statutes of limitations are provided by the forum,85 and then 
 
 77. Crowninshield, 15. F. Cas. at 364. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 364–65. 
 80. Id. at 365 (emphasis added). 
 81. Id. at 365–66.  
 82. Id. at 365 (quoting Principles of Equity, a treatise by eighteenth 
century British jurist Lord Kaimes). 
 83. See id. at 365–68 (citing Lord Kaimes’s Principles of Equity, John 
Erskine’s Institutes, Dutch jurist Ulricus Huberus’s De Conflictu Legum, 
Genoan writer Joseph Casaregis’s Discursus Legales de Commercio, French 
advocate Balthazard Emerigon’s Traite des Assurances, Dutch writer Paul 
Voet’s De Statutis et Eorum Concursu, and works by Robert Pothier and 
Johannes Heineccius, as well as cases from many different countries).  
 84. Id. at 364. 
 85. Id. at 368. The arguments are that “statutes of limitation belong to 
the regulations of process in every state, and limit the judicial order of 
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spends more than 3,000 words refuting them.86 Notably, howev-
er, Story ultimately applies the rule with which he disagrees 
because “the question now before the court has been settled, so 
far as it could be, by authorities, which the court is bound to re-
spect.”87 And what are these authoritative sources? Story first 
cites to the foreign treatise writers Huberus, Voet, and Kaimes, 
then “look[s] to the decisions at the common law”—by which he 
means English decisions—and only after all this turns to “the 
decisions in our own courts,” first considering three New York 
cases before coming to a single decision “directly in point” by 
Massachusetts’s highest court, the state in which the federal 
court was sitting.88 Story states “these authorities are too strin-
gent and obstinate to be easily resisted,” and concludes “I feel 
myself, therefore, constrained to” apply forum law, which al-
lowed the lawsuit to go forward.89  
Presaging his opinion in Swift, Story does not treat the 
choice-of-law question before the federal circuit court as a mat-
ter of state law, nor as a question whose resolution was to be 
provided by the highest state court in which the federal court 
sat; the Massachusetts decision was the absolute last datum 
that Story’s opinion considered, and received but cursory 
treatment in a single short paragraph.90 Story’s approach in Le 
Roy thus is at loggerheads with Klaxon.91  
Further, Story did not adopt the lex fori rule because the 
treatise writers and earlier decisions had convinced him that 
their approach was correct, or because their virtual unanimity 
gave him some doubts as to his preferred approach. To the con-
trary, he thought his view was the most sensible as a matter of 
“principle.”92 Nevertheless, insisted Story:  
  My humbler and safer duty is to administer the law as I find it, 
and to follow in the path of authority, where it is clearly defined, even 
though that path may have been explored by guides, in whose judg-
 
proceedings in their courts” and that “statutes of limitation extinguish the 
remedy only, and not the right, upon contracts.” Id. 
 86. See id. at 368–71 (concluding “[t]hat where all remedies are barred, or 
discharged by the lex loci contractus, and have operated on the case, there the 
bar may be pleaded by the debtor in a foreign tribunal, to repel any suit 
brought to enforce the debt”). 
 87. Id. at 371. 
 88. Id. at 371–72. 
 89. Id. at 372. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 92. See Crowninshield, 15 F. Cas. at 371. 
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ment the most implicit confidence might not have been originally  
reposed.
93
  
 That Story thought “the question now before the court 
has been settled, so far as it could be, by authorities, which 
the court is bound to respect”94 shows that he believed these 
foreign treatise writers and international cases were au-
thorities that governed the question at hand;95 in other 
words, domestic choice-of-law was continuous with interna-
tional choice-of-law doctrine. And what determined the con-
tents of choice-of-law was not principle or rationality, but 
what was determinative for general law: settled practice.96 
c. Treatises 
 i. Samuel Livermore’s Dissertations 
Samuel Livermore published the first American treatise on 
choice-of-law in 1828.97 Like the court opinions just canvassed, 
Livermore treated domestic choice-of-law as an aspect of the 
conflicts law that had been developed by foreign scholars and 
jurists. This is revealed in his treatise’s title: Dissertations on 
the Questions Which Arise from the Contrariety of the Positive 
Laws of Different States and Nations. Livermore’s methodology 
was reflective of this understanding. The introduction explains 
that the treatise “present[s] to the profession a view of the 
principles maintained by the great jurisconsults of Europe.”98 
Livermore describes his topic in a manner consistent with the 
concept of general law, explaining that he “attempt[s] to estab-
lish true and certain principles”99 and “general principles.”100 
Livermore draws on German, French, and Dutch scholars in 
 
 93. Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. (“The error, if any has been committed, is too strongly 
engrafted into the law, to be removed without the interposition of some 
superior authority.”). 
 96. Story’s treatise endorsed the rule he thought to have been wrong in Le 
Roy, see STORY, supra note 49, at 971–73 (explaining that statutes of 
limitations address the “remedy” and “right of action” and accordingly are 
governed by the lex fori), with a caveat not relevant here.  
 97. See SAMUEL LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH 
ARISE FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES 
AND NATIONS (New Orleans, Benjamin Levy 1828). Livermore’s treatise was 
not successful. See 3 BEALE, supra note 46, at 1911. 
 98. LIVERMORE, supra note 97, at 20. Livermore also provides his own 
“reflections” and “considerations.” Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 165. 
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determining the rules he believes to be applicable to domestic 
choice-of-law.101  
 ii. Joseph Story’s Commentaries on Conflicts of Laws 
Story’s Le Roy opinion presages the general law approach 
found in Story’s great treatise on conflicts-of-law, which was 
first published in 1834.102 At the treatise’s start, Story describes 
conflicts-of-law as “belong[ing] to a branch of international ju-
risprudence . . . .”103 Consistent with this, the treatise relies 
first and foremost on foreign sources. Typically, the treatise 
first reviews the foreign treatise writers, then proceeds to for-
eign case law, and only thereafter considers American cases.104 
Story states he aims to identify the “best established ap-
proach”105 and the “principle[s] generally recognised by all na-
tions,”106 and adopts practices that are widespread even if he 
disagrees with them.107 Story hoped the treatise would be of use 
to non-American lawyers in their legal practices outside of the 
United States.108 The treatise in fact had immense influence on 
European thought, particularly in France and Germany.109  
 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 21–36 (consulting sources from all these countries to 
determine the circumstances under which one state is obligated to give effect 
to laws from another state); id. at 37–38 (considering French and Italian 
scholars’ writings to determine choice-of-law question arising in Louisiana); id. 
at 164–71 (consulting foreign writers to determine whether payment of debts 
of an insolvent testator decided on basis of law of debtor’s domicile or place 
where debts arose).  
 102. Chancellor Kent’s Commentaries occasionally addressed choice-of-law, 
but did not do so in a systematic manner, and was only infrequently 
referenced by Story. See, e.g., 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 453–68 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 12th ed. 1873) 
(providing extensive discussion of principle of lex loci to contracts in midst of 
lectures on personal property); Baxter, supra note 17, at 26 (noting that Kent’s 
Commentaries “contain[] only isolated references to choice rules scattered 
throughout the various lectures on substantive topics”). For a comprehensive 
list of the foreign treatises on which Story relies, see STORY, supra note 49, at 
xviii–xxii. 
 103. STORY, supra note 49, at xi.   
 104. See, e.g., id. §§ 39–106 (evaluating the rules concerning domicile and 
capacity). For more evidence of Story’s profound reliance on foreign sources, 
see infra notes 215–25 & 240–50 (showing that foreign sources provided the 
conceptual foundation of Story’s choice-of-law approach, what this Article dubs 
the ‘anti-extraterritorialism maxim’) . 
 105. STORY, supra note 49, § 63.  
 106. Id. § 64; see also id. § 586 (looking to identify “the general assent of 
civilized nations in modern times”). 
 107. See, e.g., supra note 96. 
 108. See, e.g., STORY, supra note 49, at xiv (enumerating important non-
English treatise writers, and observing that “I am not aware, that the works of 
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 iii. Francis Wharton’s Treatise 
An influential American treatise published by Francis 
Wharton in 1872 continued to reflect the understanding that 
choice-of-law was part of the general law of private interna-
tional law. Just note the treatise’s title: Conflict of Laws, or 
Private International Law, Including a Comparative View of 
Anglo-American, Roman, German, and French Jurisprudence. 
Wharton’s preface speaks of “[t]he general European authorita-
tiveness” of the “complex, but most philosophic system of juris-
prudence, which has grown up in Germany, for the determina-
tion of Private International relations.”110 Wharton accordingly  
look[s] to the Anglo-American law on the one side, and that of Ger-
many on the other, as the principal factors in that common basis of 
jurisprudence to which all who travel or do business in foreign lands 
must appeal, and which—so far as founded on right reason—must be 
largely influential in determining the private international relations 
of the States of the American Union.
111
 
d. Choice-of-Law in Late Nineteenth Century America 
American decisions throughout the nineteenth century 
continued to treat domestic choice-of-law as part of the general 
law of private international law. The American decisions of this 
period regularly cited to the treatises of Wharton and Story,112 
and also continued to treat as authoritative the private inter-
national law found in foreign cases.113 In the other direction, 
American cases also consulted purely domestic choice-of-law 
decisions (in conjunction with foreign materials) to determine 
 
these eminent Jurists have been cited at the English Bar,” and asking “[h]ow 
it should happen, that, in this age, English Lawyers should be so utterly 
indifferent to all foreign jurisprudence” insofar as “[m]any occasions are 
constantly occurring, in which they would derive essential assistance from it, 
to illustrate the questions, which are brought into contestation in all their 
Courts.”). 
 109. 3 BEALE, supra note 46. 
 110. FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, OR 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN, ROMAN, GERMAN, AND FRENCH JURISPRUDENCE ii (1872). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See, e.g., Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 408 (1927) 
(relying on Wharton); Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 130–33 (1882) 
(relying heavily on both Wharton’s and Story’s treatises); Milliken v. Pratt, 
125 Mass. 374, 381 (1878) (relying on Story). 
 113. See, e.g., Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 130–38 (citing both foreign and 
domestic choice-of-law decisions to determine rule for purely domestic choice-
of-law question); Milliken, 125 Mass. at 377–80 (first consulting English 
decisions before considering domestic case law). 
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international choice-of-law rules.114 These practices are perfect-
ly consistent with domestic choice-of-law having been under-
stood at that time as being part of the general private interna-
tional law.  
Late nineteenth century choice-of-law decisions did not, 
however, look identical to those of fifty years before. As Story’s 
and Wharton’s treatises on conflicts-of-law grew increasingly 
influential, and as the number of domestic choice-of-law deci-
sions multiplied, the influence of these domestic sources in-
creased, and American cases turned with less frequency to for-
eign case law.115 Late nineteenth century decisions accordingly 
do not typically exhibit the degree of reliance on international 
materials shown in the Nash and Crowninshield decisions, 
though foreign citations were still frequent.116  
But late nineteenth century decisions still treated choice-
of-law as general law, aiming to discern widespread practice ra-
ther than focusing on how cases in their particular jurisdiction 
had answered the question.117 For example, when the United 
States Supreme Court made choice-of-law determinations upon 
reviewing appeals from diversity actions, it treated case law 
from other jurisdictions (both domestic states and foreign coun-
tries) as authoritative.118 Consider as well that the United 
States Supreme Court approvingly noted when state courts had 
approved of the choice-of-law rules that it—the United States 
 
 114. See, e.g., London Assurance v. Companhia de Moagens do Barreiro, 
167 U.S. 149, 160–61 (1897) (citing to a domestic choice-of-law decision to 
determine whether English or American law applied to the insurance 
contract); Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 
447–58 (1889) (analyzing both foreign and purely domestic choice-of-law 
decisions to determine whether British or American law determined whether 
common carriers can contractually exempt themselves from their own 
negligence). 
 115. See cases discussed supra note 112. 
 116. See, e.g., Scudder v. Union Nat’l Bank, 91 U.S. 406, 410–13 (1875) 
(consulting mostly domestic case law to determine which state’s law applied to 
decide the validity of a bill of exchange, but also considering English 
decisions). 
 117. See, e.g., Liverpool, 129 U.S. at 458 (noting that its choice-of-law rule 
was consistent with “the great preponderance, if not the uniform concurrence, 
of authority”); Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 130–38; Scudder, 91 U.S. at 410–13; 
Milliken, 125 Mass. at 377–83 (reviewing case law from other countries and 
other states). 
 118. See, e.g., Hall v. Cordell, 142 U.S. 116, 120–21 (1891) (consulting state 
cases to ascertain the choice-of-law rule); Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 130, 137–41 
(same). 
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Supreme Court—had earlier adopted.119 The Supreme Court al-
so noted when foreign jurists approved of choice-of-law rules 
that had been advocated in Story’s treatise.120 And when Ameri-
can courts adopted choice-of-law rules that differed from those 
of other countries, foreign cases generally were not dismissed 
as non-binding precedent, but instead were criticized to explain 
why they were “entitled to little weight.”121 In other words, for-
eign cases were authoritative (albeit distinguishable), not irrel-
evant. The unspoken premise behind these approaches to case 
law from other jurisdictions was that the American courts were 
aiming to locate a single choice-of-law jurisprudence.122 The un-
derstanding that choice-of-law was general law, in other words, 
led American courts to aim to locate a single body of law, there-
by satisfying the Single System Requirement. 
B. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS (GENERAL LAW-LIKE) STATE LAW 
1. Joseph Beale’s Treatise and the (First) Restatement 
The next comparably influential American conflicts schol-
ar123 was Joseph Beale, the Royall Professor of Law at Harvard, 
author of a new treatise on conflicts-of-law,124 and the reporter 
and main author of (what proved to be the first) Restatement of 
the Conflicts of Law. Beale largely continued Story’s approach 
to conflicts,125 but Beale’s treatise also reflects a crucial, though 
 
 119. See, e.g., Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 131 (noting a rule the Court had laid 
down and that “its correctness was recognized by” a subsequently decided 
North Carolina decision); see also id. at 139–41 (noting choice-of-law approach 
adopted by the Supreme Court in two cases and then noting that “[t]hese cases 
were relied on by the Supreme Court of New York” in a subsequent case). 
 120. See id. at 131 (noting Lord Brougham’s observation concerning “the 
excellent distinction taken by Mr. Justice Story”). 
 121. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 381. But see Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 131 (noting 
that continental Europe and England treated statutes of limitations 
differently for purposes of choice-of-law). 
 122. This is not to suggest that the decisions in fact were uniform. See 2 
BEALE, supra note 46, at 1108–09.  
 123. English scholar A.V. Dicey authored an important and influential 
book, whose approach was largely adopted by Beale. See generally A.V. DICEY 
& A. BERRIEDALE KEITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1922). Many of the early 
legal realists directed their energies to choice-of-law, but none had the short-
term influence of Beale. 
 124. See generally 1 BEALE, supra note 46. 
 125. See DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT 
ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 (8th ed. 2010). Beale rejected Story’s comity 
approach, however, introducing in its place the concept of vested rights. See id. 
For more on vested rights, see infra note 131.  
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until now largely overlooked, reconceptualization of conflicts-of-
law: instead of viewing domestic conflicts law as part of the 
general law of private international law, Beale thought that 
“Conflict[s] of Laws [was] part of the law of each state,”126 more 
specifically the “common law.”127  
To clarify Beale’s understanding, the first subpart consid-
ers why Beale abandoned the longstanding view that choice-of-
law was part of general private international law. The next 
subpart explains Beale’s understanding of common law, and 
shows why Beale’s reconceptualization did not, in his eyes at 
least, undermine choice-of-law’s uniformity across states. Beale 
had a “general law”-like conception of state common law, and 
hence understood choice-of-law in a manner that satisfied the 
Single System Requirement. 
2. What Fueled Beale’s Reconceptualization of Choice-of-Law 
a. Why It Wasn’t Legal Positivism 
It is tempting to assume that Beale reconceptualized 
choice-of-law from general law to state common law for the 
same reason that Erie rejected general law: owing to legal posi-
tivist commitments that demanded that law be tied to some 
sovereign.128 This is not so, for an examination of Beale’s philos-
ophy of law129 discloses that he was not a positivist. Excavating 
Beale’s jurisprudence illuminates how Beale could have 
thought choice-of-law would be predominantly uniform across 
all jurisdictions (hence satisfying the Single System Require-
ment) despite its being state common law. 
Beale understood legal positivism’s claim that law is “an 
expression of sovereign will” to mean that law consists solely of 
“the rules made by the legislative body,” and criticized positiv-
ism for “appear[ing] to ignore the principal element of law, the 
so-called ‘unwritten law.’”130 Instead of positivism, Beale largely 
endorsed Sir Frederick Pollock’s position, which Beale summa-
rized as the view that law was the “sum of the rules binding 
 
 126. 1 BEALE, supra note 109, at 52. 
 127. Id. at 28. 
 128. See infra Part I.C. 
 129. Justice Frankfurter, a student of Beales while at Harvard Law School, 
noted that Beale’s course on the Conflict of Laws was in essence a “course in 
Jurisprudence.” Felix Frankfurter, Joseph Henry Beale, 56 HARV. L. REV. 701, 
703 (1943). 
 130. 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 22 (emphasis added). 
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members of the state as such.”131 In Beale’s view, law comprised 
three parts: “[l]aw . . . is made in part by the legislature; in part 
it rests upon precedent; and in great part it consists in a homo-
geneous, scientific, and all-embracing body of principle . . . .”132 
Whereas legislation was the paradigm of law for legal positiv-
ists,133 Beale believed “principle” to be law’s essence.134 This is 
attributable to Beale’s conception of law: “the one most im-
portant feature of law” is “that it is not a mere collection of ar-
bitrary rules, but a body of scientific principle.”135 Beale thought 
the third component of law—principle—was a “branch of prac-
tical philosophy,” developed “through the use of reason and ex-
perience . . . .”136  
What puts Beale most at odds with legal positivism is his 
view that the first two components of law endanger principle, 
the third (and for him most important) component of law. “Pu-
rity of doctrine may be lost through wrong decisions of courts” 
and “[t]he application of general principles may be inhibited by 
legislation.”137 In other words, what legal positivists viewed as 
the only legitimate sources of law endangered what Beale 
thought to be the “most important feature of law.”138 Insofar as 
he believed scientific principle and practical philosophy to con-
stitute the core of law, Beale apparently thought law’s authori-
ty was self-generating, much like the laws of nature and moral-
ity. Beale accordingly thought law to be independent of the 
sovereign state, contradicting legal positivism’s foundational 
presupposition. 
 
 131. Id. at 25. Beale proposed one modification, which does not affect the 
analysis that follows above in text: Beale thought that instead of saying that 
“rules of law bind individuals,” it instead should be said that “[p]arties are 
bound, not by the law, but by obligations created by the law.” Id. This 
rephrasing reflects Beale’s understanding of the concept of “vested rights,” 
which was an outgrowth of his view that laws could not have extraterritorial 
application, though legal obligations could. 
 132. Id.  
 133. See id. at 22–23 (arguing that the positivist Austin “assimilat[ed] 
judicial to statute law”). 
 134. See id. at 25 (“Much the largest and most important part of the law, 
therefore, is this body of principle . . . .”). 
 135. Id. at 24–25. 
 136. Id. at 25. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 24–25. 
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b. Domesticating Choice-of-Law 
What led Beale to insist that conflict-of-laws was a part of 
state law? Not a legal positivistic need to tie conflicts doctrine 
to a sovereign, but a desire to disconnect the subject from for-
eign law. Consider the following bold statement from Beale’s 
treatise: “It is sometimes urged that the doctrines of the Con-
flict of Laws have an international sanction, binding to some 
extent upon the various states. This view is not today seriously 
held and cannot be sustained. It has never been adopted by any 
common-law authority.”139 Beale claims “the doctrines of foreign 
law have influenced [choice-of-law] only as they have been con-
sidered by the authors of some of the treatises on the subject, 
notably Story.”140 “The courts have developed the subject, as 
they have developed any other topic of the common law, by the 
course of decision,” and there have been only a “few cases 
where the decision of the courts has been influenced by a doc-
trine foreign to the common law . . . .”141  
This Article is not the place to fully evaluate the historical 
veracity of Beale’s claims. At the very least, Beale’s position is 
inconsistent with the New York Justices’ approach in the Nash 
case, and Justice Story’s approach in Crowninshield. Indeed, 
whereas Beale goes so far as to argue that foreign authority 
does not even have the status of “persuasive” precedent,142 Jus-
tice Story treated foreign materials as authoritative in his opin-
ion in Crowninshield, and indeed throughout his extraordinari-
ly influential treatise.  
3. Beale’s Conception of the Common Law  
Since Beale identified conflicts-of-law as an aspect of state 
common law, fully comprehending his conception of common 
law is necessary to appreciate his understanding of choice-of-
law. Two important lessons emerge. First, Beale’s idiosyncratic 
understanding of common law was consistent with its being 
both state law and essentially uniform across the country (and 
hence consistent with the Single System Requirement). Second, 
we will be able to understand why Beale gave no serious 
 
 139. Id. at 51. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. For Beale’s explanation as to why domestic choice-of-law was not a 
part of international choice-of-law, see id. at 10–11, 51. 
 142. See id. at 52 (arguing that “there is nothing to be gained by the 
citation of foreign authority as persuasive to the court in arriving at its 
decision”). 
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thought as to whether choice-of-law is federal law, but reflex-
ively concluded it was state law. 
Beale did not simply identify common law with judge-made 
rules. Rather, common law referred to the “common elements” 
found in the legal systems of England and the United States.143 
The common law encompassed “two kinds of unwritten law,” 
namely the “law formulated by the courts” and “the general 
body of legal precepts and legal thought.”144 The latter refers to 
the principles and doctrine that constituted Beale’s third com-
ponent of law.145 
Another characteristic of common law, for Beale, was that 
it was state law. Writing shortly before Erie, Beale’s treatise 
contained a section entitled “Is There a Federal Common 
Law?”146 To this he gives a swift (pardon the pun) unqualified 
answer: no. Mischaracterizing Story’s approach in Swift v. Ty-
son, Beale claimed that Swift only held that “on ordinary ques-
tions of unwritten law . . . the federal courts were at liberty to 
follow their own idea of the common law of the state . . . .”147 
Beale argued that “federal common law” was a misnomer. 
“[T]he way in which it was decided, the weight given by the 
[federal] court to the decisions of courts, and especially of fed-
eral courts, in other states, led lawyers to apply the name of 
‘federal common law’ to the doctrine.”148 But Beale denied there 
was “such thing as a [common] law of the nation apart from the 
laws of the states.”149 This explains why once Beale determined 
that choice-of-law was common law, he never considered 
whether it was state or federal; on his understanding, common 
law could only be state law. This Article’s third part identifies 
the fallacy in Beale’s reasoning as it explains why choice-of-law 
indeed could be federal common law.150  
Though Beale thought choice-of-law to be state common 
law, his idiosyncratic understanding of common law led him to 
expect that choice-of-law would be uniform nationwide. Beale 
believed the common law comprised two parts. First, the com-
 
 143. Id. at 10. 
 144. Id. at 26–27. 
 145. See supra text accompanying notes 132–36. 
 146. See 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 25. 
 147. Id. at 26 (emphasis added); see also id. (stating that the law “thus 
declared” by federal courts “was of course the law of the state”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 26.  
 150. See infra Part III.A, III.B, & III.D. 
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mon law was composed of the “common elements” across 
states,151 with respect to which the “decisions of courts of all 
such states are important evidences of the [common] law.”152 Se-
cond, Beale thought each state’s common law to be distinctive, 
such that there was a “common law of New York, and a quite 
distinct common law of Tennessee or of England . . . .”153 The 
tensions in Beale’s account are plain: how can common law be 
simultaneously common across the states and distinctive across 
each? And if “[t]he doctrines of [the common] law are authorita-
tive in each state whose law is based upon it,” how can each 
state’s judicial decisions merely be “evidences of the [common] 
law”?154  
The answer to these two questions is that Beale thought 
the common law primarily consisted of the common elements, 
with only relatively minor variations across states. Growing out 
of his larger jurisprudence that we examined above,155 Beale 
identified the common elements with “principle,” what he be-
lieved to constitute law’s core. It was as to principle that the 
state courts’ decisions constituted merely “important evidences 
of the [common] law.”156 It is worth noting how “general law”-
like Beale’s conception of this component of state common law 
was. Indeed, in addition to the Swift-like conclusion that state 
court decisions were mere evidence of this part of the common 
law,157 Beale sometimes referred to the common elements as the 
“general common law.”158 And Beale did not merely co-opt that 
locution, but used it much as it had been deployed by Story and 
others before him: the general common law was the “system 
which is accepted by all so-called common-law jurisdictions but 
is the particular and peculiar law of none . . . .”159 Thus, Beale 
thought there was a single common law of New York and Ten-
 
 151. 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 10. 
 152. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 153. Id. at 26–27. 
 154. Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 155. See supra notes 130–36. 
 156. 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 10.  
 157. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 158. 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 27. 
 159. Id. (emphasis added). What set Beale’s understanding apart from his 
predecessors was Beale’s exclusion of the civil law countries. See id. at 10. This 
difference does not matter for the point at hand concerning Beale’s 
expectation, like that of his predecessors, of uniformity within the United 
States. 
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nessee as to the “general common law.”160 It was only outside 
the realm of principle that each state’s common law, as an-
nounced by their courts, could diverge (i.e., be “peculiar” and 
“particular”).161  
So, notwithstanding Beale’s reconceptualization of choice-
of-law as state law, Beale (like his predecessors) believed that 
choice-of-law would be fundamentally uniform. Beale’s treatise, 
as well as his efforts in the American Law Institute that culmi-
nated in the Restatement of Conflicts, aimed at developing ro-
bust “common elements”—a robust general common law—that 
he expected would be uniform for all common law jurisdictions. 
In short, Beale’s conception of state common law shared much 
in common with the general law conception of choice-of-law 
that long had prevailed. Beale conceptualized choice-of-law as 
common law to disconnect it from foreign sources, not to render 
choice-of-law heterogeneous across states. Beale’s understand-
ing of choice-of-law, like his predecessors’, was largely con-
sistent with the Single System Requirement. 
To be sure, Beale recognized the possibility that mistaken 
case law or wrongheaded legislation could create deviations 
from the scientific body of principle and practical philosophy 
that he labored to articulate.162 But he hoped that his treatise 
and restatement would keep judicial errors to a minimum. And 
as to legislation, Beale believed that “statutes altering the law 
of a particular state within the domain of the Conflict of Laws 
are very much less common than they are in most topics of the 
law.”163 Beale undoubtedly hoped this would continue. Indeed, 
though prominent scholars in Beale’s time were arguing that 
Congress had power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s 
Effects Clause to enact a federal choice-of-law statute,164 Beale’s 
 
 160. But see id. at 52 (“While the general principles of the common law as 
developed by the states and as discussed in this treatise, are like the principles 
of the common law in force in every common-law state, yet, like any principles 
of the common law, they are subject to change either by legislation, by judicial 
decision or by any of the other forces that change the particular law of a state.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 161. Vis-à-vis such divergences, Beale presumably understood the 
appellation “common law” to refer to the fact that the rule was “unwritten” 
insofar as its source did not come from the legislature. See id. at 26 (describing 
the court-formulated law as one of “the two kinds of unwritten law”). 
 162. Id. at 52–53. 
 163. Id. at 53. 
 164. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 1, at 428. 
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treatise is silent on this subject.165 Beale evidently distrusted 
Congress as much as he distrusted state legislatures. It was 
principle—the common elements—that Beale hoped and ex-
pected would form the core of choice-of-law. 
For all these reasons, choice-of-law’s status as state law did 
not, for Beale, mean that there would be a multiplicity of 
choice-of-law doctrines across states. But as we shall soon see, 
Beale’s expectations regarding widespread “common elements,” 
and hence uniformity, of choice-of-law were to be sharply dis-
appointed.166 
C. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Thus far we have seen that domestic choice-of-law long was 
understood to be a part of the “general law” of private interna-
tional law. Beale pivoted, believing choice-of-law to be state 
common law, but his conception of common law shared many 
characteristics of the general law, most importantly an expec-
tation of cross-state uniformity that did not violate the Single 
System Requirement. There is a third way choice-of-law was 
briefly conceptualized in the pre-modern period: as constitu-
tional law.  
It has been suggested that the United States Supreme 
Court began to constitutionalize choice-of-law in the late nine-
teenth century,167 but this is mistaken for two reasons. First, 
careful study of the cases cited for this proposition shows that 
they did not concern choice-of-law, but addressed different is-
sues.168 Second, the Court decided tens of cases between 1875 
and 1928 in which it resolved choice-of-law questions without 
adverting to the Constitution.169  
 
 165. See 1 BEALE, supra note 46, at 278 (not mentioning Congress’s powers 
under the Effects Clause when discussing the Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
 166. See infra Part II.B. 
 167. See Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking 
Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2504 & n.238 (1999).  
 168. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), concerned due process 
limits on the scope of states’ regulatory jurisdiction. See id. at 587–90 (holding 
that Louisiana was without power to apply its law to an insurance contract 
entered into in New York). Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 
U.S. 615, 622 (1877), held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the 
forum to take evidence concerning non-forum law, but did not indicate what 
state’s law would have to be applied. And Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 
Wall.) 307, 313–14 (1866), addressed how the forum had to treat another 
state’s judgment, not another state’s laws.  
 169. For a helpful examination of the Court’s choice-of-law decisions 
concerning contracts, see 2 BEALE, supra note 46, at 1106–09. An examination 
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However, the Court (almost) unquestionably began treat-
ing choice-of-law as constitutional law in the 1930s.170 The 
clearest example is the 1932 case of Bradford Electric Light Co. 
v. Clapper,171 which held that a New Hampshire state court was 
constitutionally required to apply a Vermont workers compen-
sation statute to a worker accident that had occurred in New 
Hampshire.172 The Court required the forum to apply non-forum 
law because “full faith and credit [must] be given to the public 
act of Vermont . . . .”173 Clapper and several other decisions “led 
the American Law Institute in 1934 to reserve the question 
whether every problem in conflict of laws had become a ques-
tion of constitutional law.”174  
Given the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s categorical lan-
guage—“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts . . . of every other State”175—one might wonder 
why the Full Faith and Credit Clause had not been invoked by 
American courts whenever they confronted a domestic choice-of-
law question. This is a good question, about which three things 
can be said. 
First, the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not in fact play 
any role in resolving domestic choice-of-law questions in the 
United States prior to Clapper. The cases surveyed and refer-
enced above are fully representative of this: choice-of-law deci-
sions were made in consultation with foreign sources, or by 
otherwise seeking “general” principles, but not by considering 
 
of these cases discloses that the Court decided choice-of-law without adverting 
to the Constitution.  
 170. I have argued previously that these cases are best understood as 
federal common law rather than constitutional law, and continue to believe 
this to be so. See Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) 
Unconstitutional: Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal 
Actors That Determine What the Constitution Requires, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 915, 
957–75 (2006); see also Mark D. Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role in 
Determining What Full Faith and Credit Requires: An Additional Argument, 
41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 7, 8–28 (2010) [hereinafter Rosen, Congress’s Primary 
Role]. The main point made above in text is unaffected whether this case law 
is understood to be constitutional law or federal common law because, either 
way, choice-of-law was conceptualized consistently with the Single System 
Requirement. That the Court’s Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence is best un-
derstood as federal common law means that overturning Klaxon would result 
in less doctrinal disruption than might otherwise appear. 
 171. 286 U.S. 145 (1932). 
 172. Id. at 159. 
 173. Id.  
 174. Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 17, at 587. 
 175. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
ROSEN_5fmt 2/3/2015 10:09 AM 
2015] CHOICE-OF-LAW 1049 
 
what the Constitution required.176 Likewise, Justice Story’s 
monumental treatise says absolutely nothing about the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause’s application to sister states’ legisla-
tion; it only addresses that Clause’s requirements as to judg-
ments issued by another state’s courts,177 a subject distinct from 
choice-of-law.  
Second, doctrinal considerations explain Full Faith and 
Credit’s long time absence from choice-of-law. In an excellent 
recent article that builds upon the work of many other scholars, 
David Engdahl persuasively argues that the original and early 
understanding was that “full faith and credit” meant only that 
American courts were required to treat sister-state acts as pri-
ma facie evidence.178 On this view, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause did not mandate that a forum give effect to sister state 
legislation,179 and hence was not relevant to choice-of-law.180 
This explains why American choice-of-law decisions of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not appeal to the Con-
stitution, and raises questions as to why Clapper did.181  
Third, Clapper’s move to constitutionalize choice-of-law 
was short-lived. Clapper did not acknowledge that its approach 
of constitutionalizing choice-of-law was a break with the past,182 
 
 176. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 177. And as to that, Justice Story literally dedicates only a single 
paragraph! See STORY, supra note 49, § 609. 
 178. See David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1584 (2009); see also STORY, supra note 49, at 1004–05 (“The Constitution 
. . . did not make the judgments of other states domestic judgments to all 
intents and purposes; but only gave a general validity, faith, and credit to 
them, as evidence.”); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments 
and Public Acts: A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33 
(1957); Sachs, supra note 15, at 1206 & n.25. For a discussion of what it meant 
for a judgment to be prima facie evidence, see Sachs, supra note 15, at 1252–
53. 
 179. See Engdahl, supra note 178, at 1609. 
 180. With one important caveat: the Clause gave Congress the power to 
determine such effects. See id.  
 181. Of course the mere fact that Clapper effectuated a change does not on 
its own mean that it was wrongly decided. Changed applications can be 
legitimate even under originalist commitments, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM (2011), and all the more so under non-originalist approaches. 
 182. Justice Brandeis, Clapper’s author, had stated in a 1916 opinion that 
the claim that a state court had “made a mistaken application of doctrines of 
the conflict of laws” was “purely a question of local common law . . . with which 
this court is not concerned.” Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916). This 
proposition was not cited by the Supreme Court until after Klaxon, however, 
and between Kryger and the aborted attempt to constitutionalize choice-of-law 
the Supreme Court continued to treat choice-of-law as if it were a part of 
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nor did it provide a clear rule for determining when a forum 
was constitutionally required to apply non-forum law.183 In sub-
sequent cases the Court fashioned a balancing test under which 
choice-of-law was to be decided by “appraising the governmen-
tal interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of deci-
sion according to their weight.”184 With only a few exceptions, 
cases after Clapper held that the forum could apply forum law, 
even where the non-forum had substantial interests in having 
its law applied.185 Less than ten years after Clapper, the Court 
definitively announced in Klaxon that choice-of-law was state 
law.186  
II.  MODERN AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW, AND FOUR 
LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE   
Part I identified three different ways choice-of-law was 
conceptualized in the pre-modern era: it long was understood to 
be part of the general law of private international law, was 
reconceptualized as state common law by Beale, and for a short 
period was treated as federal constitutional law by the Su-
 
general law, see, e.g., Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403, 407 
(1927). In other words, Kryger’s identification of choice-of-law as state law was 
but a fleeting blip until Klaxon.  
 183. Clapper ruled that full faith and credit required that a defendant be 
able to invoke a defense available under non-forum law. See Bradford Elec. 
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932). Clapper plausibly noted that 
allowing plaintiff to circumvent the non-forum’s workman’s compensation 
statute would mean that “the effectiveness of the [non-forum] Vermont Act 
would be gravely impaired.” Id. at 159. But Clapper also stated “the full faith 
and credit clause does not require the enforcement of every right conferred by 
a statute of another state. There is room for some play of conflicting policies.” 
Id. at 160. 
 184. Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 
547 (1935). 
 185. See id.; see also Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 
U.S. 493, 504 (1939). For a scholarly treatment of these cases, see Paul A. 
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 
1219–25 (1946). For some of the few cases where the forum was required to 
apply non-forum law, see Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 
U.S. 586 (1947) (holding the forum had to apply the law of the state of 
incorporation of a fraternal benefit society); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182–83 (1936) (requiring the forum to apply non-forum 
law on the theory that non-forum statute became part of the terms of a 
contract, not on a balancing of interests approach). 
 186. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). From that 
time forward, the Constitution has not served as the source choice-of-law, but 
has been understood to provide (exceedingly modest) limits on state choice-of-
law doctrines. For a discussion of these constitutional limits, see Rosen, 
Congress’s Primary Role, supra note 170, at 14–16.   
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preme Court.187 As different as they were, all three anticipated 
that choice-of-law would be uniform nationwide; uniformity is 
an inherent characteristic of general law and constitutional 
law, and was Beale’s expectation because of his general law-
like conception of common law. All three conceptualizations of 
choice-of-law thus satisfied the Single System Requirement. 
Expectations of choice-of-law uniformity have been aban-
doned, however, in the modern era. This Part first explains how 
and why our present “chaotic” system came about. As the first 
subsection shows, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Klaxon and 
Wells declared that choice-of-law was state law that could vary 
from state to state. The next subsection demonstrates the many 
different choice-of-law regimes that have since emerged, and 
shows that they generate disparate outcomes. In the process, 
the second subsection identifies four lessons that will prove 
crucial to Part III’s argument that choice-of-law should be 
reconceptualized as federal nonconstitutional law.   
A. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS (HETEROGENEOUS) STATE LAW: KLAXON 
AND WELLS 
Choice-of-law’s modern era began in 1941, in the Supreme 
Court’s decision of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufactur-
ing Co.188 Klaxon did two things, both of which this Article 
sharply criticizes. First, Klaxon held that federal courts sitting 
in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the states in 
which they are located. (Part III explains why this is wrong: 
federal courts sitting in diversity must apply federal choice-of-
law rules.) Second, Klaxon held that choice-of-law is state 
law.189 (Part III also explains why this is wrong: choice-of-law in 
state courts is properly understood to be federal law).  
Although Klaxon’s second holding, that choice-of-law is 
state common law, superficially might sound as if the Court 
had simply accepted Professor Beale’s approach, Klaxon had a 
fundamentally different conception of common law, with impli-
cations orthogonal to Beale’s expectations. Whereas Beale un-
derstood the bulk of choice-of-law to be principles that would be 
uniform across states, Klaxon did not. To the contrary, Klaxon 
presupposed cross-state non-uniformity of choice-of-law. Klaxon 
 
 187. But see supra note 170. 
 188. Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487. 
 189. Id. at 497 (stating that federal courts must apply the choice-of-law 
rules declared by the states in which they sit because “the proper function of 
[a] federal court is to ascertain what the state law is”). 
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justified its holding on the basis of Erie, which Klaxon de-
scribed as establishing the “principle of uniformity within a 
state” as between state and federal courts.190 Klaxon recognized 
that its holding made possible a “lack of uniformity . . . between 
federal courts in different states,”191 but thought this sort of 
non-uniformity was “attributable to our federal system, which 
leaves to a state . . . the right to pursue local policies diverging 
from those of its neighbors.”192 Thus, under Klaxon, choice-of-
law was just another type of state law that might vary across 
states. In Klaxon’s words, “[i]t is not for the federal courts to 
thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent ‘general 
law’ of conflict of laws.”193 Rather, each state “is free to deter-
mine whether a given matter is to be governed by the law of the 
forum or some other law.”194  
Four observations are in order. First—to state the obvi-
ous—Klaxon’s conception of choice-of-law as state law marks a 
bold break from the earlier understandings examined in Part I, 
including Beale’s. Second, just as Clapper nine years earlier 
had been silent about the novelty of its decision to constitution-
alize choice-of-law, Klaxon did not acknowledge that it had pro-
pounded a fundamentally novel understanding of choice-of-law. 
Third, Klaxon did not explain its conclusion that choice-of-law 
was state law; it simply asserted so in the ipse dixit language 
reproduced just above. Fourth, Klaxon’s very short opinion did 
not consider the full range of possibilities. Klaxon rejected the 
view that federal courts could “enforce[e] an independent ‘gen-
eral law’ of conflict of laws,”195 but did not consider that federal 
courts could announce a non-constitutional federal rule that 
would be binding on—and hence not independent of—state 
courts. It is this unconsidered possibility that Part III develops. 
These four observations are consistent with something 
else: that Klaxon was decided very quickly. Briefs were submit-
ted on April 10 and 19, oral argument was heard on May 1 and 
2, and the Court handed down its opinion only one month later, 
 
 190. Id. at 496. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 497. 
 195. Id. at 496. Klaxon plainly meant “independent” of the state’s conflicts 
rule. 
ROSEN_5fmt 2/3/2015 10:09 AM 
2015] CHOICE-OF-LAW 1053 
 
on June 2.196 Consistent with the published decision’s tenor, the 
parties’ briefs focused almost exclusively on Erie, and gave lit-
tle attention to choice-of-law. The core question was whether 
choice-of-law was “substantive or procedural.”197 The parties 
paid virtually no attention to the nature of choice-of-law, apart 
from a fleeting reference to Beale’s treatise and dictum from a 
prior Supreme Court decision.198 Ironically—and troublingly—
while Klaxon focused primarily on Erie, its most lasting impli-
cations have been on choice-of-law. 
Klaxon was unanimous, but three Justices in effect dis-
sented from its holding twelve years later in Wells v. Simonds 
Abrasive Co.199 The plaintiff in Wells asserted a statutory 
wrongful death claim under Alabama law in a Pennsylvania 
federal court. Pennsylvania had a shorter statute-of-limitations 
than Alabama, and Pennsylvania’s choice-of-law rule provided 
that statutes-of-limitations were governed by forum law. The 
majority followed Klaxon, stating “[t]he states are free to adopt 
such rules of conflict of laws as they choose” and requiring the 
federal court to apply Pennsylvania law.200 Justice Jackson and 
two others dissented, thinking the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
required application of Alabama’s statute-of-limitations.201 
Jackson acknowledged Klaxon “contain[ed] language that 
would seem to make all conflict questions depend on the law of 
the forum,” but distinguished it—or, more accurately, aimed to 
narrow it to its facts—by noting that Klaxon concerned “an ac-
tion on contract” and hence was “but dictum so far as it touches 
this statutory tort case.”202  
Two things are worth noting. First, Wells established that 
Klaxon’s dual holdings—that choice-of-law is state law, and 
that states may select “such rules of conflict of laws as they 
choose”203—applied to the entire range of choice-of-law, by 
 
 196. See id. at 487; Brief for Petitioner, Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487 (No. 741) 
1941 WL 76680; Respondent’s Brief, Klaxon, 313 U.S. 487 (No. 741) 1941 WL 
76681. 
 197. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 196, at *4.  
 198. See id. The earlier decision was Kryger, which I discuss supra note 
182. 
 199. 345 U.S. 514 (1953). 
 200. Id. at 516.  
 201. See id. at 521–22 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (concluding that the full 
faith and credit “requir[es] that the law where the cause of action arose will 
follow the cause of action in whatever forum it is pursued”).  
 202. Id. at 520–21 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  
 203. Id. at 516 (majority opinion). 
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which I mean state laws grounded in both legislation and com-
mon law. Second, both the majority and dissent in Wells con-
fined their analysis to constitutional analysis. No Justice con-
sidered the possibility, defended in Part III, that non-
constitutional federal law determined the issue. 
B. TODAY’S MANY APPROACHES TO CHOICE-OF-LAW 
Soon after Klaxon’s declaration that choice-of-law was state 
law, all hell broke loose204: a “revolution” occurred in choice-of-
law in which the fundaments of Beale’s (and Story’s) approach 
were rejected, and replaced by not one alternative, but a multi-
plicity of contenders.205 The full story of this revolution has been 
told well before,206 and I do not intend to repeat it here. I pro-
vide a partial recounting for two reasons: (1) to definitively es-
tablish the heterogeneity of contemporary choice-of-law in the 
United States, and (2) to identify four lessons fundamental to 
Part III’s argument that choice-of-law should be 
reconceptualized as non-constitutional federal law. Both tasks 
are best accomplished by considering how each of today’s 
choice-of-law methodologies would apply to a single concrete 
case. I shall use the well-known late nineteenth-century case of 
Milliken v. Pratt.207  
Here are Milliken’s facts. Married women did not have the 
capacity to contract under Massachusetts law, but did under 
Maine law.208 Mr. and Mrs. Pratt resided in Massachusetts, 
Milliken in Maine.209 Mr. Pratt and Milliken agreed that Milli-
ken would sell certain goods to Mr. Pratt on credit, but only if 
Mrs. Pratt guaranteed her husband’s payment.210 Mrs. Pratt 
signed and handed her husband a guaranty contract, which he 
then deposited in a mailbox near their home in Massachu-
 
 204. This is not to suggest the field was orderly before. Writing in 1924, 
Ernest Lorenzen observed that “[t]here are, relatively speaking, few rules of 
the Conflict of Laws which can be said to be recognized by all Anglo-American 
states, or by the great majority of them.” LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 11–12. 
 205. Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 772, 775 (1983) (approvingly observing that “[i]t is a commonplace in 
contemporary conflict-of-laws discourse that we are witnessing a ‘revolution’ 
in the branch of that subject known as choice of law”). 
 206. See id. at 802–39 (discussing critiques of Beale’s territorialism and the 
emergence of interest analysis, the Second Restatement, lex fori, and Leflar’s 
“better law” approach).  
 207. 125 Mass. 374 (1878). 
 208. Id. at 376–77. 
 209. Id. at 374. 
 210. Id. 
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setts.211 After receiving Mrs. Pratt’s contract in the mail in 
Maine, Milliken shipped the goods to Mr. Pratt, who thereafter 
failed to make payment.212 When Milliken sued in a Massachu-
setts court to enforce Mrs. Pratt’s guaranty contract, she ar-
gued it was invalid on the ground that married women did not 
have the capacity to make contracts.213 The choice-of-law ques-
tion before the court was whether Massachusetts law governed 
the contract’s validity, in which case Mrs. Pratt would prevail, 
or whether Maine law applied, in which case the guaranty con-
tract was valid and Mr. Milliken would win.214  
1. Territorialism 
The actual court in Milliken relied on Story’s treatise, ap-
plying what has come to be known as the “territorialist” ap-
proach to choice-of-law. For our purposes, it will be useful to 
examine the presuppositions behind Story’s methodology before 
turning to the court’s analysis.  
a. Presuppositions and Description 
Near the beginning of his treatise, Justice Story wrote, 
“[b]efore entering upon any examination of the various heads, 
which a treatise upon the Conflict of Laws will naturally em-
brace, it seems necessary to advert to a few general maxims or 
axioms, which constitute the basis, upon which all reasonings 
on the subject must necessarily rest . . . .”215 Two are of interest 
to us. First, relying primarily on the seventeenth-century 
Dutch scholar Ulrich Huber,216 Story asserted “[t]he first and 
most general maxim or proposition is that . . . every nation pos-
sesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own 
territory.”217 Story thought this international law principle ap-
plied fully to sister states,218 and hence that “the laws of every 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 375. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 377. 
 215. STORY, supra note 49, § 17. 
 216. See id. §§ 29, 31; LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 155 (“Story gives to 
[Huber’s] maxims his unqualified assent”). To be more precise, what I treat as 
the first maxim is a combination of Huber’s first two, and my second maxim 
corresponds to Huber’s third. See STORY, supra note 49, § 17. 
 217. STORY, supra note 49, § 18; see also id. § 7 (“[A country’s law’s] can 
bind only its own subjects, and others, who are within its jurisdictional limits; 
and the latter only, while they remain therein.”). 
 218. See id. § 9. 
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state affect and bind directly all property . . . within its territo-
ry . . . and all persons who are resident within it,” and “no 
state . . . can, by its laws, directly affect or bind property out of 
its own territory, or bind persons not resident therein.”219 Call 
this Story’s anti-extraterritorialism maxim. Because states’ 
regulatory powers were strictly limited by their physical terri-
torial borders, Story’s approach is typically referred to as the 
“territorialist” approach to choice-of-law. 
Story’s second maxim invoked Huber once again. Notwith-
standing the anti-extraterritorialism axiom, the courts of state 
A may, and generally will, as a matter of “comity,” give “force” 
to the laws of state B insofar as state B’s laws are applied to 
property, persons and events within state B’s borders.220 For in-
stance, an English court typically will give force to a contract 
entered into in France pursuant to French laws. Comity is nec-
essary because “nothing could be more inconvenient in the 
commerce and general intercourse of nations, than that what is 
valid by the laws of one place should become without effect by 
the diversity of laws of another . . . .”221 But comity is a matter 
of the forum’s discretion,  not a legal  requirement. Accordingly, 
other states’ laws need not be given force if they are “contrary 
to [the forum’s] known policy, or prejudicial to its interests.”222  
These maxims meant that choice-of-law for Story com-
prised two parts. First were the rules for physically locating 
persons, things, and occurrences; location was crucial to deter-
mining which sovereign’s law applied on account of the anti-
extraterritorialism axiom. Second were the rules concerning 
comity.223  
b. Application to Milliken, and Modern Territorialism 
Let us now turn to the Milliken court’s decision. Under the 
first maxim, determining whether Massachusetts or Maine law 
applied turned on where some crucial event had occurred. Look-
ing to caselaw and quoting Story’s treatise, the court concluded 
that because “capacity of the contracting party” concerned the 
 
 219. Id. §§ 18, 20. For a qualification, see infra note 249 and accompanying 
text. 
 220. See STORY, supra note 49, §§ 29, 38.  
 221. Id. § 29. 
 222. Id. § 38. 
 223. Story was skeptical that comity could be reduced to clear cut rules. See 
id. § 28. The bulk of his treatise accordingly was directed to localizing rules. 
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“validity of a contract,”224 capacity was to be determined by the 
place of contracting.225 Since the contract was made in Maine,226 
that state’s capacity rules governed, so the guaranty contract 
was valid. On to the second maxim: since “it is only by the com-
ity of other states that laws can operate beyond the limit of the 
state that makes them,” the Massachusetts court then consid-
ered whether it should decline to give effect to the contract on 
grounds of “public policy.”227 Milliken gave force to Maine’s law, 
upholding the validity of Mrs. Pratt’s contract.228  
Joseph Beale carried Story’s territorialist approach for-
ward into the twentieth century. Like Story’s first maxim, 
Beale’s treatise assumed “[i]t is quite obvious that since the on-
ly law that can be applicable in a state is the law of that state, 
no law of a foreign state can have there the force of law.”229 De-
termining physical location accordingly was critical to Beale (as 
it was to Story), and Beale (like Story) concluded that “[t]he 
question whether a contract is valid” was to be determined by 
the law of the “place of contracting.”230 Beale brought this ap-
proach to the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which provided 
that “[t]he law of the place of contracting determines the validi-
ty and effect of a promise with respect to . . . capacity to make 
the contract.”231 But Beale rejected Story’s second maxim. Dis-
pensing with comity, Beale believed that “[w]hen a right has 
been created by law, this [vested] right itself becomes a fact” 
that “cannot be called into question anywhere.”232 
Beale’s Restatement is universally referred to today as the 
First Restatement because the American Law Institute adopted 
 
 224. Id. § 102b. Milliken quoted a different part of Story’s discussion that 
was not as clear as what I have reproduced above.  
 225. See Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 381 (1877) (quoting Story’s 
treatise that “capacity of persons to contract” determined by “lex loci 
contractus”). 
 226. The place of contracting was decided by the forum law, and 
Massachusetts at the time had not adopted the mailbox rule, but instead 
viewed acceptance as occurring upon the offeror’s physical receipt of offeree’s 
acceptance. See id. at 376 (noting that the guarantee was executed in 
Massachusetts and mailed in Massachusetts, but that “[t]he contract between 
the defendant and the plaintiffs was complete when the guarantee had been 
received and acted on by them at Portland, and not before”). 
 227. Id. at 382–83. 
 228. See id. 
 229. BEALE, supra note 46, § 5.4.  
 230. Joseph Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract, 23 HARV. 
L. REV. 260, 270–71 (1910). 
 231. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). 
 232. BEALE, supra note 46, § 73.    
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a second restatement of conflicts sixty-seven years later (what 
today is known as the Second Restatement of Conflicts). But 
the First Restatement is not a relic; it still is relied upon by the 
ten or so states that today utilize what is called the 
“territorialist” approach to choice-of-law.233 A modern 
territorialist state thus would conclude, as did the 1878 Milli-
ken court, that Mrs. Pratt’s contract was valid.234  
2. Modern Alternatives and Four Lessons 
Beginning in the early 1900s, the Legal Realist movement 
propounded a sustained critique of the territorialist system,235 
showing that the apparently rule-bound system of territorial-
ism was indeterminate236 and laboring to identify the actual 
considerations that informed courts’ choice-of-law determina-
tions.237 But notwithstanding the Realists’ critiques, most states 
in the United States continued using the territorialist method-
ology well into the 1950s.238 Today’s heterogeneity of choice-of-
law methodologies, which I shall now describe, is thus a rela-
tively new phenomenon.  
The discussion that follows toggles back and forth between 
two stories. The first is a demonstration of the multiple ap-
proaches to choice-of-law presently used by states. The second 
narrative arc identifies four lessons that emerge from the cri-
tique of territorialism and territorialism’s alternatives that will 
inform Part III’s argument that choice-of-law be 
reconceptualized as federal law. This subsection interweaves 
 
 233. See, e.g., Symeonides, supra note 2, at 255 (describing an Ohio court 
resolving a conflict-of-law case). 
 234. Most modern territorialist states, however, reject Beale’s view that 
vested rights categorically must be given effect, and instead allow the forum to 
refuse to give effect to the foreign law (and whatever rights it may have 
vested) through the public policy exception. 
 235. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.  
 236. For example, why not say that the legal question at issue in Milliken 
was an aspect of family law capacity, which under territorialism is governed 
by domicile, rather than the validity of contract, which under territorialism is 
governed by the place of contract formation? In other words, there is 
indeterminacy in which state’s law is selected under territorialism where (a) a 
legal question is susceptible to two different characterizations (such as ‘family 
law’ or ‘contract formation’) and (b) the two characterizations’ choice-of-law 
rule select different states’ law. 
 237. See, e.g., LORENZEN, supra note 46 (differentiating between types of 
considerations that informed court decisions about choice-of-law). 
 238. See Korn, supra note 205, at 820–22 (bringing the cases that “began to 
pave the way for the first total and explicit break with the traditional 
approach” in the choice-of-law rules concerning torts and conflicts).  
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these two narratives because they are related; the lessons sim-
ultaneously emerge from, and deepen an understanding of, 
each of territorialism’s alternatives. 
a. First Lesson: The Repudiation of Anti-Extraterritorialism  
It is important for present purposes to identify a conceptu-
al cornerstone of Story’s and Beale’s territorialism that has 
been widely repudiated: the anti-extraterritorialism maxim. As 
I shall shortly explain, the territorialist methodology does not 
depend upon the anti-extraterritorialism maxim.239 But recog-
nizing the fallacy of anti-extraterritorialism will prove to be 
important to this Article’s argument that choice-of-law is feder-
al law, and is necessary to appreciate why territorialism is not 
the only logical possibility. 
 i. Description 
For Story, the anti-extraterritorialism maxim was self-
evident:  
It is plain, that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic force, 
proprio vigore, except within the territorial limits and jurisdiction of 
that country. They can bind only its own subjects, and others, who are 
within its jurisdictional limits; and the latter only, while they remain 
therein . . . . Whatever extra-territorial force they are to have, is the 
result, not of any original power to extend them abroad, but of that 
respect, which from motives of public policy other nations are dis-
posed to yield to them . . . .240 
The anti-extraterritorialism maxim was embraced by im-
portant American jurists who preceded Story,241 by many state 
courts thereafter,242 in late nineteenth-century Supreme Court 
cases describing the scope of states’ powers,243 and by Joseph 
Beale.244  
 
 239. See infra note 263. 
 240. STORY, supra note 49, § 7. 
 241. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. (12 Tyng) 1, 3 (1816) (“That 
the laws of any State cannot, by any inherent authority, be entitled to respect 
extraterritorially, or beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, is 
the necessary result of the independence of distinct sovereignties.”). 
 242. See, e.g., Ala. Great S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126, 134 (1892) 
(holding that Alabama statute “had no efficacy beyond the lines of Alabama” 
but “is to be interpreted in the light of universally recognized principles of 
private, international, or interstate law” so that it does not “operate upon facts 
occurring in another state”); Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 383 (1877). 
 243. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877), overruled by 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (stating “every State possesses 
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its 
territory” and “no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over 
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Story’s anti-extraterritorialism maxim relied foremost on 
the Dutch treatise writer Ulrich Huber.245 Yet as Ernest 
Lorenzen has shown, in “proclaiming in such unqualified terms 
the territoriality of all laws, Huber went beyond any of his pre-
decessors.”246 French, German, and Italian scholars all recog-
nized that “some laws were deemed to follow the person wher-
ever he went,” and accordingly had extraterritorial effect.247 In 
fact, Story himself recognized this; Story discussed the civil-
ians’ distinction between real and personal statutes, concluding 
that “[w]henever [foreign jurists] wish to express, that the op-
eration of a law is universal, they compendiously announce, 
that it is a personal statute; and whenever, on the other hand, 
they wish to express, that its operation is confined to the coun-
try of its origin, they simply declare it to be a real statute.”248 
Thus Story used “universal” to mean having effect outside a 
state’s territorial borders, meaning that Story understood per-
sonal statutes to have extraterritorial effects. Story also 
acknowledged another “exception, of some importance” to the 
maxim: “that although the laws of a nation have no direct, 
binding force, or effect, except upon persons within its own ter-
ritories; yet that every nation has a right to bind its own sub-
jects by its own laws in every other place.”249 As Lorenzen 
shows, Story’s treatise embraced other exceptions to the anti-
extraterritorialism maxim.250  
 
persons or property without its territory” in determining territorial limits on 
state’s adjudicatory jurisdiction); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 
(1881) (“No State can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction. . . . 
Each State is independent of all the others in this particular.”).    
 244. See BEALE, supra note 46, § 4.12. Beale’s anti-extraterritorialism was 
the product of his jurisprudence, which posited that the “very nature of law” 
demanded that “law extend[s] over the whole territory subject to it and 
appl[ies] to every act done there,” and that only one law can apply to any 
single person, transaction or occurrence. See id. At one point in his treatise, 
however, Beale “comes perilously close to recognizing overlapping legislative 
jurisdiction.” Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our 
Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1884 n.205 
(2005) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi]. 
 245. See STORY, supra note 49, §§ 29–38; LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 136 
(“Story himself relied upon Huber more than upon any of the other foreign 
jurists”). 
 246. LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 137. 
 247. See id. 
 248. See STORY, supra note 49, §§ 12–16, at 26–27 (emphasis added).  
 249. Id. § 21.  
 250. LORENZEN, supra note 46, at 3–9.  
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While the many exceptions in his treatise may mean Story 
intended to “express only [a] general attitude of the Anglo-
American law” rather than a categorical principle of territorial-
ity,251 nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Supreme Court 
cases typically referred to the anti-extraterritoriality maxim as 
if it were absolute. An 1892 decision declared, without qualifi-
cation, that “[l]aws have no force of themselves beyond the ju-
risdiction of the State which enacts them,”252 and a 1914 case 
stated “it would be impossible to permit the statutes of Mis-
souri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . . with-
out throwing down the constitutional barriers by which all the 
States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful authori-
ty.”253 One commentator who has catalogued the Court’s “terri-
torial limits . . . on the reach of state laws” vis-à-vis criminal 
law, tax laws, and business regulations has concluded that 
“[e]very significant attribute of legislative power available to 
states was territorially circumscribed . . . by the late nineteenth 
century as a matter of constitutional principle.”254  
But categorical anti-extraterritoriality never squared with 
actual practice. From early on, states applied their laws to per-
sons, transactions, and occurrences beyond their physical bor-
ders. For example, in 1819 Virginia’s General Court held that a 
Virginia statute which criminalized “all felonies committed by 
citizen against citizen, in any such place” authorized Virginia’s 
prosecution of a Virginia citizen for having stolen a fellow Vir-
ginian’s horse in the District of Columbia.255 A nineteenth-
century Texas law provided that “[p]ersons out of the State 
may commit, and be liable to indictment and conviction for 
committing, any of the offenses enumerated in this chapter, 
which do not in their commission necessarily require a personal 
presence in this state.”256 Interpreting this law, an 1882 Texas 
decision upheld the application of Texas’s criminal law to an 
act of forgery of a land certificate for Texas property, though all 
criminal acts had occurred in Louisiana.257  
 
 251. See id. at 3 (identifying this possible interpretation of Story). 
 252. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892). 
 253. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914).  
 254. James Y. Stern, Choice of Law, the Constitution, and Lochner, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1509, 1516, 1519 (2008). 
 255. See Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172, 174 (1819).  
 256. 1879 TEX. CRIM. STAT. 454. 
 257. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289, 305–09 (1882). 
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In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court formally rec-
ognized the power of states to regulate persons and things out-
side their physical borders. In Strassheim v. Daily, the Court 
permitted Michigan to prosecute a non-Michigander for acts de-
frauding Michigan that were undertaken in Illinois.258 Writing 
for the Court, Justice Holmes wrote “[a]cts done outside a ju-
risdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental 
effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the 
harm as if he had been present at the effect.”259 Speaking of 
states’ civil jurisdiction, the Supreme Court observed in the 
1930s that “the power of [one state] to effect legal consequences 
by legislation is not limited strictly to occurrences within its 
boundaries . . . .”260 Today’s restatements and model codes ex-
plicitly acknowledge that states have the power to apply their 
laws extraterritorially.261  
Though this Article’s focus is on American law, choice-of-
law’s longstanding connection to private international law 
makes it appropriate to observe that Huber’s strict anti-
extraterritorialism has not fared well in international law ei-
ther. The Harvard Research Project famously identified five 
traditional bases of jurisdiction over crimes under international 
law, three of which justify extraterritorial regulation.262 These 
 
 258. 221 U.S. 280, 281 (1911). For a full discussion, see Rosen, supra note 
5, at 864–76. 
 259. Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285.  
 260. See Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 156 (1932), 
overruled in part by Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Alaska 
Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 532, 538 (1935) 
(applying California’s workmen’s compensation statute, which by its terms 
applied to “injuries suffered without the territorial limits of this state,” to 
work accidents occurring in Alaska); see also Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. 
Accident Comm’n of Cal., 306 U.S. 493, 498–500 (1939) (assuming that 
Massachusetts’ workmen’s compensation law, which by its terms applied to 
injuries received in course of employment “whether within or without the 
commonwealth,” could constitutionally be applied to an accident occurring in 
California).    
 261. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402 reporters’ note 5 (1986) (stating that states within the 
United States “may apply at least some laws to a person outside [State] 
territory on the basis that he is a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of the 
State”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f ) (1962) (positing that State A may 
impose liability if “the offense is based on a statute of this State that expressly 
prohibits conduct outside the State”). 
 262. See H. R. I. L., Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 
SUP 435, 445 (1935) (describing regulatory jurisdiction justified on basis of the 
“national” principle under which a country can regulate its own citizens 
extraterritorially, the “protective” principle that allows a country to regulate 
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conclusions have been broadly accepted as reflecting contempo-
rary international norms, and the Third Restatement of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States adopts the research 
project’s principles as the basis for American extraterritorial 
regulatory jurisdiction.263  
 ii. Implications of Anti-Extraterritorialism’s Repudiation 
The repudiation of Story’s first maxim does not necessarily 
entail the rejection of territorialism as a choice-of-law method-
ology. Territorialism’s rules may (or may not) be a useful meth-
od, all things considered, for purposes of choice-of-law. But an-
ti-extraterritorialism’s repudiation means that territorialism 
cannot be defended as the sole legitimate choice-of-law method-
ology on the basis of deductive logic from principles of sover-
eignty or territoriality. To explain, Story’s first maxim entailed 
a territorialist choice-of-law methodology that aimed to identify 
where something had occurred because anti-extraterritorialism 
meant that only the polity where the event transpired had the 
power to regulate it. But a location-based choice-of-law meth-
odology is no longer the only possibility in a world of extraterri-
torial regulatory jurisdiction, in which the polity where an 
event did not occur also may have the power to regulate it. Re-
pudiating the anti-extraterritorialism maxim accordingly opens 
the door to other choice-of-law methodologies.264  
There is a second respect in which the first maxim’s rejec-
tion profoundly alters choice-of-law. Under anti-
extraterritorialism, choice-of-law was a method for determining 
what single polity’s law applied to a given person, transaction, 
or occurrence. Only one law could apply—the law of the polity 
where the event transpired—and the task of choice-of-law was 
to identify which polity that was. Anti-extraterritorialism’s re-
pudiation, by contrast, entails the possibility that two (or more) 
polities might have the power to regulate a given person, 
transaction, or occurrence. In the words of the modern Supreme 
Court, “a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular is-
 
extraterritorially when its national interest is harmed, and the “passive 
personal” principle where a country can regulate non-citizens’ extraterritorial 
acts that harm their citizens extraterritorially).  
 263. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 402. 
 264. For these reasons, I reject Professor Laycock’s argument that choice-
of-law rules must be territorial. 
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sue within a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms, ap-
plication of the law of more than one jurisdiction.”265  
This means two or more polities might have concurrent 
regulatory authority, and each polity may have different regu-
lations. In such a circumstance, a genuine choice among con-
flicting laws may have to be made. After all, notwithstanding 
Story’s and Beale’s nomenclature of “conflicts of law,” the max-
im of anti-extraterritorialism in effect denied the possibility of 
conflict among jurisdictions’ regulations, and hence of any need 
to choose which polity’s law applied. Put simply, the possibility 
of conflict—and the resulting need to exercise choice—arises 
only if states have concurrent regulatory authority. 
Choosing among different polities’ conflicting laws is more 
conceptually complex than determining where something oc-
curred. Indeed, as explained further below, choosing among dif-
ferent polities’ conflicting laws is an enterprise that is inherent-
ly and unavoidably subjective—and in that sense deeply 
political.266 Though the alternatives to territorialism have been 
largely silent about their connection to anti-
extraterritorialism’s repudiation, we shall see that they all pre-
suppose the possibility of concurrent regulatory authority, and 
hence all reject anti-extraterritorialism. Their recognition that 
two or more states may have concurrent regulatory powers is 
the reason why most methodological alternatives to territorial-
ism incorporate substantial subjective components.267  
b. Modern Alternatives to Territorialism 
Let us now explore how five alternatives to territorialism 
would analyze Milliken: Interest Analysis, the Second Re-
statement, Significant Contacts, Better Law, and Lex Fori. 
 i. Interest Analysis 
We know how an interest analysis state would approach 
Milliken because Brainerd Currie, the scholar who developed 
interest analysis, provided an enormously influential critique of 
Milliken.268  
The first question an interest analysis court asks is what 
(if any) state’s law would be applicable to Mrs. Milliken’s poten-
 
 265. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981). 
 266. See infra note 287. 
 267. With the one exception of lex fori. 
 268. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-
of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). 
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tial contract. This determination is made by means of ordinary 
legal analysis: by interpreting statutory language and analyz-
ing case law. Since state law almost never explicitly indicates 
whether or not it is to apply to circumstances that straddle 
multiple states, courts applying interest analysis typically must 
appeal to the purposes behind a given law. If interpretation of 
both states’ legal materials reveals that only one state’s law 
applies, then there is a “false conflict,” and the court can only 
apply the one state’s law that is applicable. If analysis indicates 
that more than one state law is applicable, then there is a “real 
conflict.”269 (What to do with such real conflicts will be ad-
dressed shortly). 
It is worth noting that the category of real conflicts is in-
consistent with the anti-extraterritorialism maxim. Under the 
maxim, only one state’s law determines the validity of a con-
tract—the place where the contract was made. Because Massa-
chusetts law rejected the mailbox rule in Milliken’s day, and 
instead deemed a contract to form at the place of acceptance 
(Maine), only Maine’s law possibly could apply. Real conflicts, 
in other words, are an artifact of concurrent regulatory jurisdic-
tion.  
Currie proposed that the purpose of Massachusetts’s law 
disallowing married women’s contracts was to “protect [] mar-
ried women.”270 Continues Currie in a famous passage: “What 
married women? Why, those with whose welfare Massachusetts 
is concerned, of course—i.e., Massachusetts married women.”271 
On this view, Massachusetts’s law, under which married wom-
en were without the capacity to contract, indeed applied to Mrs. 
Pratt. Currie thought the policy behind Maine contract law was 
to protect the security of its residents’ contracts, and hence that 
Maine’s law applied to protect citizen Milliken.272 The Milliken 
case thus presents a “real conflict.”  
Currie thought courts lacked the institutional capacity to 
resolve real conflicts, and that Congress instead should resolve 
them pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s Effects 
 
 269. There is a third possibility under interest analysis: that no state’s law 
applies, what has been dubbed an “unprovided-for case.” I discuss this third 
case in greater detail below. See infra notes 342–51. 
 270. Currie, supra note 268, at 239.  
 271. Id. at 234. 
 272. See id. 
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Clause.273 In the absence of federal statute, Currie concluded 
that when faced with a real conflict, the forum should simply 
apply forum law.274 Some scholars have tried to develop a prin-
cipled defense of Currie’s rule.275 A state fully following Currie’s 
approach accordingly would have applied the law of Massachu-
setts, thereby finding against Mr. Milliken. 
Some interest analysis states (most notably California)276 
have rejected Currie’s solution to real conflicts, and instead ap-
ply a “comparative impairment” analysis. Comparative im-
pairment requires a court to apply the law of the state whose 
interests would be most gravely impaired if its law were not 
applied, thereby minimizing overall costs. On Milliken’s facts, 
this would mean comparing the costs to Massachusetts of not 
protecting married women (if Massachusetts law were not ap-
plied) as against the costs to Maine of not protecting the securi-
ty of its citizens’ contracts (if Maine law were not applied). The 
outcome almost always will be indeterminate, for reasons soon 
to be explained.277 
 ii. The Second Restatement 
Since twenty-three states have adopted the Second Re-
statement for choice-of-law questions concerning contracts,278 let 
us now see how Milliken would be analyzed under that ap-
proach to choice-of-law. The Second Restatement provides that 
“[i]ssues in contract are determined by the law chosen by the 
parties”279 or, if none has been chosen, “by the local law of the 
state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant 
relationship to the transaction . . . under” a laundry list of 
“principles” that are found in section 6.280 The section 6 princi-
ples include  
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the rele-
vant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested 
 
 273. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 124–
25 (1963); infra Part III.B (demonstrating Congress’s powers to enact choice-
of-law rules for both state and federal courts). 
 274. Id. at 119. 
 275. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53 (1991).  
 276. See Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723–25 (Cal. 1976). 
 277. See infra notes 310–20. 
 278. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 279. 
 279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 186 (1971). The 
Restatement provides two caveats regarding the parties’ ability to choose the 
governing law. See id. § 187(2). 
 280. Id. § 188(1). 
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states and the relative interests of those states in the determination 
of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) 
the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, 
predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determina-
tion and application of the law to be applied.281 
The Restatement further specifies that “in applying the 
principles of Section 6, a court is to “take[] into account” the 
“place of contracting,” “the place of negotiation of the contract,” 
“the place of performance,” “the location of the subject matter of 
the contract,” and “the domicil, residence, nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the parties.”282 Finally, 
“[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative 
importance with respect to the particular issue.”283 
The Second Restatement is notoriously indeterminate. 
Enumerating what seems to be all conceivably relevant consid-
erations, it provides no guidance when different factors point to 
the application of different states’ laws. Because Mrs. Pratt’s 
guaranty contract contained no choice-of-law provision, the 
question under the Second Restatement would be which state 
“has the most significant relationship”284 to the contract, as de-
termined by the Section 6 principles. Principles (b) and (c)—
”the relevant policies of the forum” and “other interested 
states”285—call for interest analysis, and so would generate a 
real conflict. Principle (c) further specifies that a court should 
consider “the relative interests of those states in the determina-
tion of the particular issue,”286 inviting a comparative impair-
ment analysis, which is indeterminate for reasons soon to be 
explained.287 The “protection of justified expectations”288 (princi-
ple (d)) would favor Maine law on the theory that the parties 
are presumed to have intended to create valid contracts.289 
“Certainty, predictability and uniformity of result”290 could be 
argued either way.  
Second Restatement courts typically do not consider all of 
Section 6’s principles, and a frequently overlooked considera-
 
 281. Id. § 6. 
 282. Id. § 188(2). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. § 188(1). 
 285. Id. § 6. 
 286. Id. (emphasis added).  
 287. See infra notes 310–20. 
 288. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
 289. Cf. Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 137–38 (1882) (holding that 
parties are presumed to have intended to create a valid contract). 
 290. Id. 
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tion is principle (a)’s “needs of the interstate . . . system[].”291 If 
it were applied, principle (a) might favor application of Maine 
law, which arguably facilitates interstate commerce. Principle 
(e), the “basic policies underlying the particular field of law,”292 
would favor Maine law to the extent the “basic policy” underly-
ing contract law is facilitating transactions, though principle (e) 
also could be argued to favor Massachusetts law insofar as con-
tract law paternalistically protects persons. 
 iii. Significant Contacts 
Five states use a “significant contacts” and/or “center-of-
gravity” test for resolving choice-of-law questions regarding 
contracts,293 which is akin to the Second Restatement “most sig-
nificant relationship” test but without the section 6 principles. 
This test requires the court to identify all relevant contacts 
that the parties had with each state and select the state with 
the greatest number and importance of contacts. This test is 
indeterminate for three main reasons. First, the number of con-
tacts is a function of how each contact is characterized, and 
multiple characterizations are possible. For instance, is there a 
single Maine contact described by Mrs. Pratt’s guaranty con-
tract with Milliken, or should each of Mr. Milliken’s actions in 
Maine regarding the guaranty contract (for instance concerning 
its negotiation, its receipt, his acting upon it) count as a sepa-
rate contact? Second, there is uncertainty as to whether all con-
tacts count, or only those that are (deemed to be) relevant to 
the choice-of-law decision at hand. For example, do any, or all, 
of Mr. Pratt’s contacts with Massachusetts and Maine in rela-
tion to the sales contract count for purposes of determining 
which state’s law applies to determine the validity of the guar-
anty contract? Third, most courts that utilize the significant 
contacts test do not claim to decide simply based on which state 
has the largest number of contacts. This means they assess the 
relative weight of the different contacts, a self-evidently open-
ended inquiry. The center-of-gravity test is intended to be more 
intuition-based than significant contacts, but in practice it too 
tends to look to contacts.  
 
 291. Gary J. Simson, Choice of Law After the Currie Revolution: What Role 
for the Needs of the Interstate and International Systems?, 63 MERCER L. REV. 
715, 724 (2012).  
 292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6. 
 293. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 279.  
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As applied to the facts of Milliken, the significant contacts 
and center-of-gravity tests are indeterminate, for the reasons 
mentioned above. Massachusetts law may be selected on the 
basis that the Pratts at all times were there, and Mrs. Pratt’s 
guaranty contract was in aid of a delivery of goods to Massa-
chusetts. On the other hand, Maine also had many contacts: 
Mr. Milliken at all times was there, the guaranty contract was 
accepted and hence became a contract there, and Mr. Milliken 
acted upon both the goods and guaranty contracts in Maine.  
 iv. Better Law 
Two states use what is known as the “better law” ap-
proach, based on the work of the late Dean Robert A. Leflar, for 
resolving choice-of-law questions concerning contracts.294 Leflar 
claimed to identify “five major choice-influencing considera-
tions, within which all or most of the factors that ordinarily af-
fect choice-of-law decisions can be incorporated”:295 (1) predicta-
bility of results, (2) maintenance of the interstate and 
international order, (3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) 
advancement of the forum’s governmental interests, and (5) 
application of the better rule of law. Leflar purported to strip 
away the “manipulative devices to cover up”296 that led courts to 
decide as they did, and to forthrightly describe the factors that 
courts actually take into account.297 
As to the first factor, Leflar wrote that “[u]niformity of re-
sults, regardless of forum, has always been a major goal in 
choice-of-law theory.”298 Leflar explained the third factor to 
mean that courts “use their own procedural rules.”299 Leflar’s 
understanding of the remaining factors in effect rendered his 
system a variant of interest analysis. Leflar explained the se-
cond factor as meaning that “[n]o forum whose concern with a 
set of facts is negligible should claim priority for its law over 
the law of a state which has a clearly superior concern with the 
facts . . . .”300 This reduced the second factor to interest analy-
 
 294. Id. 
 295. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing 
Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1585–87 (1966). 
 296. Id. at 1588. 
 297. Id. at 1585–86.  
 298. Id. at 1586. 
 299. Id. at 1587. 
 300. Id. at 1586. Further, “nor should any state’s choice-of-law system be 
based upon deliberate across-the-board ‘forum preference.’” Id. This is a 
rejection of the system known as lex fori, under which the forum simply 
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sis’s insight regarding “‘false conflicts,”: a court first should de-
termine if more than one state’s law applies and, if not, should 
apply the single applicable law.301 Leflar’s fourth and fifth fac-
tors largely address real conflicts: the fourth factor favors fo-
rum law so long as it “has a genuine concern with the facts in a 
given case”302—what in effect justifies Currie’s rule that forum 
law applies where there is a real conflict—and the fifth factor 
provides that courts appropriately may choose the substantive 
law they objectively believe to be the best.303  
As applied to Milliken, Leflar’s approach would permit the 
Massachusetts court to resolve the real conflict in either of two 
ways: choosing the law it thought to be best (either Massachu-
setts because it protected a class of people needing protection, 
or Maine’s because the Massachusetts law was archaic or oth-
erwise unwise), or applying Massachusetts law because the fo-
rum had a genuine concern with the case. 
 v. Lex fori 
Some states apply a choice-of-law rule of lex fori, under 
which forum law applies so long as the forum has any signifi-
cant contact.304 Lex fori presently is applied by only two states 
in respect only to torts,305 though it has been endorsed by many 
scholars as the presumptive rule that should apply to contracts 
as well.306 Scholars supportive of this approach typically view 
lex fori as a strong, though not absolute, presumption to be 
overridden “only in such distinctive problem areas where a 
transnationally [and country-wide] uniform pattern of 
 
applies forum law. A few modern states have adopted lex fori vis-à-vis tort 
law. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 279. 
 301. As I explain below, this reflects an incomplete understanding of what 
is required by facilitating the interstate system.  
 302. Leflar, supra note 295, at 1587. 
 303. Id. at 1588. 
 304. See, e.g., Saleba v. Schrand, 300 S.W.3d 177, 181 n.2, 182 (Ky. 2009) 
(holding that, absent a “special reason”, the law of the forum state, Kentucky, 
should apply regarding torts). 
 305. Symeonides, supra note 2, at 279. 
 306. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori – Basic Rule in the Conflict of 
Laws, 58 MICH. L. REV. 637, 679 (1960); Amos Shapira, “Grasp All, Lose All”: 
On Restraints and Moderation in the Reformulation of Choice of Law Policy, 
77 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 256–57 (1977). Prominent contemporary endorsers 
include Dean Simson, see Simson, supra note 291, at 726–27, and perhaps 
Louise Weinberg, see Weinberg, supra note 275, at 65–67, 87–94 (proposing 
forum law-solution to real conflicts using rationale that arguably supports lex 
fori more generally).  
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decisionmaking is patently indicated.”307 A lex fori approach in 
Milliken would have led to the application of Massachusetts 
law.308  
c. Second Lesson: The Heterogeneity of the Modern Approaches 
The second lesson from the modern period is straightfor-
ward: there is a multitude of approaches to choice-of-law that 
the states presently employ. As illustrated by our exercise with 
Milliken, both analysis and outcomes vary depending upon the 
choice-of-law methodology.  
d. Third Lesson: The Existence and Intractability of Real 
Conflicts  
The third lesson from the modern approaches is that there 
can be real conflicts, and that such conflicts are intractable. All 
alternatives to classical territorialism recognize—consistent 
with contemporary Supreme Court doctrine309—that states can 
have concurrent regulatory jurisdiction, and that more than 
one state’s substantively divergent laws can apply to a particu-
lar person, transaction, or occurrence.310 When two or more 
such laws apply we have a real conflict—something that was 
conceptually impossible under territorialism’s anti-
extraterritoriality axioms, under which only one state’s law 
could govern a single transaction or occurrence.311 Sixty years of 
case law and intense scholarly thought have failed to uncover a 
satisfactory judicial solution to real conflicts.312 Currie’s pro-
posal that forum law should be applied is administratively 
simple but normatively unsatisfactory, for it impairs pre-
litigation predictability as to governing law, results in incon-
sistent outcomes, and encourages forum shopping. Leflar’s bet-
ter law approach likewise undermines pre-litigation predicta-
bility, generates inconsistent results, and suffers from the 
 
 307. Shapira, supra note 306, at 265–69. 
 308. The uncertainty is generated by the fact that scholars supportive of lex 
fori have recognized the need for an exception to protect justified expectations. 
See id. at 265–66.  
 309. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313–20 (1981) (holding 
that Minnesota state law could apply to a tort that occurred outside the state). 
 310. This is true of the scholarly forms of lex fori that recognize lex fori to 
be a strong, but rebuttable, presumption. See, e.g., Shapira, supra note 306, at 
265–69. 
 311. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 312. See Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be 
Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 819 n.179 (2004). 
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added drawback of vesting judges with decisionmaking authori-
ty—choosing what they think to be the best law—that is not 
properly theirs in a democracy. 
The most conceptually promising approach to resolving re-
al conflicts is comparative impairment. Comparative impair-
ment posits that real conflicts should be resolved by means of a 
decision rule that minimizes the costs of non-application of the 
two states’ laws.313 In other words, a court should apply the law 
of the state whose interests would be most impaired were its 
law not applied. Though such a decisionmaking rule seems 
wise,314 it is exceedingly difficult for a single court to imple-
ment. After all, how are the costs of non-application to be 
measured and compared? Each state’s law typically reflects di-
verging judgments as to facts, and as to how incommensurable 
commitments are to be harmonized. When state laws are a re-
sult of these sorts of differences, comparative impairment can-
not generate determinate answers.  
To illustrate, consider Milliken once again. Massachusetts 
valued security of contracts, but thought it more important to 
protect married women. Maine either thought married women 
did not need special protection (i.e., had a different assessment 
of facts), or thought it more important to uphold contracts (i.e., 
had a different values assessment). If the difference between 
the two states’ laws reflected differing assessments of facts, 
how is a court applying comparative impairment to generate a 
determinate answer? The answer is simple: it cannot. Compar-
ative impairment is similarly indeterminate if the two states 
agreed as to facts but differed as to commitments. Protecting 
married women and securing contracts are both commitments, 
 
 313. See generally Baxter, supra note 17 (discussing rationale behind 
comparative impairment). There is a vast literature on comparative 
impairment. In addition to Baxter’s article, the most important analyses 
include William H. Allen & Erin A. O’Hara, Second Generation Law and 
Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter’s Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 1011, 1034–37 (1999); Leo Kanowitz, Comparative 
Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 
HASTINGS. L.J. 255 (1978); Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative 
Impairment To Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California 
Experience, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 576 (1980); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of 
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 316–18 (1990). 
 314. Though one might ask why the states would not instead select a rule 
that sought to maximize the benefits of applying state law. The results of 
Comparative Impairment and (what might be called) “Comparative 
Betterment” conceivably could diverge, and why is the former decisional rule 
preferable to the latter?  
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but they are what philosophers call “incommensurable”: it is 
not possible to translate both of them to a meaningful common 
metric such that an objective comparison can be made between 
them. Making decisions between or among incommensurable 
commitments accordingly is an exercise of subjective choice ra-
ther than cold logic. Indeed, such choices define and express, 
and in that sense are deeply constitutive of, the 
decisionmaker’s character;315 an individual’s choice among com-
peting incommensurable commitments goes far to determining 
who she is as a person,316 and a state’s decision among compet-
ing incommensurable commitments is a core determinant of its 
political culture.  
There is no “view from nowhere” from which a single insti-
tution can undertake a comparative impairment analysis.317 Ac-
cordingly, comparative impairment clarifies why real conflicts 
present intractable dilemmas, but does not provide courts tools 
to generate determinate solutions. Fortunately, as I have ex-
plained in detail elsewhere, legislators can undertake compara-
tive impairment by negotiating solutions to real conflicts before 
they occur.318 The bad news concerning real conflicts, according-
ly, is not that they cannot be managed, but just that courts 
cannot manage them well.  
Another approach to managing real conflicts is to let citi-
zens choose the law themselves through contractual choice-of-
law provisions.319 Such a “party autonomy” approach doesn’t 
contradict the argument above that real conflicts are conceptu-
ally intractable; it eliminates the conflict rather than resolving 
it. But party autonomy has limitations. First, it is an option on-
ly where parties have an ex ante relationship, and hence is 
 
 315. See Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in 
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth 
Chang ed.) 151, 151–69 (focusing on individual decision making under 
circumstances of incommensurability); Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and 
Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, 
supra, at 110, 127 (arguing that choice, not rationality, governs the selection 
among incommensurables); Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in 
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra, at 
178–83 (arguing that justified choice among incomparables can be made by 
analyzing how the competing goods fit within the “shape” of a person’s life). 
 316. See Taylor, supra note 315. 
 317. But cf. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (addressing the 
problem of how to combine subjective and objective viewpoints).  
 318. See Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role, supra note 170, at 21–25. 
 319. Advocates of this approach do not believe it to be limited to resolving 
real conflicts. 
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available for only a subset of choice-of-law questions. Further, 
party autonomy is normatively suspect where one of the con-
tracting parties is a repeat player with superior information 
and resources to the other contracting party, for party autono-
my allows the repeat-player to systematically choose the sub-
stantive law that benefits it.320 This can have undesirable dis-
tributive consequences, and also may undermine paternalistic 
law and laws that protect third-party interests.321  
e. Fourth Lesson: Fading of Interstate Considerations 
The final lesson to draw from our survey of alternatives to 
territorialism is that contemporary choice-of-law approaches do 
not take much account of the health of the interstate system. 
We can readily hypothesize how this has come to pass: the most 
influential alternative to territorialism, Currie’s governmental 
interest approach, focuses exclusively on states—ascertaining 
the state “interests” behind the different states’ laws—and lit-
erally takes no account of the interstate system.322 Leflar’s se-
cond factor is “maintenance of the interstate . . . order,” but he 
(and cases following him) treated this as being interchangeable 
with the charge that courts should be aware of false conflicts.323 
The Second Restatement’s section six principles include “the 
 
 320. See, e.g., HERMA H. KAY, LARRY KRAMER & KERMIT ROOSEVELT, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 115–16 (9th ed. 2013) (detailing plan of Citicorp, a New 
York holding company, to undertake steps so South Dakota usury law, which 
allows charges of up to twenty-four percent interest, would apply to consumer 
credit card contracts).  
 321. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971) 
(explaining that the parties’ choice of law is disregarded if “application of the 
law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a state 
which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the 
determination of the particular issue”). A considerable body of case law refuses 
to enforce choice-of-law provisions on the ground that the chosen law 
contravenes public policy. See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 247–52 (discussing 
recent cases concerning enforceability of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum 
provisions). 
 322. See Simson, supra note 306, at 722 (“[I]nterest analysis leaves little 
room for courts to consider policies other than those reflected in states’ 
domestic laws . . . .”); Trautman, Toward Federalizing, supra note 14, at 1721–
22. 
 323. See Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 157 (1973) (“[N]o more is called 
for than that the court apply the law of no state which does not have 
substantial connection with the total facts and the particular issue being 
litigated.”); Leflar, supra note 295, at 1587 (“No forum whose concern with a 
set of facts is negligible should claim priority for its law over the law of a state 
which has a clearly superior concern with the facts.”). 
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needs of the interstate and international systems,”324 but this 
also has not received much attention from courts or commenta-
tors.325 As Dean Simson has observed, “in practice, the needs of 
the interstate and international systems have figured only 
marginally in courts’ decisions on choice of law. Even on the ra-
re occasions that the needs are mentioned in the courts’ opin-
ions, they often play no meaningful role in the final resolu-
tion.”326  
III.  RECONCEPTUALIZING CHOICE-OF-LAW AS 
FEDERAL LAW   
Building on the insights from Parts I and II, this Part pre-
sents this Article’s core claim: that in a post-Erie positivist 
world in which law must be traceable to some sovereign, do-
mestic choice-of-law rules must be federal law. Section A ex-
plains why, on functional and conceptual grounds, choice-of-law 
must be federal law. Section B fortifies Section A’s argument on 
positive grounds, showing that the Constitution gives Congress 
the power to prescribe uniform choice-of-law rules that would 
be applicable in both state and federal courts. Section C argues 
that the 1948 amendments to the Full Faith and Credit Act 
partially overruled Klaxon, and that Klaxon should be fully 
overturned to revive language in the Rules of Decision Act that 
authorizes federal courts to create federal choice-of-law rules. 
Section D explains that even without these two federal stat-
utes, choice-of-law would best be understood as a nationwide, 
uniform body of federal common law.  
A. WHY CHOICE-OF-LAW IS FEDERAL LAW 
For functional and conceptual reasons, domestic choice-of-
law is best understood as being federal law.327 First, as Subsec-
 
 324. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(a) (1971). 
 325. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, On the Need for a Uniform Choice of Law 
Code, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2134, 2141 (1991) (arguing “we must think about 
choice of law more like treaty negotiations, where the ‘correctness’ of a 
particular solution is simply a matter of what the states agree to do,” thus 
overlooking systemic considerations). 
 326. Simson, supra note 306, at 749; Luther L. McDougal III, Toward the 
Increased Use of Interstate and International Policies in Choice-of-Law 
Analysis in Tort Cases Under the Second Restatement and Leflar’s Choice-
Influencing Considerations, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2465, 2466–69 (1996). 
 327. See Hart, supra note 18, at 514 (concluding that questions addressed 
by conflict of laws are “essentially federal, in the sense that they involve, by 
hypothesis, more than one state.”); Trautman, Toward Federalizing, supra 
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tion 1 explains, choice-of-law can only discharge its function of 
managing the differences of substantive law across polities if 
there is a single uniform set of choice-of-law rules across those 
polities—what this Article has been calling the Single System 
Requirement. Interestingly, all three pre-modern conceptuali-
zations of choice-of-law surveyed in Part I—choice-of-law as 
general law, as Bealean common law, and as constitutional 
law—satisfied the Single System Requirement. In a post-Erie 
world, federal law holds out the only prospect for satisfying the 
Single System Requirement. Subsections 2 through 4 argue 
that, as a conceptual matter, federal law is the appropriate ap-
paratus for policing the limits of states’ extraterritorial powers, 
determining the nature of our federal union, and maintaining 
the health of the interstate and federal systems.  
1. An Historical and Functional Argument for the Single 
System Requirement 
a. The Single System Requirement, and the Unyielding Need 
for Uniform Results 
As Part I showed, choice-of-law historically has functioned 
as a system for managing substantive differences of law across 
polities to facilitate cross-polity transactions; it was originally 
developed in Europe to serve this goal, and was imported into 
this country to do the same. Choice-of-law can effectively man-
age the differences in substantive law across polities only if 
choice-of-law generates uniform outcomes across those polities. 
That is to say, the chosen law—the law deemed applicable to a 
person, transaction, or occurrence that straddles multiple poli-
ties—cannot vary depending upon which polity’s court is asked 
to determine which law applies. If choice-of-law does not gener-
ate uniform results, then it will not be predictable as to which 
polity’s law applies.  
The absence of predictability is deeply problematic, for 
predictability is necessary for both people and polities: predict-
ability allows parties to rationally plan their activities with the 
knowledge of what law applies, and thereby enables the regu-
lating polity’s laws to be efficacious. To elaborate, without pre-
dictability, there will be pre-litigation uncertainty, or mistake, 
 
note 14 (“I have no doubt that choice of law as between states of the United 
States is, in theory, inherently and unarguably a federal question.”); see also 
Gottesman, supra note 16, at 32 (arguing that choice-of-law is a “uniquely 
appropriate federal role”).  
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as to which state’s law applies. People will be unable to conform 
their actions to legal requirements, or to intelligently bargain 
in the shadow of the law. Such legal uncertainty also under-
mines states’ capacity to effectively regulate, to the extent that 
compliance requires knowledge as to what law governs.328 Fur-
thermore, if the need for litigation should arise, heterogeneous 
choice-of-law regimes and their attendant non-uniformities will 
encourage forum shopping, and may impose unnecessary litiga-
tion costs—for instance, fighting as to which choice-of-law rules 
apply, and efforts to transfer forum so as to trigger a choice-of-
law system that will select the favored substantive law. For all 
these reasons, if a choice-of-law system does not generate uni-
form results, choice-of-law cannot successfully accomplish its 
managerial functions.  
Choice-of-law can generate uniform results, and hence al-
low for predictability as to applicable law, only if one condition 
holds: if all the polities whose differences in substantive law oc-
casion the need for choice-of-law use the same choice-of-law 
rules.329 This is what gives rise to what I have been calling 
choice-of-law’s ‘Single System Requirement.’ Predictability is 
lost if the Single System Requirement is not met. If two polities 
use different choice-of-law rules—such that state A’s choice-of-
law rules select state Z’s contract law whereas state B’s choice-
of-law rules select state Y’s—then parties cannot predict what 
law will govern, and choice-of-law will fail as a management 
system.  
 
 328. Compliance sometimes is possible even under conditions of 
uncertainty as to which state’s law governs. For example, if one state’s law is 
stricter than another’s with respect to only a single dimension, it is possible to 
comply with both state’s laws. But compliance with the stricter law may in 
some circumstances be in tension with the less strict state’s law. For example, 
if the less strict state’s policy is to permit persons to be unregulated where its 
restrictions are inapplicable, then compliance with the stricter state’s law due 
to uncertainty as to which state’s law applies must be deemed to undermine 
the policy of the less-strict state.  
 329. See Hart, supra note 18, at 514 (“[U]niformity of obligation as between 
particular individuals, regardless of the locus of litigation, is almost invariably 
desirable; and the essence of this can be achieved without enacting uniform 
substantive laws. The promotion of this kind of uniformity . . . is one of the 
functions of the principles of the conflict of laws.”). 
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b. The Single System Requirement As a Solution to Renvoi 
 i. The Problem of Renvoi 
An additional consideration demonstrates that choice-of-
law has a Single System Requirement. The Single System Re-
quirement eliminates what is widely described as the most con-
ceptually intractable problem in choice-of-law, renvoi.330 
Demonstrating this necessitates full discussion of the intricate 
subject of  renvoi.  Readers who are not already familiar with 
renvoi may wish to jump ahead ten pages to Part III.A.1(c); 
while the analysis of renvoi below strengthens the case for the 
Single System Requirement, the less technical considerations 
discussed thereafter fully ground this Article’s argument that 
choice-of-law is inherently federal. 
To explain renvoi, let us slightly rework the facts of the 
well-known case of In re Schneider’s Estate.331 Consider a domi-
ciliary of State A who, at his death, has real property in State 
B. Assume that the decedent’s will is valid under State A’s law, 
but not State B’s. Assume further that State A’s choice-of-law 
rule provides that the law of the place where the real property 
is located governs the will’s validity as regards that property 
(the situs rule), whereas State B’s choice-of-law rule is that a 
will’s validity is governed by the law of the testator’s domicile 
(the domicile rule).  
Note what will occur if a lawsuit concerning the will’s va-
lidity as applied to the real property is litigated in the court of 
State A. Applying State A’s choice-of-law rule, Court A will de-
termine that the question of the will’s validity should be deter-
mined by the law of State B. But when Court A goes to apply 
the law of State B, it must consider what to do about State B’s 
choice-of-law rule, which provides that the will’s validity should 
be governed by State A’s law. There are only two options, nei-
ther of which is palatable.  
 
 330. For an extensive list of scholars who identify renvoi as intractable, see 
Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra note 244, at 1822–24. For thorough 
discussions of the many unsuccessful solutions to renvoi that have been 
propounded by American scholars, see Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 984–97 (1991). Most recently, proponents of interest 
analysis thought their approach eliminated the problem of renvoi, but Larry 
Kramer and Kermit Roosevelt have persuasively debunked that claim. See id. 
at 997–1012; Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1850–64. I 
discuss Professor Roosevelt’s intriguing proposed solution to renvoi below. See 
infra Part III.A.1.b.iii. 
 331. 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). 
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First, Court A can apply State B’s choice-of-law rule—in 
the arcane language of choice-of-law, Court A can ‘accept the 
renvoi.’ But doing so will generate an infinite loop, for State A’s 
choice-of-law, it should be recalled, determines that State B’s 
law applies (which in turn determines that State A’s law ap-
plies, which in turn determines that State B’s law applies, ad 
infinitum).332 The infinite loop can be eliminated if, after accept-
ing the renvoi from State B, Court A disregards its own choice-
of-law rule (rejects the renvoi) and applies only its ‘internal 
law’ concerning testamentary validity. But what justification 
can there be for accepting the renvoi once and once only—that 
is to say, for State A to apply choice-of-law rules twice (first the 
choice-of-law of its own state and then State B’s domiciliary 
rule), and thereafter to ignore choice-of-law rules? To this day, 
there is no widely accepted answer to this question.333  
The second option is that after Court A applies its choice-
of-law rule—which, to recall, indicates that State B’s law gov-
erns the will’s validity—Court A can ignore State B’s choice-of-
law rule (‘reject the renvoi’) and straightaway apply State B’s 
testamentary rules to the will (apply only State B’s ‘internal 
law’, not its ‘whole law,’ in the language of renvoi). Rejecting 
the renvoi avoids the risk of an infinite loop, but what is the 
justification for Court A’s decision to apply only its state’s 
choice-of-law rule? No widely accepted answer to this question 
has yet been identified.334 
 ii. Solving Renvoi by Banishing It: The Single System 
Requirement 
This Article solves renvoi by eliminating it: renvoi arises 
only if different states have different choice-of-law rules, and 
this Article’s core claim is that there must be a single federal 
choice-of-law system operative in both state and federal 
courts.335 Put differently, the paradox of renvoi is additional ev-
 
 332. Renvoi also arises if State B’s choice-of-law rules would select the 
substantive law of State C. For present purposes we need not explore this even 
more complicated scenario, which only amplifies the point made above in the 
text. 
 333. See CURRIE ET AL., supra note 125, at 64–70; supra note 330. 
 334. See id. 
 335. Professor Roosevelt has stated that “eliminat[ing] the possibility of 
renvoi . . . requires complete uniformity in choice-of-law methodology, internal 
law, and characterization techniques—at which point, obviously, there is very 
little need for choice of law.” See Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1830. 
While Roosevelt is right to dismiss as impossible such a trifecta uniformity, see 
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idence for the Single System Requirement. Satisfying the Sin-
gle System Requirement—ensuring that there is a single 
choice-of-law system over the jurisdictions whose differences in 
substantive law choice-of-law manages—is the only way to 
avoid the paradox of renvoi. 
My renvoi-avoiding argument on behalf of the Single Sys-
tem Requirement would be weakened, though not fatally un-
dermined, if there were a satisfactory alternative solution to 
renvoi. Such an alternative would weaken my argument on be-
half of the Single System Requirement because renvoi would no 
longer be a veritable paradox; a solution’s ability to sidestep an 
unsolvable paradox constitutes strong evidence that the solu-
tion contains a conceptual advance.336 In separate articles, Pro-
fessors Larry Kramer and Kermit Roosevelt each have demon-
strated the insufficiencies of the proposed solutions to renvoi 
that were advanced in the twentieth century.337 I find their 
analyses persuasive, and accordingly incorporate their argu-
ments by reference.  
Accompanying Professor Roosevelt’s review of the unsatis-
factory past solutions, however, is an ingenious novel solution 
to renvoi.338 The strength of my claim on behalf of the Single 
 
id. (“Renvoi . . . is aptly termed one of the ‘pervasive problems’ in choice of 
law.” (citations omitted)), he overstates the uniformity necessary to eliminate 
renvoi. Uniformity as to internal law and characterization techniques is 
necessary only within a territorialist approach to choice-of-law, for only 
territorialism relies on characterization and internal law to locate where a 
transaction or occurrence has taken place. Though this Article is not the place 
to fully work out the details of federal choice-of-law, this much can be said: the 
fact that territorialism demands uniformity of substantial swaths of 
substantive law to achieve uniformity of choice-of-law results is a strong 
reason for rejecting territorialism as a candidate insofar as one of choice-of-
law’s core tasks is to generate uniform results that permit ex ante 
predictability. I provide a few more general observations concerning the 
specifics of federal choice-of-law below. See infra notes 474–77.  
 336. Even the existence of a remedy for renvoi would not necessarily 
destroy my claim that the Single System Requirement’s circumvention of 
renvoi constitutes strong evidence in its favor. Whether the existence of a 
solution in fact rendered the Single System Requirement’s avoidance of renvoi 
normatively irrelevant would turn on a detailed analysis of the solution’s 
strengths and weaknesses. For example, a ‘solution’ that created problems, or 
that was based on counterfactual assumptions, would do little to undermine 
the strength of an approach that obviated the problem. Moreover, the 
existence of even a fully satisfactory solution to renvoi would not necessarily 
undermine this Article’s argument for the Single System Requirement, 
becauseavoiding a problem altogether still might be normatively preferable. 
Further, some problems have multiple good solutions. 
 337. See Kramer, supra note 330; Roosevelt, supra note 330. 
 338. See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244.  
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System Requirement’s elimination of renvoi accordingly de-
pends in part on whether Roosevelt’s solution is satisfactory.339 
For the reasons explained below, I believe Roosevelt’s solution 
to be brilliant but deeply problematic. It thus does not deflate 
the power of the Single System Requirement’s elimination of 
renvoi.  
 iii. Professor Roosevelt’s Proposed Solution to Renvoi 
Roosevelt argues that where the choice-of-law rules of two 
states each determine that the other state’s substantive law 
applies—as in the variation on In re Schneider’s Estate dis-
cussed above—the solution is that no state’s substantive law 
applies. Roosevelt’s solution, in other words, draws upon, and 
expands, the component of interest analysis known as the 
“unprovided-for” case. In Roosevelt’s words, “renvoi is simply a 
special instance of the unprovided-for case.”340  
To appreciate Roosevelt’s argument, it is important to 
quickly explain the notion of the unprovided-for case. The first 
step of interest analysis is to determine whether each state’s 
law would apply to the multistate set of facts.341 “False con-
flicts” are present where only one state’s law applies, whereas 
“true conflicts” are where two (or more) states’ laws apply. But 
there is a third possibility: that no state’s law applies. And that 
is the unprovided-for case. As I shall now explain, though the 
unprovided-for case is a perfectly valid concept, Roosevelt’s in-
vocation of it as a solution to renvoi is problematic, and ulti-
mately unworkable. 
A concrete example will aid our analysis, so let us consider 
the classic case of Erwin v. Thomas.342 After Mr. Erwin was in-
jured by Mr. Thomas in Washington, Erwin’s wife sued Thomas 
in Oregon for loss of consortium.343 Oregon law permitted such 
claims, whereas Washington did not allow wives to sue for loss 
of consortium.344 Applying interest analysis, the Oregon court 
determined that Washington law would not apply to these 
facts; the court thought the purpose of the Washington law was 
to protect Washington defendants from having to pay for loss of 
 
 339. But see supra note 336. 
 340. See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1885. 
 341. See supra notes 268–70. 
 342. 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973).  
 343. Id. at 494–95. 
 344. Id. at 495. 
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consortium,345 and there was no Washington defendant on the 
case’s facts.346 The court also concluded that Oregon law was 
inapplicable; the court thought Oregon law aimed to compen-
sate Oregon wives, and there was no Oregon wife in the case.347  
Although several scholars have argued that the possibility 
of the category of an unprovided-for case proves that interest 
analysis is conceptually unsound,348 Professor Larry Kramer 
persuasively argues that an unprovided-for case on facts like 
Erwin is simply an unproblematic instance where “[t]he plain-
tiff has no cause of action . . . because she suffered no legally 
cognizable injury.”349 The appropriate response to an 
unprovided-for case of this sort is simply to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim on which relief can be granted—a pedestrian 
occurrence that in no way undermines interest analysis’s con-
ceptual coherence.350  
Though Professor Kramer’s explanation of the unprovided-
for case is to my mind irrefutably sound, Professor Roosevelt’s 
reliance on unprovided-for cases to resolve renvoi does not 
work, for four reasons. Accordingly, the Single System Re-
quirement’s circumvention of renvoi remains a robust argu-
ment on the requirement’s behalf.  
First, Roosevelt’s approach generates more gaps in the law 
than good sense suggests exist. For example, Roosevelt’s ap-
proach leads to the conclusion that no state’s law governs the 
validity of domiciliary A’s will in In re Schneider’s Estate. Con-
sider as well the question in Milliken regarding the validity of 
Mrs. Pratt’s guaranty contract: because Massachusetts choice-
of-law indicated that Maine law applies, and Maine’s choice-of-
 
 345. Professor Kramer persuasively critiques this interpretation of 
Washington law. See Larry Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-For” Case, 
75 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1062 (1989).  
 346. 506 P.2d at 496. 
 347. Id. 
 348. See Kramer, supra note 345, at 1046 (citing arguments to this effect 
propounded by Professor Aaron Twerski, Dean John Hart Ely, and Professor 
Lea Brilmayer). 
 349. Id. at 1062. Professor Kramer ultimately concludes that the privileges 
and immunities clause would obligate Oregon to apply Oregon law and that 
Erwin v. Thomas therefore is not really an unprovided-for case. See id. at 
1073. I do not agree with that component of Kramer’s argument, though this 
already lengthy Article is not the place to explain why; this Article’s argument 
on behalf of the Single System Requirement does not at all depend upon the 
conceptual soundness of unprovided-for cases.  
 350. Professor Roosevelt agrees. See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, 
note 244, at 1885 (endorsing Kramer’s solution). 
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law rule would have selected Massachusetts contract law (on 
the assumption the mailbox rule was operative in Maine, so 
that any contract would have come into existence in Massachu-
setts, where Mr. Pratt mailed the contract), Roosevelt would 
conclude that no law governed the validity of Mrs. Pratt’s con-
tract. Yet the conclusion that no law governed either of these 
situations seems unsound. Lawmakers and citizens likely 
would expect that some law governed the will’s validity, and the 
validity of Mrs. Pratt’s contract. Let us call the absence of law 
in each of these cases, under Professor Roosevelt’s approach, a 
“Surprising Gap.” 
The category of a Surprising Gap does not entail a rejection 
of unprovided-for cases. Tools that Professor Roosevelt has 
helped publicize enable us to see why. Roosevelt helpfully sug-
gests that choice-of-law analysis consists of two steps: (1) iden-
tifying the ‘scope’ of each state’s law to determine what kind of 
case there is (for instance a false or true conflict) and, if there is 
a true conflict, (2) applying a “rule of priority” to determine 
“which of the conflicting rights will prevail.”351 It makes perfect 
sense to invoke the category of the unprovided-for case when 
analysis at the first step determines that a multistate circum-
stance falls outside the scope of both states’ laws; that is what 
happened, for instance, in the above-discussed case of Erwin v. 
Thomas. The category of a ‘Surprising Gap’ hence sheds no 
doubt on the validity of unprovided-for cases.  
Professor Roosevelt’s tools also help us to see, however, 
why his proposed solution to renvoi creates veritable Surprising 
Gaps. It makes no sense to conclude that there is an 
unprovided-for case where analysis of the scope of each state’s 
laws determines that both would apply, and renvoi results only 
because each state uses a different “rule of priority.” Calling 
such a circumstance an unprovided-for case is, in fact, perverse; 
rather than being unprovided-for, the circumstance is overpro-
vided-for, in the sense that multiple states’ laws are prima facie 
applicable. We confront renvoi—each state’s choice-of-law rule 
selects a different state’s substantive law—only because the 
states disagree as to which state’s law should prevail in that 
circumstance of both states’ substantive laws being prima facie 
applicable. Frequently, a state’s decision to forego applying its 
own law, and to instead apply another state’s law, reflects that 
state’s commitment to comity (its desire to be accommodating of 
 
 351. Id. at 1871. 
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the other state).352 Surely a circumstance where each state 
would like to apply its own law, but out of comity would apply 
the other’s, is not appropriately described as an unprovided-for 
case where neither state’s law applies, as Professor Roosevelt 
would have us do.  
Second, under Roosevelt’s approach, Surprising Gaps in 
substantive law vis-à-vis transborder occurrences will increase 
to the extent that states’ choice-of-law rules diverge. This is so 
because the more that states’ choice-of-law rules diverge, the 
greater is the likelihood that states’ choice-of-law rules will 
identify different state law as being applicable. Yet there is no 
justifiable basis for thinking that increasing divergences in 
choice-of-law should escalate the number of unprovided-for cas-
es. This is an additional consideration that suggests Roosevelt’s 
solution is conceptually off-the-mark. 
To his credit, Roosevelt acknowledges that his solution “is 
in a certain sense the death of choice of law”—that it is an 
“abandonment of the fundamental aspiration of the field of con-
flict of laws” that “will surely strike some as shocking.”353 But 
Roosevelt does not come to terms with the breadth of the gaps 
in law that his approach produces, nor with the fact that the 
number of gaps likely will increase should states’ choice-of-law 
regimes continue to diverge. Roosevelt’s solution depends upon 
the existence of Substantial Gaps not heretofore recognized, 
and it likely would increase those gaps if states’ choice-of-law 
systems continue to diverge. These concerns must count as ar-
guments against his solution—particularly if there is an alter-
native solution to renvoi (namely, the Single System Require-
ment) that does not generate Surprising Gaps. 
Third, there is no simple, normatively justifiable way that 
the forum’s legislature, or its courts,can fill the Surprising 
Gaps that appear under Roosevelt’s proposed solution. A Sur-
prising Gap appears where two conditions obtain: (1) Forum A’s 
choice-of-law rule determines that State B’s law applies and (2) 
State B’s choice-of-law rule determines that Forum A’s law ap-
plies. Call this ‘the two-factor circumstance.’ The only way Fo-
rum A’s legislature (or courts) can fill that Surprising Gap is by 
prescribing a substantive law that will apply in the two-factor 
circumstance. Any such solution will be quite odd; plugging the 
gaps requires the forum to have, first, a conditional choice-of-
 
 352. Cf. Kramer, supra note 345, at 1052. 
 353. Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1888 (citations 
omitted).  
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law rule under which another state’s law governs unless that 
state’s choice-of-law indicates that the forum’s substantive law 
applies, and also, second, a substantive rule that will apply in 
that circumstance. That’s pretty strange.  
And the problems of legislative remedying of Rooseveltian 
gaps go beyond strangeness. What substantive law should the 
forum prescribe? There are only two possibilities, and both are 
problematic. First, Legislature (or court) A could create a 
unique substantive rule that would govern should the two-
factor circumstance pertain. Second, Legislature (or court) A 
could provide that Forum A’s substantive law incorporates B’s 
substantive law.354  
The first solution creates a troubling asymmetry: the iden-
tical set of facts that straddle more than one state sometimes 
will result in the application of another state’s substantive law, 
and other times in the application of A’s substantive law, and 
which obtains will depend entirely on the foreign state’s choice-
of-law rules.355 The second solution is functionally equivalent to 
a court’s rejecting the renvoi insofar as it in effect disregards 
the foreign state’s choice-of-law rule—a practice that is func-
tionally identical to rejecting the renvoi, which to this day has 
not been successfully justified.356  
Furthermore, both solutions are prone to generating non-
uniformity of results across state courts, thereby undermining 
predictability and incentivizing forum shopping. To illustrate, 
imagine that both the forum and foreign states adopt the first 
solution—that is to say, each adopts a unique rule (A1 and B1) to 
 
 354. The second solution is equivalent to the legal realists’ “local law” 
approach to resolving renvoi. See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, 
at 1842–43. 
 355. It might be thought that there is a valid counter-argument: there is no 
troubling asymmetry because a set of facts Y that straddles States A and B is 
not identical to the same set of facts Y that straddles States A and C if C has 
different law than B. The counter-argument is generally valid vis-à-vis 
substantive laws; if B and C have different tort rules, then there is a 
meaningful difference between facts Y that straddle A and B, on the one hand, 
and facts Y that straddle A and C. But there is an important question that 
must be resolved to determine whether the counter-argument is valid as 
applied here—is the counter-argument valid vis-à-vis states’ different choice-
of-law rules? Answering this question would appear to replay the question 
that lies at the heart of renvoi, as to whether the non-forum’s choice-of-law is 
deemed to be law that must be applied by the forum, and for that reason is 
likely intractable. And that is why the statement above in text, to which this 
footnote is attached, remains valid. 
 356. For a thorough critique of this solution, see Roosevelt, Resolving 
Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1843–49. 
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be applicable in the event the two-factor circumstance arises. If 
P files suit in court A, then rule A1 will apply, whereas rule B1 
will apply if the lawsuit is filed in court B. Non-uniformity of 
results will also occur if both states adopt the second solution: if 
P files suit in court A, then rule B will apply, whereas rule A 
will apply if the lawsuit is filed in court B. Uniform results will 
obtain only if one of two events occur: (1) the unlikely event 
that all state legislatures determine that the identical substan-
tive rule R is to apply when the two-factor circumstance arises, 
or (2) the fortuitous circumstance where one of the two states 
giving rise to the two-factor circumstance has adopted the first 
solution and the other has adopted the second. Surely uniform 
results should not hinge on unlikely events or mere fortuity.  
Fourth, Roosevelt’s solution is undesirable because it con-
tinues the contemporary approach of treating conflicts as state 
law.357 The core of Roosevelt’s argument is that whether foreign 
law applies can only be determined by the foreign state because 
applicability of the foreign state’s law is exclusively a question 
of state law.358 This assumption is deeply problematic: for the 
reasons explained already in this Part III.A.1, along with those 
to come in Part III.A.2, choice-of-law is best understood as be-
ing federal law.359  
In conclusion, this Article’s federal choice-of-law approach 
satisfies the Single System Requirement and thereby solves 
renvoi, but without the untoward consequences of Roosevelt’s 
 
 357. See id. at 1888.  
 358. See id. (concluding that renvoi is the byproduct of the mistaken notion 
that “forum law can determine the scope of foreign law,” a proposition that “is 
an unconstitutional usurpation of authority, a denial of the basic proposition 
that a state’s courts have the last word on the meaning of their own law”). 
 359. To be more precise, determining when a state’s law applies to an 
occurrence that straddles multiple states is primarily a function of federal law. 
Fully explaining why this determination is primarily, not exclusively, a 
function of federal law is complicated, and the subject of a work-in-progress. A 
brief preview of that article’s argument nonetheless may be useful here. 
Whether a foreign law prima facie applies to a multi-state circumstance turns 
on the scope of state law, which is a matter of state law. Much of the time, 
however, more than one states’ laws will be applicable to a multistate 
circumstance; put differently, there are far fewer false conflicts than interest 
analysis ordinarily purports to identify. This means that choice-of-law’s 
frequently will have to determine which of two or more prima facie applicable 
states’ laws will be applied, and that is a matter of federal rather than a state 
law. All state courts (as well as federal courts) have the power to aim to 
answer this federal question of which of two prima facie applicable state laws 
should be applied, and such resolutions ultimately are subject to Supreme 
Court review and congressional revision. 
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approach. By satisfying the Single System Requirement, the 
federal law approach eliminates the very source of renvoi. And 
it resolves renvoi in a manner that is consistent with deeply 
held and longstanding intuitions. Thus, under the federal ap-
proach, there is law that addresses the validity of A’s will in In 
re Schneider’s Estate, and of Mrs. Pratt’s contract in Milliken. 
Renvoi’s infinite loop is avoided because there is a single body 
of choice-of-law rules, applicable in both states’ courts (and fed-
eral courts as well), that selects  one state’s substantive law to 
govern these validity questions. Whereas under Roosevelt’s ap-
proach “choice-of-law rules cannot resolve the very question 
that called them into being,”360 under this Article’s federal ap-
proach choice-of-law  can discharge the tasks that called it into 
being.  
To be sure, renvoi still can arise under this Article’s ap-
proach for so long as neither Congress nor the courts have de-
finitively identified a nationwide choice-of-law rule. But any 
such renvoi risks are contingent, not an inherent property of a 
federal approach to choice-of-law. Only the federal approach to 
choice-of-law, which meets the Single System Requirement, is 
capable of eliminating renvoi.  
c. Longstanding Historical Practice, the Single System 
Requirement, and Federal Law 
The analysis above shows there was wisdom in the 
longstanding historical practice, shown in Part I, of conceptual-
izing choice-of-law as a type of law that, by its nature, was eve-
rywhere uniform. All three pre-modern conceptualizations of 
choice-of-law surveyed in Part I—choice-of-law as general law, 
as Bealean common law, and as constitutional law—
accordingly satisfied the Single System Requirement. The rela-
tively recent contemporary phenomenon of multiple choice-of-
law systems violates the Single System Requirement, and for 
that reason is fundamentally incompatible with what choice-of-
law aims to accomplish. Put simply, a multiplicity of choice-of-
law systems is itself a conceptual oxymoron. 
In our contemporary post-Erie country, federal law holds 
out the best hope of satisfying the Single System Requirement 
by delivering the nationwide uniformity that domestic choice-
of-law requires.361 Consider state law’s inherent deficiencies. 
 
 360. Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1888. 
 361. See Freund, supra note 185, at 1211 (“Uniformity can be achieved 
most naturally by the adoption of uniform rules of conflict of laws.”).  
ROSEN_5fmt 2/3/2015 10:09 AM 
1088 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:1017 
 
Klaxon’s conception of choice-of-law—under which choice-of-law 
is state law that is expected to vary across states—is literally 
antithetical to uniformity. Though state law is not necessarily 
incompatible with uniformity—there could be a uniform choice-
of-law statute formulated by the Uniform Law Commission and 
adopted by all state legislatures362—state law poses many prac-
tical barriers to uniformity. Not every state may agree to enact 
the ‘uniform’ law. Even those legislatures that do may make 
changes to the uniform legislation, creating non-uniformities in 
statutory language. Finally, even where there is identical stat-
utory language, non-uniformities almost invariably will be in-
troduced by the supreme courts of each state, each of which has 
final interpretive authority over its state’s law.363  
Federal law sidesteps all these impediments to uniformity. 
Whereas each state holds a veto power under a uniform laws 
approach, the federal legislative process364 can generate a na-
tionwide uniform choice-of-law statute upon receiving simple 
majorities in Congress with presidential support. The ability to 
generate binding rules absent unanimity is important where 
coordinating rules are necessary because unanimity require-
ments undersupply valuable law.365 Supreme Court review 
likewise holds out the possibility of nationwide uniform inter-
pretation of the statute, or of federal common law doctrines for 
choice-of-law.  
2. Why Choice-of-Law Is Inherently Federal: Three 
Conceptual Arguments 
The previous subsection looked to history to locate a fea-
ture—consistency with the Single System Requirement—that 
was shared by multiple conceptualizations of choice-of-law, and 
then argued that choice-of-law is today best understood as fed-
eral law on account of contemporary jurisprudential commit-
ments having nothing to do with choice-of-law—namely our 
post-Erie positivist need to tie law to some sovereign. The pre-
vious subsection then bolstered the argument on behalf of the 
 
 362. For such a call, see Kramer, supra note 325. 
 363. See generally DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 233 
(1965) (noting these things). 
 364. I explain below Congress’s sources of power to enact nationwide 
uniform choice-of-law statutes. 
 365. See DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
FRAMEWORK 243–45 (2008). See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS 
OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL 73–176 (2007). 
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Single System Requirement by showing that it can solve the 
paradox of renvoi. 
This subsection argues that choice-of-law is appropriately 
understood as federal because it accomplishes three inherently 
federal functions366: it polices states’ extraterritorial powers, is 
substantially responsible for determining the nature of our fed-
eral union, and maintains the health of the interstate system. 
These three tasks are inherently federal because they are not of 
interest to only a single state, they cannot properly or effective-
ly be decided by single states, and they are best decided by the 
federal government on functional and normative grounds.  
a. Policing States’ Extraterritorial Powers 
First, choice-of-law discharges the inherently federal func-
tion of policing the scope of states’ extraterritorial powers.367 
Treating choice-of-law as state law is to allow each state to de-
termine for itself whether its or another state’s law is to govern 
a person, transaction, or occurrence that both states have con-
stitutional power to, and wish to, regulate. Consider the Har-
rah’s Club case, where California residents who had been 
served excessive alcohol in a Nevada tavern later had a car ac-
cident in California while returning home.368 California law al-
lowed recovery against the Nevada tavern keeper for injuries 
suffered in California that had been proximately caused by his 
sale of alcohol in Nevada, whereas Nevada law did not.369 Both 
states had power, consistent with the Constitution, to apply 
their laws. Under the modern view that choice-of-law is state 
 
 366. In so doing, this subsection does not confine itself to history, but 
suggests that choice-of-law is best understood, as a conceptual matter, as 
federal law—not as general law or Bealean common law. 
 367. Choice-of-law acts in conjunction with other doctrines, including 
federal limitations on states’ extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction, to 
discharge this role. See Rosen, supra note 5, at 871–913. For other arguments 
that choice-of-law discharges an inherently federal function, see Baxter, supra 
note 17, at 22–23 (“[T]he process of resolving choice cases is necessarily one of 
allocating spheres of legal control among states . . . . Responsibility for 
allocating spheres of legal control among member states of a federal system 
cannot sensibly be placed elsewhere than with the federal government.”). 
Unlike the argument presented here, Baxter did not think Congress had the 
power to prescribe choice-of-law rules for states. See id. at 42 (arguing that 
that “every state should, as a matter of state law, adopt the comparative 
impairment principle; but I cannot justify a federal compulsion to do so.”). For 
my response to Baxter, which identifies and explains the source of such 
congressional power, see infra notes 382–88.  
 368. Bernhard v. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d 719, 720 (Cal. 1976) (en banc). 
 369. Id. at 721. 
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law, the California court was able to decide as a matter of state 
law whether to apply California or Nevada law.370 As argued 
above, real conflicts like Harrah’s Club are intractable371—they 
are not susceptible to determinate, principled resolution, but 
instead are necessarily decided through a process of indetermi-
nate factual and political prognostication, and then by render-
ing inherently subjective tradeoffs among those court-
determined factual and policy differences that are  incorporated 
in the two states’ laws. With this understanding, it is not too 
surprising that the California court in Harrah’s Club chose to 
apply California law, and it seems likely that a Nevada court 
would have chosen otherwise.372 What is surprising is that the 
law determining which state’s law applied presently is deemed 
to be state law.  
 Modern political theory is rightfully suspicious of claims 
that bureaucracies can be trusted to determine the scope of 
their own powers. And when the competing state laws reflect 
deep differences in the values of each respective state, allowing 
each to choose for itself is tantamount to asking the proverbial 
fox to guard the henhouse. These problems are not sidestepped 
by the fact that courts are the typical decisionmakers; most 
state judges are elected, and even those that are appointed can 
be expected to share their state’s political preferences insofar 
as they are appointed by the state’s politicians. Making matters 
worse, state legislatures have the ultimate power to set choice-
of-law rules under most modern choice-of-law methodologies.373  
In short, the modern understanding that states possess ex-
traterritorial regulatory authority that generates real conflicts 
constitutes another reason why the law that sorts out such con-
flicts—choice-of-law—must be federal, not state. 
b. Helping To Determine the Character of our Federal Union 
Choice-of-law plays a significant role in determining the 
very character of the federal system. Allowing room for legal 
pluralism is one well-recognized benefit of federalism; federal-
ism allows states to take different regulatory approaches vis-à-
vis policies concerning which neither the Constitution nor fed-
 
 370. See id. at 722. 
 371. See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
 372. Harrah’s Club, 546 P.2d at 725–26. 
 373. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6(1) (1971) 
(“A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive 
of its own state on choice of law.”). 
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eral law demand national uniformity.374 On the other hand, our 
federal system also values allowing citizens of each state to 
have an opportunity to travel to sister states where, in addition 
to taking in the scenery, they can have access to the laws of 
those sister states. These two values—legal pluralism and what 
might be called legal tourism—frequently can come into con-
flict. For instance, State A’s more restrictive laws designed to 
paternalistically protect its citizens or protect the interests of 
third parties (say, State A’s limitations on gambling) will be 
undermined to the extent that a citizen A from State A can 
simply cross the border and be subject to State B’s pro-
gambling laws. What is true of gambling laws is equally true of 
a host of deeply controversial laws about which states take di-
vergent regulatory approaches: for instance parental notifica-
tion statutes and motorcycle helmet laws.375  
This Article is not the place to seek to resolve the difficult 
normative question of how to harmonize these competing val-
ues of legal pluralism and legal tourism.376 What is relevant for 
present purposes are two related points. First, how the compet-
ing values are harmonized is a substantial determinant of the 
character of our federal system. Second, in today’s jurispruden-
tial world where states have substantial overlapping regulatory 
jurisdiction—such that both the domiciliary state and the tour-
ism state typically have power to regulate citizen A consistently 
with the due process clause—choice-of-law is the main tool for 
reconciling the competing values of legal pluralism and legal 
tourism. For instance, choice-of-law would determine whether 
citizen A, while she is in state B, will be subject to state A’s an-
ti-gambling laws or state B’s allowance to gamble.  
The upshot is this: to the extent that choice-of-law deter-
mines how the competing values of legal pluralism and legal 
tourism are to be balanced, choice-of-law is determining the 
character of our federal union, and hence properly has the sta-
tus of federal rather than state law.  
 
 374. See generally Mark D. Rosen, “Hard” or “Soft” Pluralism?: Positive, 
Normative, and Institutional Considerations of States’ Extraterritorial Powers, 
51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 744–50 (2007). 
 375. See generally Rosen, supra note 5, at 882–91. 
 376. See generally Rosen, supra note 374 (fleshing out these competing 
considerations more fully). 
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c. Maintaining the Health of the Interstate System 
Third, choice-of-law ensures that the interstate system is 
well-functioning.377 Predictability as to what state’s law will ap-
ply to a multi-state transaction or occurrence—which, as dis-
cussed above, requires satisfaction of the Single System Re-
quirement—is only one way choice-of-law affects the interstate 
system’s health. Choice-of-law doctrines also can help reduce 
transaction costs—both contracting and litigation costs—
associated with interstate activity. Further, choice-of-law has 
effects on interstate frictions. For instance, a choice-of-law rule 
that permits a forum not to apply non-forum law may open the 
door to the widespread circumvention and hence undermining 
of non-forum law378—something that can produce interstate 
friction.  
More generally, because determining the character of our 
federal system and maintaining the interstate system’s health 
are inherently federal matters, it follows that choice-of-law also 
is appropriately federal since it is so deeply interwoven with 
both. Post-Klaxon empirical evidence substantiates this concep-
tual claim: choice-of-law has largely ignored interstate and fed-
eral considerations379 since it has been viewed as state law. 
Moreover, although federal interests in theory could be man-
aged by the states, as through the uniform law process, this 
seems to be a second-best solution. Leaving management of 
federal interests to the states is an approach reflecting not the 
spirit of our Constitution but that of the Articles of Confedera-
tion.380 Instead, federal interests are best guarded by federal of-
ficials, who are charged with protecting federal matters. State 
officials typically—and properly—are concerned with state in-
terests. 
 
 377. Indeed, the Second Restatement goes so far as to say that “[p]robably 
the most important function of choice-of-law rules is to make the interstate 
and international systems work well.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS, § 6 cmt. d. 
 378. See generally Rosen, supra note 5, at 864–76. 
 379. Cf. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 220 (noting the federal system need 
not respect state lines). 
 380. See generally Jack N. Rakove, The Collapse of the Articles of 
Confederation, in THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 225–45 (J. Jackson Barlow, Leonard W. Levy & Ken 
Masugi, eds., 1988) (noting the widely accepted understanding that the 
Articles of Confederation problematically left too much power to the states to 
govern matters concerning the nation as a whole). 
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B. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO PRESCRIBE CHOICE-OF-LAW 
The above arguments concerning the federal character of 
choice-of-law are bolstered by the Constitution’s allowance for 
the federalization of choice-of-law. Let us first consider Con-
gress’s power to prescribe uniform federal choice-of-law rules 
that would be applicable in state courts before considering 
choice-of-law in the federal courts.  
Congress’s power vis-à-vis state courts comes from the Full 
Faith and Credit’s Effects Clause. The Clause’s first sentence 
declares that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts . . . of every other State,” and the se-
cond provides that “Congress may by general Laws prescribe 
the Manner in which such [public] Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”381 The Constitu-
tion’s drafting history demonstrates that “public Acts” included 
state legislation, and that Congress’s powers to prescribe the 
“Effects thereof” encompassed “public Acts.”382 Early congresses 
believed their powers extended to prescribing the effects of 
state records and judgments,383 and the Court has consistently 
 
 381. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 382. For the definitive early argument to this effect, see Cook, supra note 1, 
at 425–26, 433–34 (“[T]he language of the clause was intended by its framers 
to give Congress the power ‘by general laws’ to ‘prescribe the effect,” i.e., the 
legal effects or consequences, in other states of the ‘public acts, records and 
judicial proceedings’ of a state—including, therefore, legislative acts as well as 
judgments and all other records and judicial proceedings,” and that “Congress 
could by enacting such a statute substitute, at least to a large extent, a code of 
uniform national law.”). An early version of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
only granted Congress power to prescribe “the effect which judgments 
obtained in one State shall have in another.” Id. at 425 (emphasis omitted). 
Gouverneur Morris thought this too narrow, and proposed an amendment 
essentially identical to the constitutional language that ultimately was 
adopted. See id. Commenting on Morris’ changes, Doctor Johnson “thought 
that the amendment, as worded, would authorize the General Legislature to 
declare the effect of the Legislative acts of one State in another State,” and no 
one is recorded as disagreeing. Id.; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 484–85 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). See generally CAVERS, 
supra note 363, at 246, 249 (noting that the Effects Clause “has dangled a 
tantalizing alternative before scholars who have brooded over the difficulties 
of developing a satisfactory system of judge-made rules to govern choice of law 
by the states of the Union,” though ultimately concluding that legislative 
solutions to choice-of-law present a “limited, but by no means unimportant, 
opportunity”); Gottesman, supra note 16, at 23 (“Scholars are virtually 
unanimous in their view that Congress has the power to enact federal choice of 
law statutes.”); Sachs, supra note 15, at 1227–29. 
 383. See Sachs, supra note 15, at 1240–78. But see id. at 1273 (noting one 
congressman who “idiosyncratically” argued that Congress only had the power 
to prescribe authentication procedures, not effects). 
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explained that the Effects Clause gives Congress power to de-
termine the “extra-state effect of [state] statutes.”384 Though the 
Framers did not understand “public Acts” to include state 
common law,385 there are powerful arguments for concluding 
that the Effects Clause should be understood to encompass 
common law after Erie,386 and “[t]here is a categorical state-
ment by the Supreme Court of the United States that common 
law is within the protection of the [Full Faith and Credit] 
clause.”387  
 
 384. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 
(1939) (speaking of “the case of [state] statutes, the extra-state effect of which 
Congress has not prescribed, as it may under the constitutional provision”); see 
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 728–29 (1988) (deciding that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause did not preclude a forum state from applying its 
statute of limitations to all claims in a nationwide class action on the ground 
that it was “procedural,” but also noting that at “[i]f current conditions render 
it desirable that forum States no longer treat a particular issue as procedural 
for conflict of laws purposes . . . it can be proposed that Congress legislate to 
that effect under the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”). 
 385. Cook, supra note 1, at 434 n.27a (concluding for that reason that 
“Congress has power to prescribe the effect of state statutes only, and not that 
of state ‘common law.’”). 
 386. As Elliott Cheatham has argued, “[i]t would be a serious breach in our 
constitutional system if the protection given in interstate matters were wholly 
dependent on the formal nature of the state law involved—statute or common 
law.” Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 17, at 602. Michael Gottesman 
has persuasively argued that insofar as Erie ruled that “[s]tate laws resulting 
from judicial enunciation of ‘common law’ are for federal constitutional or 
statutory purposes indistinguishable from state laws adopted by the 
legislature . . . . it would be wholly anomalous to construe the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause as distinguishing between state judicial and legislative 
lawmaking” for purposes of the Effects Clause. Gottesman, supra note 16, at 
27. Support for this conclusion comes from the recent decision of Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection, where Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion concluded that the Takings 
Clause applies to state court changes in common law, though the Framers 
would not have thought so since they believed “courts had no power to ‘change’ 
the common law.” 560 U.S. 702, 727 (2010). “Where the text they adopted is 
clear,” said Justice Scalia, “what counts is not what they envisioned but what 
they wrote.” Id. The Full Faith and Credit Clause likewise could be said to 
have “clear” text that encompasses common law within the phrase “Judicial 
proceedings,” see Gottesman, supra note 16, at 26 (noting Justice Jackson’s 
view), “records,” see id. (noting Harold Crosskey’s suggestion), or “public 
[A]cts,” see Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 17, at 602.  
 387. Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 386, at 603 n.77 (citing to 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943), which referred to 
“the faith and credit . . . to which local common and statutory law is entitled 
under [th]e Constitution and laws of the United States” (emphasis supplied by 
Cheatham)). A four-Justice plurality voted to overrule Magnolia, though on 
different grounds, in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 
(1980). 
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Let us now proceed to choice-of-law in the federal courts. 
The need to apply choice-of-law rules vis-à-vis competing state 
laws arises in federal courts when they exercise either diversity 
or supplemental jurisdiction.388 Eminent scholars long have 
thought that the Diversity Clause includes the power to gener-
ate choice-of-law rules to decide the cases that are before the 
federal court.389 A recent edition of Hart and Wechsler’s Federal 
Courts concludes that “Congress, acting under its power to 
make laws ‘necessary and proper’ to the exercise of jurisdiction 
under Article III, could certainly enact, or authorize the formu-
lation of, federal choice-of-law rules for the federal courts.”390 
Such congressional authority would apply to federal courts’ ex-
ercise of both diversity and supplemental jurisdiction, and is 
independent of Congress’s powers under the Effects Clause to 
prescribe choice-of-law rules for state courts. 
C. INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The conclusion that Congress has the power as a matter of 
positive law to enact choice-of-law rules for both federal and 
 
 388. To be clear, we are concerned only with circumstances where a federal 
court must choose between the substantive law of two (or more) sister states—
not choice-of-law between federal and state law, which is addressed by 
preemption doctrine and the Supremacy Clause.  
 389. Drawing heavily on a seminal article by Henry Friendly, the American 
Law Institute concluded that “one of the purposes sought to be achieved by the 
creation of the diversity jurisdiction might well have been the application of 
choice-of-law rules different from, or at least independent of, those of the state 
courts.” AM. L. INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 446 (1969) (citing Henry J. Friendly, The 
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 496 (1928)); see 
also Baxter, supra note 17, at 37–39. For reasons that by now should be clear, 
I take issue with the ALI’s suggestion that the federal choice-of-law rules 
might be “different from” those of state courts; choice-of-law must be uniform 
across federal and state courts. AM. L. INST., supra, at 446. That federal courts 
would have a power “independent of” states to determine choice-of-law, id., 
may seem inconsistent with Part I’s claim, supra, that choice-of-law was 
understood to be an aspect of general law, AM. L. INST., supra, at 446. It is not, 
because diversity jurisdiction addressed concerns that state courts might not 
be trustworthy. See Friendly, supra (“[T]here was much reason to fear that the 
courts of a state having laws favorable to debtors would apply these laws in 
favor of their own residents even though the debt was payable in another 
state.”); Baxter, supra note 17, at 37.    
 390. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 565 (6th ed. 2009). It should be noted that Hart 
and Wechsler’s Federal Courts’s conclusions as to congressional power to 
“formulate” choice-of-law rules may be in tension with the ALI’s suggestion 
that the federal judicial power, like all judicial power, includes “the power to 
formulate choice-of-law rules.” AM. L. INST., supra note 389, at 444. 
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state courts is sensible from the perspective of comparative in-
stitutional analysis.391 As Professor Roosevelt has helpfully ex-
plained, choice-of-law consists of two components: (1) determin-
ing the scope of two (or more) states’ laws for the purpose of 
ascertaining whether there is a false conflict or whether there 
is a real conflict in which two (or more) states’ laws are prima 
facie applicable, and, if the latter, then (2) determining which 
state’s law should apply.392 I have already explained why feder-
al institutions are superior to state institutions for discharging 
these two tasks.393 It also is true that Congress is institutionally 
superior to federal courts to undertake them. As explained 
above, real conflicts are intractable for courts because they re-
quire a court to render prognostications as to fact and values, 
and ultimately to balance states’ incommensurable policy pref-
erences.394 Courts are not well-suited to making these types of 
determinations, which helps explain why the Supreme Court’s 
efforts to solve real conflicts through constitutional doctrine 
have been unsuccessful.395 Congress, by contrast, is the appro-
priate institution as a matter of democratic theory to render 
these deeply subjective decisions. It also has the most suitable 
institutional characteristics to discharge the tasks involved in 
resolving real conflicts. To profoundly compress an argument 
I’ve made elsewhere at length,396 legislatures are designed to, 
and well-practiced in, making tradeoffs among incommensura-
ble commitments. Congress is composed of the states’ repre-
sentatives, who are better situated than federal courts to iden-
tify their state’s interests. Congress’s prospective rule-making 
encourages ex ante negotiations among state representatives, 
and the legislative process allows simultaneous tradeoffs across 
multiple issues that facilitate compromise solutions.397  
To say that Congress appropriately has final say over 
choice-of-law is not to suggest that courts have no role to play. 
To the contrary, choice-of-law in all likelihood is best generated 
by an interplay between courts and Congress.398 Legislators do 
 
 391. For a discussion of comparative institutional analysis, see NEIL K. 
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 3–5 (1994). 
 392. See Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi, supra, note 244, at 1869–72 
 393. See supra notes 174–86. 
 394. See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
 395. See infra note 469. 
 396. See Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role, supra note 170, at 17–25. 
 397. See id. 
 398. For an expanded version of this argument, as applied to the similar 
(though not identical) context of constitutional decisionmaking, see Mark D. 
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not have the time or competence to create choice-of-law rules 
from scratch; intelligent choice-of-law rules probably cannot be 
generated by legislators’ armchair hypotheticals or through de-
ductive reasoning. By contrast, courts’ case-by-case, inductive 
approach is well suited to identifying the competing considera-
tions that give shape to different choice-of-law rules. But while 
courts play a vital role in developing choice-of-law rules in a 
common law, case-by-case fashion, there is an intractability to 
choice-of-law that makes it unamenable to solutions about 
which all reasonable minds can be expected to concur.399 For 
this reason it is normatively appropriately that the judiciary’s 
choice-of-law rules are provisional, in the sense that they can 
be legislatively revised. The courts’ provisional solutions can 
provide Congress a menu of well-considered options that clarify 
the tradeoffs inherent in each choice-of-law alternative. As a 
matter of both democratic theory and institutional design, Con-
gress is the appropriate institution for negotiating over, and ul-
timately choosing among, the court-identified options.  
Doctrinally, two paths allow the type of judicial-legislative 
interplay that is best suited to generating intelligent choice-of-
law rules. Congress can enact open-ended choice-of-law stat-
utes that vest courts with significant discretion in fleshing out 
the choice-of-law rules. Or, absent congressional action, courts 
can elaborate choice-of-law rules that have the status of federal 
common law. Either way, Congress would have the ultimate 
revisionary authority over the choice-of-law that courts have 
created. Section D argues there already exist two statutes that 
authorize federal and state courts to elaborate a single body of 
federal choice-of-law that can satisfy the Single System Re-
quirement. Section E explains that even without these statutes, 
federal and state courts would have authority to generate a 
federal common law of choice-of-law that satisfies the Single 
System Requirement.  
 
Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and 
Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L. REV. 66, 132–
44 (2013). I hope to apply these ideas to the issue at hand of choice-of-law in a 
subsequent article. 
 399. Cf. STORY, supra note 49, § 28 (endorsing the proposition that “in the 
conflict of laws, it must often be a matter of doubt, which should prevail”). 
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D. TWO STATUTORY BASES FOR JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF A 
SINGLE COMPREHENSIVE BODY OF FEDERAL CHOICE-OF-LAW 
Two federal statutes together authorize courts—both state 
and federal—to develop a single body of federal choice-of-law 
that would be applicable in both federal and state courts. A 
post-Klaxon amendment to one of those statutes—the Full 
Faith and Credit Act—constitutes statutory authorization for 
state courts to develop federal choice-of-law rules on a case by 
case basis, and arguably allows federal courts to do so as well. 
Klaxon, however, stands as an obstacle to the second statute—
the Rules of Decision Act—which has clearer language than the 
Full Faith and Credit Act authorizing federal courts to gener-
ate federal choice-of-law in diversity cases. This is yet another 
reason why Klaxon should be formally overruled.  
1. The Full Faith and Credit Act 
The Full Faith and Credit Act (FF&C Act) was amended in 
1948—after Klaxon was decided—to provide that the “[a]cts” of 
the sister states “shall have the same full faith and credit in 
every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or 
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from 
which they are taken.”400 (Before 1948, the statute did not con-
tain the word “[a]cts.”).401 This statutory directive can be ful-
filled only if there is a uniform choice-of-law in all state courts 
that satisfies the Single System Requirement.  
To understand why, consider once again the Harrah’s Club 
case, where a Nevada tavern keeper overboozed a California 
resident who subsequently had a car accident in California.402 
California’s choice-of-law principles, as we saw, selected Cali-
fornia law. Nevada had different choice-of-law rules than Cali-
fornia, and Nevada courts almost certainly would have selected 
 
 400. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).  
 401. Id. The 1948 amendment has been called “perplexing” by scholars, see 
Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 541, 548 
& n.183 (1958), and has been almost entirely ignored by courts and 
scholars,but see Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 422 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he new provision of [the full faith and credit statute] cannot be 
disregarded. In 1948 Congress for the first time dealt with the full faith and 
credit effect to be given statutes. . . . Hence, if [the amendment] has any effect, 
it would seem to tend toward respecting Missouri’s legislation.”); Cheatham, A 
Federal Nation, supra note 17, at 114 (“The 1948 amendment to the full faith 
and credit statute has presented a new basis for the possibility that national 
rules of conflict of laws have entirely supplanted the state rules.”). 
 402. See supra note 345. 
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Nevada law. This circumstance violates the FF&C Act: the Cal-
ifornia act does not have the “same full faith and credit”—that 
is to say, the same effect403—in a Nevada court as it has in a 
California court.404 The Nevada act likewise does not have the 
same effect in California courts as it would have in Nevada.405 
And the FF&C Act’s statutory language of “acts” should be un-
derstood to extend to common law, just as (and for the same 
reasons that) the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s language of 
“acts” does.406 In short, the FF&C Act’s requirement that Cali-
fornia’s act “have the same full faith and credit in every 
court . . . as [it has] in the courts of” California only can be met 
if both California and Nevada courts use the same choice-of-law 
rules, satisfying the Single System Requirement.407  
Further, the Act’s requirements apply to “every court with-
in the United States,” which includes federal courts, as Con-
gress can require under the Diversity Clause.408 Fulfilling the 
Act’s requirements accordingly demands that federal courts use 
the same choice-of-law rules as state courts. If they did not—if 
federal courts used one set of choice-of-law rules and state 
courts another—then the California act may not have the 
“same full faith and credit in every court . . . as [it has] in the 
courts of” California.409  
In short, analysis of the FF&C Act confirms that, as a mat-
ter of positive law, choice-of-law must satisfy the Single System 
Requirement by being uniform over the jurisdictions whose 
substantive law it manages.410  
 
 403. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Stephen Sachs persuasively argues that the original 
1790 Act’s language of “full faith and credit” was meant to refer to 
authentication rather than effect. See Sachs, supra note 15, at 1278. This does 
not undermine the argument above in text. Regardless of how the Act 
originally was understood, the United States Supreme Court interpreted full 
faith and credit to mean effects in the 1813 case of Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. 481 
(1813), which was thoroughly known and accepted by Congress and the state 
courts by the early 1820s. See id. at 1274–76. Mills’s interpretation 
unabatedly continued until Congress amended the Act in 1948, and continues 
to this day.  
 404. See Laycock, supra note 15, at 296 (making same argument). 
 405. For the same reasons provided above, the statutory term “acts” should 
include common law. See supra notes 385–87. 
 406. See supra notes 386–88. 
 407. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 
 408. Id.; see supra note 390. 
 409. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 
 410. See supra notes 327–36162. 
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Since only federal law can provide such uniformity of 
choice-of-law rules, it follows that the FF&C Act authorizes the 
creation by judges in both state and federal courts of a single 
body of federal choice-of-law rules that is applicable in both 
federal and state courts. The resulting body of federal choice-of-
law rules can be described in one of two ways: either as the 
product of statutory interpretation (of what it means for one 
state’s act to “have the same full faith and credit in every 
court”),411 or as federal common law necessary to effectuate the 
statute.412 However described, the courts’ choice-of-law rules 
always would be subject to congressional revision.  
If this proposed interpretation of the FF&C Act is correct, 
then Klaxon has been legislatively overruled by the 1948 
amendments. Congress had the power to do so because Klaxon 
was not a constitutional decision.413 On the other hand, courts 
may be reluctant to find legislative revision because nothing in 
the legislative history suggests Congress intended the 1948 
Amendments to overrule Klaxon.414 Even without overruling 
Klaxon, however, the FF&C Act still could be understood to au-
thorize state and federal courts to create federal choice-of-law 
rules on the basis of the statutory interpretation of the Act pro-
vided above. On this approach, the 1948 amendments would 
have blunted Klaxon’s bite, requiring federal courts sitting in 
 
 411. 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 
 412. For present purposes, nothing turns on which locution is adopted. Cf. 
Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Leyman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of 
Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980) (“The difference between ‘common 
law’ and ‘statutory interpretation’ is a difference in emphasis rather than a 
difference in kind. The more definite and explicit the prevailing legislative 
policy, the more likely a court will describe its lawmaking as statutory 
interpretation; the less precise and less explicit the perceived legislative 
policy, the more likely a court will speak of common law. The distinction, 
however, is entirely one of degree.”).  
 413. Klaxon nowhere suggested its holding was constitutional. Further, as 
Professor Cavers explains, “the Constitution does not require the federal 
judicial system to respect state lines. If the system were to cease to do so, the 
command of Klaxon would no longer be reasonable.” CAVERS, supra note 363, 
at 220 n.39; see also Hill, supra note 401, at 543–46 (concluding that federal 
courts have constitutional power to make choice-of-law rules); Roosevelt, supra 
note 19, at 17 n.90.  
 414. The 1948 Act was part of a massive overhaul of the judicial code, and 
there is virtually no legislative history concerning the meaning of the 
amendment’s addition of the word “acts” to § 1738. The Historical and 
Revision Notes are not illuminating, explaining that the new language was 
included to “follow[] the language of Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution.” 
28 U.S.C. § 1738. I have reviewed the voluminous legislative history and found 
nothing else. 
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diversity to apply the (federal!) choice-of-law rules that the 
state courts do. There is nothing awry with such a proposed in-
terpretation of the amendments, as Congress unquestionably 
has the power to make legislative alterations of the Court’s 
non-constitutional decisions.415  
2. The Rules of Decision Act 
The Rules of Decision Act (RDA), enacted in 1790, author-
izes federal courts to develop federal choice-of-law rules,416 but 
has been paralyzed by Klaxon. The RDA provides that “[t]he 
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise re-
quire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil 
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they 
apply.”417 The RDA addresses the two types of choice-of-law de-
terminations that are necessary to fully prescribe what law 
federal courts are to apply. The Act’s “except” clause addresses 
‘vertical federalism’ choice-of-law: it instructs that the “law of 
the several states” apply “except” if federal law otherwise ap-
plies.418 The Act’s final words address ‘horizontal federalism’ 
choice-of-law: in cases where federal law does not apply, federal 
courts are to apply “the laws of the several states . . . in cases 
where they apply.”419 The italicized language thus presupposes 
the existence of a choice-of-law rule that determines which 
state’s law properly “appli[es]”420—something that Chief Justice 
Marshall recognized back in 1825.421  
 
 415. See generally Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Congressional Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 
1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317 (2014). 
 416. See Hart, supra note 327, at 17 (quoting the Rules of Decision Act’s 
language of “in cases where they apply” and concluding that “[t]he federal 
courts are in a peculiarly disinterested position to make a just determination 
as to which state’s laws ought to apply where this is disputed”). Professor 
Baxter came to a similar conclusion fifty years ago, see Baxter, supra note 17, 
at 40–41. For a modern assertion of this view, see Kevin M. Clermont, The 
Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 998 & n.45 
(2011).  
 417. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948).  
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. (emphasis added).  
 420. Id. 
 421. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 48 (1825) (writing that the Rules 
of Decision Act reflects the choice-of-law “principle that in every forum a 
contract is governed by the law with a view to which it was made”), quoted in 
Baxter, supra note 416, at 41 & n.144. 
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The crucial question is this: what is the choice-of-law rule 
that the RDA presupposes? The answer was straightforward at 
the time of the Act’s enactment in 1790: the general law be-
cause, as shown in Part I, general law was the one and only 
choice-of-law then recognized.422 The answer must change in a 
post-Erie world in which there no longer is general law.423 Pro-
fessor Cavers thought the RDA’s language of “in cases where 
they apply”424 referred to the choice-of-law rules of the state in 
which the federal court sat, thereby providing a statutory basis 
for Klaxon.425 Professor Baxter disagreed, believing “in cases 
where they apply” licensed the creation of a body of federal 
choice-of-law rules by federal courts, and that “Klaxon should 
be overturned.”426 Professor Hart likewise thought the RDA al-
lowed federal courts to develop a federal body of choice-of-law.427  
Professors Hart and Baxter must be correct because, as 
this Article has exhaustively argued, choice-of-law is best un-
derstood as being federal law. Accordingly, “in cases where they 
apply” authorizes federal courts to elaborate a body of federal 
choice-of-law doctrine to govern horizontal choice-of-law ques-
tions that arise in their courts, which is always subject to con-
gressional revision.428 The RDA’s broad delegation to courts is 
akin to the Sherman Act’s pithy formulation, which licensed 
federal courts to develop an elaborate body of federal antitrust 
law on a case-by-case basis.429 Klaxon, however, cripples this 
part of the RDA for so long as it remains good law. This is yet 
another reason why the case should be formally overturned. 
Two related final thoughts. The FF&C Act itself provides 
an additional counterargument to Professor Cavers’s interpre-
tation of the RDA. After all, if the RDA authorizes Klaxon, as 
Cavers thought, then the multiplicity of choice-of-law regimes 
 
 422. Cf. id. at 48 (referring to the choice-of-law principle incorporated in 
the Rules of Decision Act as a “universal law”).  
 423. For a general discussion concerning what circumstances justify 
changed interpretations of statutes, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
 424. 28 U.S.C. § 1652. 
 425. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 220 & n.39. 
 426. Baxter, supra note 416, at 41 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1652) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 427. See Hart, supra note 327, at 515 (concluding that the Rules of 
Decision Act allows federal court “development of a sound body of private 
interstate law” of conflict of laws). 
 428. 28 U.S.C. § 1652. 
 429. See Mark D. Rosen, Nonformalistic Law in Time and Space, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 622, 624–27 (1999). 
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it spawns undermines the FF&C Act. This undercuts Professor 
Cavers’s interpretation under the principle that statutes should 
be construed harmoniously.430 That same principle supports 
this Article’s interpretation of the RDA, because it meshes per-
fectly with the FF&C Act’s requirement that sister states’ acts 
“shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within 
the United States” as they have in their states of origin.431  
E. CHOICE-OF-LAW AS FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
If it should be determined that neither the FF&C Act nor 
the RDA authorizes courts to develop federal choice-of-law 
rules, there is one last doctrinal basis for holding choice-of-law 
to be federal: overturning Klaxon and declaring choice-of-law to 
be federal common law.432 Although I believe the FF&C Act 
(and the RDA, were Klaxon overturned) already authorizes the 
creation of federal choice-of-law rules for the reasons explained 
above, the federal common law argument is very strong. Sub-
section One provides a five-step argument that leads to the 
conclusion that, even absent any federal choice-of-law statutes, 
once Klaxon were overruled, the choice-of-law rules created by 
federal and state courts would have the status of federal com-
mon law. Subsection Two identifies the institutional implica-
tions of this conclusion. 
1. That Choice-of-Law Would Be Federal Common Law 
Were Klaxon to be overruled, and if there were no federal 
choice-of-law statutes, the choice-of-law rules created by federal 
and state courts would have the status of federal common law. 
A five-step argument shows this to be correct.  
First, as explained earlier, the Constitution grants Con-
gress power to create choice-of-law rules for both federal and 
state courts.433 Second, this constitutional grant to Congress 
 
 430. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 739 (1989) (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (“[S]tatutes dealing with similar subjects should be interpreted 
harmoniously.”). 
 431. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (emphasis added); see supra notes 400–08. 
 432. See supra notes 14–15 (identifying three other scholars who have so 
argued). Elsewhere I have argued that, as a matter of positive law, the Court’s 
Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence is best understood as federal common law, 
not constitutional doctrine. See Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role, supra note 
170, at 8–28. This reduces the extent to which overturning Klaxon would dis-
rupt other doctrine, though reversing Klaxon unquestionably would have 
downstream effects on other decisions. 
 433. See supra Part III.B. 
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preempts the states from creating choice-of-law rules that have 
the status of state law.434 This second step of the argument does 
not automatically follow from the first because the federal and 
state governments frequently have overlapping regulatory au-
thority.435 The second step, in other words, is that choice-of-law 
is “exclusively federal . . . as to require uniform national dispo-
sition.”436 This Article’s arguments as to why choice-of-law is 
federal—the need to satisfy the Single System Requirement, 
and choice-of-law’s inherently federal functions of policing 
states’ extraterritorial powers, determining the character of our 
federal union, and maintaining the health of the interstate sys-
tem— establish that choice-of-law must be exclusively federal. 
Buttressing this conclusion, choice-of-law bears striking resem-
blance to other exclusively federal fields. Consider “interstate 
and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of 
States.”437 So, for example, as to disputes concerning interstate 
water rights and borders, state law is preempted “not by Con-
gress but by the Constitution,”438 and federal common law re-
solves conflicting claims if no federal statutes provide the an-
swer. Likewise, choice-of-law governs disputes among states 
concerning their regulatory limits. Like interstate disputes 
concerning water rights and borders, choice-of-law is “intrinsi-
cally federal” insofar as it governs regulatory disputes between 
the states, and is best conceptualized as being federal common 
law in the absence of congressional action.439  
Third, federal courts have power to create federal choice-of-
law rules on a case-by-case basis. The third step does not follow 
ineluctably from the first and second, for there could be no op-
erative law in the absence of congressional action. But such is 
not the case with choice-of-law rules, because creating choice-
of-law rules to determine which state’s law is operative is nec-
essary for the disposition of interstate cases, and for that rea-
 
 434. See Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? 
Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 492–98 (2007) (explaining 
“constitutional preemption”).   
 435. For instance, the federal and state governments both have power over 
immigration. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–10 (2012). 
 436. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947); see 
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964) (discussing 
how state law preempted where there are “uniquely federal interests”)). 
 437. Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 641. 
 438. See Alfred Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: 
Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1076 (1967). 
 439. Horowitz, supra note 14, at 1202 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425). 
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son is part of the judicial power to decide ‘cases’ and ‘controver-
sies’ that involve interstate facts.440  
Fourth, state courts also have the judicial power to create 
federal choice-of-law rules. This is so because they too must 
generate choice-of-law rules to decide the interstate cases be-
fore them. These choice-of-law rules are created on a case-by-
case basis (i.e., are common law) and, for the reasons explained 
in this Article, are federal. And choice-of-law is not unique in 
this regard; state courts long have created federal common 
law.441  
Fifth, and finally, because choice-of-law must be uniform to 
satisfy the Single System Requirement and thereby serve its 
managerial function, the federal common law of choice-of-law 
cannot incorporate state law and vary across states, as federal 
common law sometimes does.442 Instead, all federal and state 
courts throughout the country, supervised ultimately by the 
United States Supreme Court, must work to develop a single 
body of federal choice-of-law.  
2. Institutional Implications 
If judge-created choice-of-law rules were federal common 
law (as opposed to judicial doctrines implementing the FF&C 
Act and the RDA), any judicial choice-of-law doctrines would 
always be subject to congressional revision (just as would be 
the case  were the caselaw  deemed to be interpretations  of the 
FF&C Act and the RDA).443 To put the matter more bluntly, 
Congress would have the power to reject the federal common 
law choice-of-law rules that courts—even the Supreme Court—
adopted.  
Congress’s power to have the final say over choice-of-law 
derives from the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s Effects Clause. 
As explained immediately above, for so long as Congress does 
not exercise its Effects Cause powers, courts hearing cross-
state matters must decide those cases and, in so doing, develop 
 
 440. See Hill, The Erie Doctrine, supra note 401, at 544 (arguing that 
federal courts’ power to create “choice of law rules of their own devising” comes 
from Article III’s vesting in federal courts the “judicial power of the United 
States”). 
 441. See Bellia, supra note 33 (noting that state courts have substantial 
adjudicatory jurisdiction over federal law, and must clarify and fill gaps when 
applying federal law, just as federal courts do). 
 442. See, e.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 
(2001). 
 443. See Rosen, supra note 434, at 492–93. 
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and utilize choice-of-law doctrines to determine which state’s 
law applies. But the fact that courts were the first-movers 
would not oust Congress of its Constitution-granted authority 
over choice-of-law. Courts’ choice-of-law rules hence would be 
akin to dormant commerce clause doctrine: dormant commerce 
clause rules created by courts, regarding matters that Congress 
could (but has not) regulated under the Commerce Clause, do 
not displace Congress’s commerce clause authority. Just as 
Congress may statutorily override judicial dormant commerce 
clause doctrines,444 so too Congress would not be bound by, but 
could reject, courts’ federal common law choice-of-law doctrines. 
And it is sensible that Congress have ultimate decision-making 
power over choice-of-law rules for the reasons explained 
above.445 
IV.  POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS, AND CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM 
FOR THE FUTURE   
A. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
A ready template of objections to this Article’s argument 
can be found in the strong defenses of Klaxon that were pro-
pounded by an all-star lineup of scholars from two generations 
ago, including Professors David Cavers and Alfred Hill.  
Klaxon’s defenders made an array of arguments to the ef-
fect that overruling Klaxon would diminish “uniformity and 
certainty in the choice-of-law rules.”446 Overruling Klaxon would 
lead to forum-shopping “since, as in pre-Erie days, counsel 
could shop without sending cases off to other states, often with-
out having the case leave counsel’s home town.”447 They also ar-
gued that overruling Klaxon would create uncertainty in con-
troversies involving two states with the same choice-of-law 
rules since federal courts might choose altogether different 
choice-of-law rules.448 But none of these objections applies to 
this Article’s argument, because they all presume the existence 
 
 444. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“It is well 
established that Congress may authorize the States to engage in regulation 
that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid.”); see also New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (standing for the same proposition, in 
holding that Congress may grant states the right to regulate interstate 
transportation of radioactive waste). 
 445. See supra notes 391–99. 
 446. Cavers, supra note 59, at 741. 
 447. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 222. 
 448. See Cavers, supra note 59, at 741. 
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of one choice-of-law rule in state courts and different federal 
rules in federal courts. Under the Single System Requirement 
championed in this Article, by contrast, a single choice-of-law 
regime would be applicable in all federal and state courts. 
There accordingly would be no incentive for intrastate forum 
shopping for superior choice-of-law rules, nor any incentive for 
interstate forum shopping for choice-of-law. 
Most of the arguments on Klaxon’s behalf are premised on 
the notion that choice-of-law is fundamentally a matter of state 
law. Thus, Professor Cavers’s primary claim, it is fair to say, 
was that overruling Klaxon would invade “state autonomy in 
determining the reach of state law.”449 Cavers rhetorically 
asked whether a “federal district judge [should] be empowered 
to curtail that state’s authority whenever the accident of diver-
sity litigation brings the state law within his jurisdictional 
reach?”450 and concluded a state should “be master of its own 
house.”451 Professor Hill and Professor Cheatham made similar 
arguments,452 as does the most recent edition of Hart & 
Wechsler’s Federal Courts when it asks “[c]an a federal court in 
State Y disregard the state’s choice of its own law without seri-
ously undermining a substantive state policy?”453  
The answer to all these objections is that while states have 
the prerogative to decide whether their law extends to an inter-
state matter (within the limits on prescriptive jurisdiction set 
by the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence), determining which 
of several states’ prima facie applicable laws applies is not the 
prerogative of any single state.454 As argued above, it instead is 
a federal function.455 The understanding that choice-of-law rule 
 
 449. See CAVERS, supra note 363, at 217.  
 450. Id. at 217–18. Cavers’s question also assumes that different choice-of-
law rules would apply in state courts, contrary to this Article’s claim. 
 451. Id. at 218. 
 452. Cheatham, Federal Control, supra note 17, at 588 (expressing concern 
about federalizing choice-of-law on account of “the destruction or diminution of 
state power, with the consequent weakening of local self-government. In 
conflict of laws it may be unwise, or at least premature, to sacrifice state 
independence and diversity.”); Hill, supra note 440, at 556 (arguing against 
federal choice-of-law rules on the ground that “the exercise of federal 
jurisdiction should not be the occasion for what would, in practical effect, be a 
substantial diminution of the power of a state, within its own borders, to 
vindicate its policies as against the competing policies of other states,” though 
noting that “[t]his is not an unshakable premise”). 
 453. FALLON, supra note 390, at 567. 
 454. For a similar argument, see Roosevelt, supra note 19, at 21. 
 455. See supra Part III.A. 
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is federal law accordingly does not invade “state autonomy”456 
or “undermin[e] a substantive state policy.”457 Rather, choice-of-
law is appropriately part of the federal law that determines the 
allowable scope of state autonomy and policies, helps establish 
the nature of our federal union, and maintains the health of our 
interstate federal system.  
The misconception that choice-of-law is state rather than 
federal law drives another argument propounded by Klaxon’s 
defenders. Cavers argued “the federal courts do not constitute a 
judicial system which is organized to execute the great respon-
sibility with which it would be entrusted” were Klaxon over-
ruled.458 Cavers believed that “[s]uch a system requires a su-
preme court;” “for the resolution of nonconstitutional choice-of-
law cases the federal courts do not have a supreme court, and 
clearly they should not have one.”459 What Cavers meant was 
that the Supreme Court had not been formulating choice-of-law 
rules,460 and that on account of “the great national importance 
of most of the problems with which it chooses to deal, the Court 
should not clog its docket with private litigation involving 
choice-of-law questions.”461 Other matters, Cavers asserted, 
were “far too important to be set aside for the perplexing 
choice-of-law problems that arise in private litigation.”462  
With all due respect, Professor Cavers’s argument here is 
180 degrees off the mark.463 A full appreciation of the many fed-
eral interests explained in this Article that are implicated by 
choice-of-law makes clear that the Supreme Court’s absence 
from choice-of-law has been costly and wrongheaded. It has 
kicked the can of choice-of-law to the states, which are not re-
sponsible for, are uninterested in, and incapable of responsibly 
formulating rules that guard federal interests, and which are 
 
 456. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 217. 
 457. FALLON, supra note 390, at 567. 
 458. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 220–21. 
 459. Id. at 221. 
 460. Cavers, supra note 59, at 738 (noting that deciding cases that “can 
give direction to, and impose uniformity upon, the courts subordinate to it . . . 
is a function which clearly the Supreme Court of the United States has not 
been discharging with respect to diversity cases involving choice-of-law 
problems for many decades”). 
 461. CAVERS, supra note 363, at 221 n.40 (emphasis added). 
 462. Cavers, supra note 59, at 739. 
 463. Cavers’s descriptive claim likely builds on his assumption (discussed 
above) that Klaxon’s overruling would lead to separate state and federal 
choice-of-law regimes. After all, Supreme Court absenteeism is less likely 
where the choice-of-law operative in all courts is federal law. 
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incapable of achieving the uniformity demanded by the Single 
System Requirement that is a sine qua non of an effective sys-
tem of choice-of-law. The Supreme Court’s absenteeism is an 
argument for overturning—not keeping—Klaxon.  
Klaxon’s defenders raised two pragmatic arguments that 
apply to this Article’s proposal. The first is that overruling 
Klaxon would result in transition costs. The day after Klaxon 
were overruled, or recognized as having been legislatively over-
ruled, there would be uncertainty as to the applicable choice-of-
law rules.464 Further, as Cavers wrote, courts would be con-
fronted with “the existence of a substantial body of federal 
precedents (many of them over fifty years old)”—which by now 
are more than 100 years old, virtually all of which preceded the 
choice-of-law revolution.465 Would that old territorialist juris-
prudence, which was subject to the legal realists’ scathing cri-
tiques, be binding precedent? 
This is an important, but manageable, issue. There always 
are transition costs when moving from one legal regime to an-
other; such costs are not trumping reasons for maintaining the 
status quo, but must be considered in relation to the costs of 
not changing, which this Article has suggested are substantial. 
Further, transition costs can be contained. For example, the 
Supreme Court decision declaring Klaxon’s demise should ex-
plain that courts would not be limited by the old jurisprudence, 
and furthermore should provide a framework to guide the de-
velopment of federal choice-of-law doctrine. This Article is not 
the place to do this in great detail, though the Article’s final 
subpart provides some preliminary guideposts.466  
Perhaps the main anxiety animating Klaxon’s defenders 
was concern that overruling the case would short-circuit the 
choice-of-law revolution against territorialism that had just 
then begun.467 While these concerns may have been valid when 
they were made—in the early 1960s—it is difficult to credit 
them today. The alternatives to territorialism have had the op-
portunity to refine themselves for more than half a century 
 
 464. Indeed, the transition costs would be greater under this Article’s 
proposal than what Cavers et al. contemplated insofar as the uncertainty 
would extend to the choice-of-law rules in state courts. 
 465. Cavers, supra note 59, at 738. 
 466. See infra Part IV.B. 
 467. See Cavers, supra note 59, at 738 (stating that “an about-face on 
Klaxon would” lead federal courts to “turn[] their backs on the very process of 
change from which improvement in choice-of-law decisions is expected to 
come.”). 
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across more than fifty jurisdictions. And while Cavers could 
proclaim in 1959 that he “s[aw] no evidence that Klaxon has 
given rise to a crisis,”468 it is hard to believe he would say the 
same today, when sister states use nearly a half-dozen different 
choice-of-law methodologies.  
Another possible objection is that this Article ignores the 
lessons of history, namely the Supreme Court’s failed efforts in 
the 1930s, which it formally abandoned some decades later, to 
use the Full Faith and Credit Clause to generate choice-of-law 
rules.469 But this objection also fails. The Court’s aborted effort 
aimed at constitutionalizing choice-of-law doctrine, an exclu-
sively judicial task for all practical purposes. This was doomed 
to failure, for the criteria the Court thought guided choice-of-
law—a “balancing” of the competing states’ interests—is be-
yond courts’ capacities; like comparative impairment, it re-
quired prognostication as to facts and a balancing of incom-
mensurables.470  
By contrast, this Article understands judicial solutions to 
be statutory interpretation or provisional federal common law. 
Judicial doctrines hence would be subject to congressional revi-
sion. Choice-of-law accordingly would be jointly developed by 
courts and Congress. Institutional synergy is important be-
cause Congress has institutional characteristics crucial to de-
veloping intelligent choice-of-law rules, but is incapable of do-
ing so without judicial input.471  
B. CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM 
Perhaps the strongest objection to this Article’s proposal is 
skepticism that any acceptable choice-of-law regime can be ju-
 
 468. Cavers, supra note 59, at 753. 
 469. See supra Part I.C. In a moment of extraordinary candor, the Supreme 
Court explained “[w]e have, in the past, appraised and balanced state 
interests when invoking the Full Faith and Credit Clause to resolve conflicts 
between overlapping laws of coordinate States. This balancing approach 
quickly proved unsatisfactory. As Justice Robert H. Jackson . . . aptly 
observed, ‘it [is] difficult to point to any field in which the Court has more 
completely demonstrated or more candidly confessed the lack of guiding 
standards of a legal character than in trying to determine what choice of law is 
required by the Constitution.’ In light of this experience, we abandoned the 
balancing-of-interests approach under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.” 
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495–96 (2003) (citations 
omitted). 
 470. See supra notes 314–22. 
 471. See Rosen, Congress’s Primary Role, supra note 170, at 17–28; supra 
notes 391–399. Full explication of this must await another day. 
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dicially created, based on the less than satisfactory outcome of 
the twentieth century choice-of-law revolution in this country. 
History may be said to provide additional support for such sus-
picion, insofar as nearly 800 years of international efforts to 
generate choice-of-law rules472 has failed to yield a single widely 
accepted solution. America’s experience, in conjunction with the 
international efforts, may lead one to conclude that choice-of-
law grapples with intractable problems to which there are no 
good answers.473 
I believe, however, that such cynicism about improving 
choice-of-law is misplaced. To begin, only limited lessons can be 
drawn from international choice-of-law because there are two 
fundamental disconnects between domestic and international 
choice-of-law. First, sister states stand in a different relation-
ship to one another than do foreign countries. That factor alone 
means that choice-of-law rules that are appropriate when de-
ciding between French and German law may not properly gov-
ern domestic choice-of-law problems. Second, there is a far 
greater chance of achieving a uniform choice-of-law system 
within the United States than internationally—once it is rec-
ognized that choice-of-law is federal, and that it is under the ul-
timate checks of the Supreme Court and Congress.  
Further, justifiable frustrations with the past sixty years’ 
choice-of-law revolution cannot legitimately cast doubt on the 
possible success of this Article’s proposal, for two reasons. First, 
choice-of-law’s status as state law over the past half century 
has generated a multiplicity of choice-of-law regimes such that 
the Single System Requirement has not been met. The multi-
plicity of choice-of-law regimes accordingly undermines the effi-
cacy of each and every choice-of-law regime, making it impossi-
ble to definitively evaluate any one of them.  
Second, choice-of-law has been profoundly misunderstood 
since Klaxon, insofar as it has been viewed as a matter of “local 
polic[y]”474 that aims at advancing a state’s “governmental in-
terests,” when it in fact is fundamentally federal in character 
 
 472. See STORY, supra note 49, §§ 3–16 (providing historical overview of 
choice-of-law).  
 473. Cf. id. § 28 (endorsing the observation that “‘[w]hen so many men of 
great talents and learning are thus found to fail in fixing certain principles, we 
are forced to conclude, that they have failed, not from want of ability, but 
because the matter was not susceptible of being settled on certain principles 
. . . . [I]n the conflict of laws, it must often be a matter of doubt, which should 
prevail’” (quoting Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (n.s.) 569, 595–96 (La. 1827)). 
 474. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
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and purpose. This misconception itself has distorted choice-of-
law’s development, with the result that disappointments with 
the choice-of-law revolution cannot legitimately ground skepti-
cism about this Article’s proposal of reconceptualizing choice-of-
law as non-constitutional federal law.  
Indeed, the understanding that choice-of-law is federal law 
that must satisfy the Single System Requirement provides the 
proper—and, indeed, a very helpful—framework for the future 
development of choice-of-law rules. For example, a state court 
developing choice-of-law should not consider whether applying 
its law would advance its state’s interest, but must ask wheth-
er all state and federal courts plausibly could be expected to 
adopt its choice-of-law approach.475 This “generalizability re-
quirement” would eliminate many choice-of-law rules presently 
used.476 The generalizability requirement also identifies several 
insights from the choice-of-law revolution that would be com-
ponents of any federal choice-of-law: for example, false conflicts 
and comparative impairment. Further, the understanding that 
choice-of-law is federal permits identification of the overarching 
purposes that properly guide choice-of-law’s development: sup-
porting our federal system by facilitating the smooth operation 
of the interstate system while ensuring that states remain 
meaningfully empowered.  
This Article is not the place to fully work out the detailed 
doctrinal implications that follow from the understanding that 
choice-of-law is federal.477 In the end, it likely is the case that 
multiple choice-of-law solutions are conceptually and norma-
tively sound, and that what matters is that one—and only 
one—solution be operative at any point in time. And that, too, 
is something only federal law can accomplish in our post-Erie 
world. 
 
 475. Cf. Bellia, supra note 33, at 919 (making a similar argument about 
reasoning courts should use when generating federal common law). 
 476. For example, the requirement would eliminate Leflar’s best law 
approach, lex fori, and the rule used by Minnesota that was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in the Hague decision. See Allstate Insur. Co. v. Hague, 449 
U.S. 302 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota court’s application of Minnesota law 
in a circumstance where, virtually all commentators agree, that state had only 
three de minimis contacts with the parties and transaction, and another state 
had far more intense interests in having its law applied); see CURRIE ET AL., 
supra note 125, at 348 (“[C]onflicts scholars have made a cottage industry of 
criticizing the plurality opinion in Hague”). 
 477. I presently am at work on this project. 
